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Anxiety and depression are debilitating disorders that often co-occur. Their 
differentiation has important ramifications for theory and treatment. Beck’s (1976) 
Cognitive Content Specificity (CCS) hypothesis proposes that depression and anxiety are 
characterized by unique cognitive profiles that should be reflected, among other 
variables, in their cognitions. Further, the Balanced States of Mind model (BSOM; 
Schwartz, 1997) asserts that the cognitive ratio of positive to the sum of positive and 
negative cognitions is implicated in distinguishing various levels of pathology from 
optimal functioning. The present study used a cross-sectional design to compare the 
differentiating abilities of the CCS hypothesis and the joint CCS/BSOM model by 
examining depression and test anxiety-relevant positive and negative cognitions 
separately versus the BSOM cognitive ratios. Additionally, the specific interval 
predictions of the BSOM model were tested for test anxiety and depressive content. Four 
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groups of college women were selected from a larger sample of college women from a 
large public university: Depressed (n = 51), Test Anxious (n = 51), “Mixed” Depressed 
and Test Anxious (n = 51), and Control (n = 51). Findings indicated that the Depressed 
Group differed from Test Anxious Group on test anxious and depressive negative 
cognitions and BSOM ratios. Consistent with previous literature, positive anxious content 
yielded less specificity, as it failed to discriminate between test anxious and depressed 
groups. While the “Mixed” group was most dysfunctional, Controls showed a least 
dysfunctional cognitive profile on both cognitions and cognitive ratios. Thus, the 
quantitative parameters of the BSOM model with varying content were partially 
validated, with depressive content not fitting the predictions as well as test anxious 
content. Results support the integration of the CCS and BSOM models and the use of a 
specific anxiety disorder (i.e., test anxiety) as ways to improve depression-anxiety 
differentiation in nonclinical populations. Theoretical and treatment implications are 
highlighted, and limitations are discussed. 
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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Although usually adaptive in everyday life at short term and mild levels, if 
prolonged and severe, anxiety and depression can be debilitating conditions affecting 
both youths and adults. Depression and anxiety are prevalent in clinical as well as 
nonclinical populations and are found to occur more frequently in women than men, 
although almost equally in boys and girls (Mash & Barkley, 1996). Both anxiety and 
depression are challenging to conceptualize, as they can be viewed as moods, symptoms, 
syndromes (i.e., clusters of symptoms), or clinical disorders (i.e., syndromes with the 
additional criteria of frequency, severity, and length).  
Clinical disorders of anxiety and depression differ in their etiology, epidemiology, 
symptomatology, course, and correlates. However, it has been noted that clinically-
defined symptoms of anxiety disorders (e.g., difficulty concentrating, social withdrawal, 
fatigue, sleep disturbance) overlap with those of depressive disorders (Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual - Text Revision, 4
th
 ed., 2000). Furthermore, individuals with anxiety 
disorders have a high likelihood of having a coexisting, or comorbid depressive disorder 
and vice versa. Comorbidity is the co-occurrence of a disorder or condition in an 
individual with another psychological or medical condition. Clinical comorbidity rates of 
depression and anxiety disorders run as high as 60% (Brown & Barlow, 1992; Levine, 
Cole, Chengappa, & Gershon, 2001). Furthermore, self-report measures of anxious and 
depressive symptoms show relatively high intercorrelations in both referred and 
nonreferred populations (Dobson, 1985; Gotlib, 1984; Tanaka-Mitsumi & Kameoka, 
1986).  
Scholars in the field have argued about the nature of the connection between 
anxiety and depression since the early days of psychology. At present, it is widely agreed 
that anxiety and depression have some aspects in common, yet each has some 
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characteristics that seem to be distinct. Therefore, in addition to explaining the occurring 
overlap, a particularly relevant task in conceptualizating the anxiety-depression 
relationship is to determine their specificity by finding the unique features of each. Such 
differentiation has important benefits for theory, research, identification, and treatment of 
the conditions.  
Both depression and anxiety have strong physiological, cognitive, emotional and 
behavioral underpinnings, and there have been many attempts to explain their connection 
from various perspectives. However, it is cognitive theorists who have provided some of 
the most widely used and detailed explanations of the anxiety-depression connection. 
Cognitive theory postulates that cognitions mediate emotions and behavior and that 
cognitive factors are at the core of psychopathology. Many cognitive models of 
psychopathology assert that a biased cognitive system (i.e., cognitive structures, 
processes, and products) is an intrinsic part of the etiology and maintenance of the 
disorder and that emotional and behavioral responses are mediated by cognitive 
processes. Automatic thoughts are one cognitive construct that has been widely used in 
models attempting to differentiate between pathology and normalcy and between various 
disorders (D.A. Clark & Beck, 1989). 
Compared to those free of pathology, individuals with signs of abnormal 
functioning are hypothesized to show distortions in their thinking, including frequency 
(how often they think maladaptive thoughts), valence (how negative or positive the 
thoughts are), and content (dominant themes). The bulk of cognitive research 
investigating automatic thoughts has focused on valence. Negative thoughts have 
received the most empirical support for their role in psychological disorders and for 
helping differentiate between adaptive and maladaptive conditions. In fact, negative 
thinking has been a central topic of several influential models of psychopathology (e.g., 
Allport, 1937; A.T. Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1962, 1977) and is viewed by some as inherent in 
brain patterns (Gilbert, 1998). Positive thoughts are also considered relevant to 
psychopathology, as they are commonly seen enhancing well-being and helping people 
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cope with stress and adversity. Typically, excess or deficiency of positive or negative 
cognitions has been viewed as dysfunctional.  
In addition to cognitive theory, social psychology and mathematical psychology 
have also uniquely contributed to a conceptualization of psychopathology and the 
cognition-affect relationship by providing a concept of ‘balance’. Within a balance 
framework, significant deviation from an optimal set point is considered maladaptive. 
Therefore, psychopathology is not gauged as presence or absence of certain symptoms 
but as relative to a stable numeric cognitive-affective balance point. In accordance with 
this notion, Robert Schwartz and his colleagues proposed the States of Mind (SOM) 
model (Schwartz & Garamoni, 1986, 1989), which was later reformulated and termed the 
Balanced States of Mind (BSOM) model (Schwartz, 1997). This model specifies theory-
based precise set-points and intervals for the normal, pathological, and optimal 
functioning. The ratios delineating intervals equal to a proportion of positive cognitions 
in a sum of both negative and positive cognitions.  
For several decades, cognitive scholars have made and tested predictions 
regarding differentiation between anxiety and depression based on the elements of their 
cognitive systems, including automatic cognitions. Much of the research has focused on 
Aaron Beck’s cognitive content specificity hypothesis, which suggests that cognitive 
profiles of anxiety and depression differ, among other things, in themes of their 
respective thoughts, i.e., loss and deprivation content in depression and threat content in 
anxiety (A.T. Beck, 1976). Additionally, in his cognitive theory of depression, Beck 
(A.T. Beck & Rush, 1978; A.T. Beck et al., 1979) hypothesized that depressed 
individuals have relatively more negative thoughts about self, the world, and the future, 
and relatively less positive cognitions, compared to other disorders, such as anxiety. 
Although a few studies substantiated original content specificity claims in terms 
of cognitive themes in depression and anxiety (e.g., A.T. Beck, et al., 1987; D.A. Clark, 
Beck, & Brown, 1989), the uniqueness of depressive negative content did not gain wide 
support. Specifically, depression and various types of anxiety have been both associated 
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with high negative thinking when compared to a lack of psychopathology (Beidel, 
Turner, & Dancu, 1985; Blankstein, Flett, Boase, & Toner, 1991; Bruch, Kaflowitz, & 
Kuethe, 1986; Crandell & Chambless, 1986; Dobson & Shaw, 1986; Harrel & Ryon, 
1983; Kendall & Hollon, 1989; Ross, Gottfredson, Christensen, & Weaver, 1986). 
Moreover, negativity of affect has been found to be specific to depression but to 
distressed individuals in general (e.g., D.A. Clark, Steer, Beck, 1994; Steer, Clark, Beck, 
& Ranieri, 1995).  The tripartite model proposed by L.A. Clark and Watson (1991) 
explained those findings by suggesting that depression and anxiety share a basic common 
factor of negative affectivity, which results in high frequency of negative cognitions. Low 
positive affectivity and low frequency of positive cognitions are viewed as unique to 
depression; high physiological arousal is seen as unique to anxiety. There has been some 
empirical support for the cognitive predictions of the tripartite model (R. Beck, Benedict, 
& Winkler, 2003; R. Beck et al., 2001; D.A. Clark, Steer, & Beck, 1994; Jolly, Dyck, 
Kramer, & Wherry, 1994; Jolly & Kramer, 1994; McKellar, Malcarne, & Ingram, 1996). 
However, despite extensive testing, neither Beck’s model nor the tripartite model alone 
has garnered unequivocal empirical backing. Evidence of specificity has been stronger 
for depression than anxiety, for adults rather than children or adolescents, and for 
psychiatric populations rather than nonclinical populations.  
Ambiguity in empirical findings has prompted researchers to investigate 
alternative ways of looking for cognitive content specificity of anxiety and depression via 
integration of different models (e.g., R. Beck et al., 2001; Mineka, Watson, & Clark, 
1998; Ronan & Kendall, 1997). Although the BSOM model has not been tested 
extensively within the context of cognitive specificity, it lends itself to specific 
predictions and can be utilized for cognitive content differentiation. Preliminary evidence 
supports this integration (Calvete, Estévez, Landín et al., 2005).  
In addition, cognitive researchers have speculated that since specific anxiety 
disorders and maladaptive states (e.g., test anxiety) exhibit less comorbidity with 
depression than more generalized forms of anxiety, using specific types of anxiety may 
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contribute to successful anxiety-depression differentiation (Ingram, Kendall, Smith, 
Donnell, & Ronan, 1987). As a syndrome, test anxiety shares several cognitive 
components with depression, including frequent negative thoughts and infrequent 
positive thoughts. Although specificity of depression and several anxiety disorders has 
been addressed in many studies (Bruch, Mattia, Heimberg, & Holt, 1993; Cho & Telch, 
2005; Woody, Taylor, & McLean, 1998), the relationship between test anxiety and 
depression has received little attention from empirical researchers (for exceptions, see 
Ingram et al., 1987; Sanz & Avia, 1994).  
The current dissertation study was designed to address the limitations in the 
current body of literature and aimed to establish whether integrating the BSOM model 
with CCS models would prove a useful aid in differentiating test anxiety from depression. 
The study investigated cognitive content specificity of test anxiety and depression in 
nonclinical college women by testing syndrome-specific cognitive content alone versus 
the BSOM ratios of positive and negative cognitions. Additionally, the predictions of the 
BSOM model regarding specific ratio intervals were examined.    
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
To help the reader better understand the theoretical underpinnings driving the 
study, first, issues in the relationship between psychopathological conditions are 
reviewed. Second, conceptualization of anxiety and depression, followed by the 
discussion on how to view the link between them is presented. An overview of the 
cognitive system in psychopathology in general and anxiety and depression in particular 
follows. More specifically, the role of cognitive system components, particularly 
automatic thoughts, in anxiety and depression are explored. Further, the content 
specificity issues in anxiety and depression are addressed and the models accounting for 
specific aspects of the two conditions are summarized. Empirical evidence to support the 
cognitive content specificity hypothesis in anxiety disorders and depression is then 
examined. Finally, test anxiety is introduced as a syndrome showing specificity within 
the class of anxiety disorders. Relevant issues including conceptualization, cognitive 
system, and empirical research within the framework of specificity models are covered 
throughout. 
2.1 Capturing the Relationship between Maladaptive States 
It has been noted that many frequently-occurring psychopathological states have 
common features and a person diagnosed with one psychiatric disorder is likely to exhibit 
one or several comorbid maladaptive conditions (L.A. Clark, Watson, & Reynolds, 1995; 
Lilienfeld, Waldman, & Israel, 1995). Youths often manifest co-occurring maladaptive 
affective and behavioral conditions (Mash & Barkley, 1996) but adults, including college 
students, have also been found to have high comorbidity rates (Gotlib, 1984; Rosenthal & 
Schreiner, 2000). Discussion of comorbidity is relevant to the topic of conceptualizing a 
relationship between psychological disorders or maladaptive states.  
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Comorbidity in psychopathology may be real or an artifact of methodology 
(Ingram, 1989a). True comorbidity may reflect the fact that overlapping conditions both 
theoretically and empirically represent interrelated affective states with co-occurring 
cognitive, physiological, and motivational symptoms (Ingram, 1989b), same or similar 
etiology and concomitants, or one disorder may serve as a risk factor for the other one 
(D.A. Clark et al., 1999; Watson & Kendall, 1989). Some argue that the overlap can be 
explained by methodological limitations and fuzziness in the diagnostic criteria. Current 
empirical data indicate that comorbidity of psychological disorders cannot be solely 
attributed to methodological issues or to chance (Widiger & Clark, 2000). There is 
emerging evidence that both genetic and environmental factors (e.g., childhood and adult 
adversity) are responsible for the frequently observed co-occurrence both directly (e.g., as 
a common risk factor) and indirectly (e.g., through their influence on prevalence) 
(Widiger & Clark).  
The issue of comorbidity is further complicated by a lack of theoretical consensus 
in conceptualization of psychopathological states, which can be seen as continuous or 
categorical variables. The medical model, exemplified by the DSM-IV-TR of the 
American Psychiatric Association (2000), adheres to a categorical view. From a clinical 
perspective, comorbidity means an overlap of not just symptoms of the disorders but, 
more importantly, of their diagnoses (D.A. Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999). Comorbidity of 
clinically-defined disorders and resulting validity issues have given an impetus for the 
growing wave of dissatisfaction with the categorical nosology, despite its wide use for 
diagnosis, especially in the light of development of the new edition of the DSM (Trull & 
Durrett, 2005; Watson, 2005; Widiger & Clark, 2000). The dichotomous diagnostic 
system (either meeting the threshold criteria or not) prohibits one from identifying 
conditions that are not as severe, i.e., subclinical or prodromal. It also results in lower 
comorbidity rates, as some symptoms are frequently subsumed by several disorders 
(Brown & Barlow, 1992). It does, however, allow for some flexibility associated with the 
dimensional view, as a pathological condition is also distinguished from the normal one 
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on the basis of intractability, pervasiveness, and the degree of interference with daily 
routine (Mash & Barkley, 1996) and there is no assumption that each category within the 
manual is discrete (DSM-IV-TR, 2000).  
Dimensional classifications of psychopathology (Achenbach, 1993; Frances, 
Widiger, & Fyer, 1990) are currently gaining momentum. Advocates of the dimensional 
approach place disorders on a continuum, with a low level of disorder expression 
(associated with adaptive functioning) on one end and severe manifestation of the 
condition (associated with psychopathology) on the other. Opponents of the categorical 
model have made a convincing argument, citing the many limitations of the categorical 
approach, such as extensive diagnostic co-occurrence, inadequate diagnostic coverage 
(whereby some conditions are not adequately captured by categories), arbitrary nature of 
boundaries between pathological and “normal” functioning, and heterogeneity among 
people with the same diagnosis (see Widiger & Trull, 2007, for a review). Although it is 
possible that an optimal system lies somewhere in between (Mash & Barkley, 1996), it 
has been recommended that future editions of the DSM strive to move towards 
categorical dimensions by developing “meaningful quantitative points of demarcation 
along more continuous distributions of functioning (Widiger & Clark, 2000, p.950 
Due to the recent findings of comorbidity between various psychological 
disorders, it has become apparent that many variables previously believed to be specific 
to a particular disorder may no longer be considered unique. Therefore, theorists and 
researchers have been searching for the ways to capture not only commonalties across 
psychopathology but, more importantly, critical features of the disorder that are typical of 
that disorder and not typical of the others (i.e., specificity). The knowledge of factors that 
contribute to the unique variance in specific disorders has important implications because 
it is essential for the understanding of their “etiology, course, exacerbation, and, 
eventually, alleviation” (Bruch et al., 1993, p. 3). Among various maladaptive conditions 
that demonstrate a high level of comorbidity are depression and anxiety. The relationship 
between the two has been a basis for many models and has generated much research. 
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Before addressing their connection, the concepts of anxiety and depression are 
introduced. Their course, prevalence, and differences in manifestation between men and 
women also are discussed.  
2.2 Anxiety 
2.2.1 Conceptualization 
It is not by chance that the twentieth century was named the age of anxiety. The 
interest towards the anxiety phenomenon is not likely to wane in the twenty-first century. 
Anxiety is a basic human emotion and, as such, has a great appeal to scientists, clinicians, 
and lay people alike. Although it is widely agreed that anxious reactions may at times be 
adaptive and are involved in the primal mechanisms that help people survive in a 
threatening environment, consistent exaggeration of the existing danger is likely to cause 
severe impairment of the everyday functioning.  
As an affect, anxiety may accompany most psychological disorders. In addition to 
being viewed as an affect, anxiety is viewed as a symptom, syndrome, and a clinical 
disorder. It becomes a symptom leading to a syndrome or a disorder only when 
objectively uncomfortable or is perceived to be out of control (Julien, 2001). Anxiety 
disorders are a genetically-diverse group (Mineka, Watson, & Clark, 1998). DSM-IV-TR 
(2000) lists two anxiety syndromes, i.e., agoraphobia (anxiety about or avoidance of 
places or situations from which escape might be difficult) and panic attack (a period of 
the sudden onset of intense fear associated with impending doom, characterized by 
shortness of breath, chest pain, choking sensations, and fear of going crazy or losing 
control). Both are used to diagnose the following common adult clinical anxiety 
disorders: (1) panic disorder (PD) with or without agoraphobia (i.e., recurrent unexpected 
panic attacks with or without agoraphobia symptoms); (2) agoraphobia without history 
of panic disorder; (3) specific phobia (i.e., anxiety provoked by exposure to a specific 
fear object or situation); (4) social phobia (i.e., anxiety provoked by exposure to social or 
performance situations); (5) obsessive-compulsive disorder or OCD (characterized by 
obsessions and compulsions that serve to neutralize anxiety); (6) posttraumatic stress 
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disorder or PTSD (re-experiencing a traumatic event accompanied by increased arousal); 
and (7) generalized anxiety disorder or GAD (at least 6 months of persistent and 
excessive anxiety). Clinical classification of anxiety reflects diversity of its expression 
but fails to entirely capture its nature. The construct of anxiety has been subject to a 
debate of proponents of dimensional and categorical views discussed above. Current 
evidence seems to point to the benefits of a continuity hypothesis (Flett, Vredenberg, & 
Krames, 1997; cited in Endler & Kocovski, 2001). 
Moreover, anxiety is an ambiguous construct, having been defined as a state, a 
trait, a drive, a motive, a stimulus, and a response (Endler & Kocovski, 2001). Anxiety is 
widely believed to have physiological (autonomic arousal), cognitive (thoughts about 
danger), emotional (feelings of fear, dread, apprehension), motivational, and behavioral 
(escape/avoidance) components. Another vivid example of heterogeneity of anxiety is its 
trait and state distinction. A trait is a “generalized and enduring predisposition to react to 
many situations in a consistent manner” (Endler & Kocovski, 2001, p. 233). In contrast to 
trait anxiety, state anxiety is anxiety in a specific situation, which is usually transient and 
varies depending on circumstances. Researchers acknowledge that both state and trait 
components, as well as their interaction, may cause significant impairment in an 
individual’s functioning (Spielberger & Vagg, 1995).  
Research in anxiety and anxiety disorders has been prolific. Theories of general 
anxiety have been too numerous to list them all and represent various schools of thought, 
e.g., psychodynamic, personality, learning, social, motivational, and cognitive-
behavioral. Examples of notable theoretical contributions to the field of anxiety feature 
Freud (1924), Allport (1937), Spielberger (1975), Eysenck (1979, 1992, 1997), Endler 
(1975, 1983; Endler & Magnusson, 1976), and Barlow (1988). Most recent theories of 
anxiety use a transactional or integrative approach to accommodate for the multifaceted 
nature of the phenomenon (Endler, 1997; Endler, Crooks, & Parker, 1992). However, due 
to the complexity of anxiety, there is still much to be learned about how it affects our 
well-being.  
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2.2.2 Prevalence and Course of Anxiety 
Anxiety disorders are some of the most widespread psychological disorders in 
young people and adults. Although a few childhood-onset anxiety or anxiety-related 
disorders (e.g., separation anxiety disorder, selective mutism) typically resolve 
themselves by adolescence, most anxiety conditions often persist throughout later years. 
The prevalence and course of different adult anxiety disorders vary considerably. The 
start of panic disorder is typically between late adolescence and mid-40s. Specific 
phobias are thought to start in early childhood or adolescence. Social phobia starts in 
early to middle adolescence. OCD is less frequent and is found to typically manifest itself 
in adolescence or early adulthood. PTSD can occur at any age, with a wide variation in 
the duration of symptoms. Generalized anxiety disorder is chronic and generally begins 
in childhood and adolescence (DSM-IV-TR, 2000). 
Most community studies with adults report the following lifetime prevalence of 
clinical anxiety disorders: PD – 1% - 3.5%; agoraphobia without PD – 5.3%; specific 
phobia (depending on the study’s criteria for selection and the type of phobia) – 7.2% -  
11.3%; social phobia – 3% - 13%; PTSD – 8%; and GAD – 5% (Mackinaw-Koons & 
Vasey, 2000; Parker & Hadzi-Pavlovic, 2001). One-year prevalence is as follows: PD – 
0.5% - 1.5% (with much higher prevalence, up to 60%, reported in clinical populations); 
specific phobias – 4% - 8.8%; and GAD – 3% (DSM-IV-TR, 2000; Mackinaw-Koons & 
Vasey, 2000). The overall rate of nonclinical generalized anxiety symptoms appears to be 
high in college populations. In Rosenthal and Schreiner’s (2000) study of an ethnically-
diverse student sample, 7.3% of surveyed participants in an urban college reported a high 
level of anxiety, while more than half of the sample (51.8%) endorsed at least moderate 
levels of anxiety. 
 
2.2.3 Sex Differences in Anxiety 
Before the differences in anxiety between men and women can be addressed, the 
author must clarify that in this manuscript, the term ‘sex differences’ (which is described 
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as a “biological distinction” in the Publication Manual of the American Psychological 
Association, APA, 1997, p. 47) will be used rather than ‘gender differences’. This does 
not, however, imply that the observed differences are always biological in nature 
(Mackinaw-Koons & Vasey, 2000).  
Anxiety symptoms and anxiety disorders are frequently documented to be more 
common among women than men. On self-report measures of anxious symptoms, girls 
consistently score higher and endorse more cognitive anxiety symptoms than boys, as 
well as more general and specific symptoms (e.g., social evaluative concerns). This trend 
is similar across cultures and continues into adulthood (Mackinaw-Koons & Vasey, 
2000). Sex differences in clinical anxiety disorders have also been found. Most 
community lifetime prevalence rates and incidence samples across the globe show a 
preponderance of adult women over men in the following: GAD (more so in adolescence, 
3:1, and less in adulthood, 1.5:1, although with significant variations across cultures); PD 
with or without agoraphobia and specific phobias (possibly 2-3 times more frequent in 
women than in men, averaging 1.63 across cultures); agoraphobia without history of PD; 
social phobia (more pronounced differences exist in childhood but tend to disappear in 
adulthood); and PTSD (DSM-IV-TR, 2000; Gater et al., 1998; Mackinaw-Koons & 
Vasey). Finally, empirical investigations of OCD have yielded inconsistent results, with 
more recent data pointing to sex differences in adulthood rather than occurring equally 
among men and women (DSM-IV-TR, 2000; Mackinaw-Koons & Vasey). A review of 
research with college students by Rosenthal and Schreiner (2000) yielded ambiguous 
results, with women either reporting higher anxiety than men on self-report measures or 
not manifesting any differences. In their own sample, college women had significantly 
higher anxiety scores than men, but the magnitude of sex differences was small 
(Rosenthal & Schreiner). 
Psychosocial variables, such as social support, self-esteem, and coping skills, do 
not seem to contribute substantially to the sex disparities (Lewinsohn, Gotlib, Lewinsohn, 
Seeley, & Allen, 1998). However, differences in parental control (e.g., overprotection) 
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may be related to differential anxiety manifestation (Rapee, 1997). Additionally, 
researchers note that sex differences in anxiety are at least partially due to the social 
desirability factor, i.e., males being less willing to report anxiety (Mackinaw-Koons & 
Vasey, 2000). Further, the impairment in girls reporting high levels of anxiety may not be 
as high as that of boys reporting similar levels, yielding a possibility of differential 
interpretation of anxiety across sexes (Mackinaw-Koons & Vasey).  
2.2.4 Summary 
Anxiety evidences diversity in expression and, therefore, is difficult to measure 
and conceptualize. It has state and trait components, as well as cognitive, physiological, 
behavioral, and emotional aspects. Anxiety is as the core of several clinical disorders. As 
an affect and as a symptom, anxiety is widespread in general population, including 
college students. When maladaptive, anxiety can lead to the development of anxiety 
disorders. On the average, girls and women report higher levels of general and specific 
anxiety symptoms and have higher rates of most clinical anxiety disorders than boys and 
men, making anxiety disorders prevalent across life span. In college students, however, 
sex differences have not received consistent support, although a trend of women scoring 




Depression, which is often considered the most common of all psychological 
disorders, causes serious impairment in the overall functioning of children and adults 
alike (Gotlib, Roberts, & Gilboa, 1996). Similar to anxiety, various meanings of 
depression have been proposed, i.e., a normal mood state that can turn into a pathological 
one, a symptom, a syndrome involving related non-mood symptoms, and a diagnostic 
entity (L.A. Clark & Watson, 1991; Hollon & Kendall, 1980). Depression has cognitive 
(e.g., thoughts of loss), affective (e.g., sad mood), behavioral (e.g., regression, 
withdrawal), and physiological (parasympathetic system activation) components. 
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Depressive or sad mood is a universal experience that lies within the normal broad range 
of emotion (D.A. Clark et al., 1999) and can be viewed as typical under some 
circumstances, such as significant loss (e.g., loss of a job or loss of a loved one).  
Depressive disorders in the DSM-IV-TR (2000) belong to a category of mood 
disorders. The two essential types of depressive disorders are major depressive disorder 
(MDD) and dysthymic disorder (DD). The term ‘depressive episode’ is a syndromal 
definition of depression and is used for a diagnosis of major depression, if certain 
symptoms last for a two-week period. A depressive episode, in addition to depressed 
mood, encompasses a loss of pleasure in almost all daily activities (whereby an individual 
cannot experience positive moods, even when good things happen, i.e., anhedonia), 
weight fluctuation/appetite and appetite disturbance, sleep disturbance, fatigue, feelings 
of worthlessness, difficulties in thinking and concentration, psychomotor agitation or 
retardation, and suicidal ideation or attempts (DSM-IV-TR, 2000). To meet the criteria for 
dysthymia, one has to have a depressed mood most of the day for more days than not, for 
at least two years. Also, other symptoms, e.g., appetite disturbance, sleep disturbance, 
low energy, low self-esteem, poor concentration, and feelings of hopelessness must be 
present. Dysthymia sometimes co-occurs with major depression (a combination known as 
‘double depression’).  
It must be noted that in the DSM-IV, disorders that involve cyclical depressive 
affect that is associated with another affect (i.e., bipolar depression) are conceptualized 
differently from those involving depressive affect only (i.e., unipolar depression). In this 
manuscript, only unipolar expression of depression will be considered. Additionally, the 
term ‘dysphoria’ (not to be confused with ‘dysthymia’) is sometimes used in clinical 
literature. Dysphoria is not a clinical disorder but rather a feature or symptom of many 
psychiatric disorders, including anxiety disorders and mood disorders. It is typically 
described as an unpleasant or uncomfortable mood, such as sadness (depressed mood) 
mixed with anxiety, irritability, or restlessness (retrieved February 26, 2007, from 
http://www.answers.com/topic/dysphoria). It is also commonly associated with low-level 
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or subclinical pathology. Gotlib (1984) proposed to use the terms ‘dysphoria’, ‘malaise’, 
and ‘general psychological distress’ interchangeably.  
Depression has been widely viewed as a recurrent state (Dobson, 1985), although 
there exists a much disputed category of a Depressive Personality Disorder (DPD, 
included in the DSM-IV-TR, 2000 appendix). Additionally, some believe syndrome 
depression to be relatively homogeneous, especially compared to anxiety (e.g., A.T. Beck 
et al., 2003), whereas others think that it has many facets and should be subtyped (e.g., 
Keller & Nesse, 2006; Weissenberger & Rush, 1996). The current DSM version makes an 
attempt to differentiate between the subtypes of depression, e.g., melancholic versus non-
melancholic and typical versus atypical. Additionally, the DSM-IV-TR appendix 
incorporates several conditions with a mood (depression) component that need further 
study (e.g., minor depressive disorder, recurrent brief depressive disorder, and 
premenstrual dysphoric disorder). There have been attempts to further differentiate 
between the types of depression beyond the DSM classification, e.g., endogenous 
(biologically-based) versus reactive (event-activated) (Beckham et al., 1995; 
Weissenberger & Rush, 1996); state versus trait (Endler, Macrodimitris, & Kocovski, 
2000); somatic (Silverstein, 1999, 2002; both cited in Halbreich & Kahn, 2007); and 
hopelessness depression (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989). 
Proponents of the dimensional view contend that depression occurs along a 
continuum and it is appropriate to use nonclinical samples to examine it (Flett, Hewitt, 
Endler, & Bagby, 1995; Vredenberg et al., 1993; cited in Endler et al., 1998). Syndrome 
severity has been proposed as a distinguishing factor in depression (e.g., Sullivan, 
Kessler, & Kendler, 1998). Depression has been a popular subject of many models and 
empirical studies. One of the most influential approaches to its understanding has been 
based on a cognitive theory, drawing on the writings of A. Beck (1967, 1976), Ellis 
(1962), and Seligman (1975) and his colleagues (e.g., Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 
1978; Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989). 
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2.3.2 Prevalence and Course of Depression 
Depression is highly prevalent among adolescents and adults. Dysthymia typically 
starts in late childhood/early adolescence or appears later in life, as remittance of the 
major depressive disorder. MDD can start at any age, with most cases starting in early 
adulthood (DSM-IV-TR, 2000). The available longitudinal research suggests that 
depressive episodes in youths remit, yet tend to be of longer duration than those of adults, 
with children suffering from relapses and persistent dysfunction (Kovacs, 1996; Nolen-
Hoeksema, Girgus, & Seligman, 1986).  
 Although most agree that depression is often transient, if untreated, it can assume 
a chronic course (Segal & Dobson, 1992), result into serious maladjustment, and lead to 
suicide (McDermott, Hawkins, Littlefield, & Murray, 1989). Kaelber, Moul, and Farmer 
(1995) note that nearly 30% of people in general population may experience depressive 
symptoms for at least two weeks throughout their lifetime, with age groups 18 - 29 and 
30 - 44 years old reporting the most symptoms. Lifetime incidence is estimated as 
follows: major depression – 4.9%-14.9%, major depressive episode – 6.3% - 17.1%, and 
dysthymia – 3.2% - 6.4% (Kaelber et al., 1995).  
As early as 1978, Beck and Young approximated that one out of four college 
students would have depression in various forms during their college career (cited in 
Nagelberg et al, 1983). Currently, depression appears to be on the rise in college 
populations and younger people in general (D. A. Clark et al., 1999; Nagelberg, 
Pillsbury, & Balzer, 1983), although the notion of it being an epidemic in children has 
been debated (see Costello, Erkanli, & Angold, 2006). Many college students have 
depression of varying severity that goes undiagnosed, and depression rates are higher in 
college students than in non-students and are associated with suicide and dropout 
(Nagelberg et al., 1983). In Nagelberg et al.’s study, 23.7% of the total class attendees 
reported depression, with 7.5% of total sample falling into the moderate to severe range. 
In a more recent survey of college students by Rosenthal and Schreiner (2000), 12.6% of 
the total nonreferred college sample endorsed high level of depression, whereas 41.6% 
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endorsed at least a moderate level. Younger students reported higher levels of depression 
than those over 25 years old (Rosenthal & Schreiner).  It has been argued that depression 
in students is a conceptually different entity than that in clinical populations (Coyne & 
Gotlib, 1983; cited in Endler et al., 1998). Its uniqueness may lie in that it does not 
include a vegetative component (e.g., lack of sleep, loss of sexual drive, and loss of 
appetite) and remits rapidly (Endler et al.). Most of the data on the prevalence of 
depression come from clinical studies, and there is still much to be done to shed the light 
on the manifestation of this disorder in college students (McDermott, Hawkins, 
Littlefield, & Murray, 1989). 
2.3.3 Sex Differences in Depression 
It is generally found that women evidence more depressive symptoms than men. 
Sex differences, with depression prevalence among women 1.5 times to 3 times more 
than men (average ratio 2:1 in developed countries), have been long established through 
literature reviews (Weissman & Klerman, 1977) and replicated in various studies both 
national and international (Culbertson, 1997; Gater et al., 1998; Kaelber et al., 1995; 
Kessler, McGonagle, Swartz, et al., 1993; Weismann, Bland, & Canino, 1996). Women 
are also more often diagnosed and treated for depression than men and have a higher 
lifetime risk for Major Depressive Disorder (DSM-IV-TR, 2000). Among children, boys 
are equally or even more likely to be diagnosed with depressive syndromes (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1987). Once puberty starts, significantly more girls than boys report 
depression, and the magnitude of differences wanes in old age (Jorm, 1987; Kessler et al., 
1993; Mash & Barkley, 1996), although mid- to late adulthood may also see an increase 
in depression (Parker & Hadzi-Pavlovic, 2004). 
Sex ratio holds for clinical as well as nonclinical populations (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1990; cited in Brems, 1995). Rosenthal and Schreiner (2000) indicated that although 
depression in college students has been well researched, sex differences did not receive 
consistent support in many studies. In their study, Rosenthal and Schreiner found that 
although the differences in self-reported depression symptoms between college women 
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and men were significant, the magnitude of differences was small. Yet recent research 
continues to lend support to the statement that college women endorse higher levels of 
depression on self-report measures than men (e.g., Carmody, 2005). 
Literature yields several explanations that account for the existing differences. 
The hypotheses of differential treatment seeking, differential reporting, and flawed 
methodology have not been substantiated (Amenson & Lewinsohn, 1981; Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1990; Weissman & Klerman, 1985; all cited in Brems, 1995). Biological 
models suggest that depression may be genetically-based or related to the female 
reproductive cycle, as in the case of premenstrual and postpartum syndromes and 
menopause (Burt & Stein, 2002). Currently, there is not enough evidence to support 
biological hypotheses unequivocally (Beckham, Leber, & Youll, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1987; Petersen et al., 1993). However, a similar relative preponderance of women over 
men across the globe found in both industrialized and less industrialized countries (see 
Gater et al., 1998) could potentially attest to the importance of biological factors in the 
etiology of depression. Psychosocial accounts of depression involve such depression 
correlates as socioeconomic factors (e.g., socioeconomic status, income, employment, 
and education), social roles and social support issues, discrimination, socialization and 
personality development, and interpersonal violence (e.g., sexual harassment, rape, 
spouse abuse, and history of childhood sexual abuse). There has been considerable 
empirical support for the notion that depression is related to women being socially 
disadvantaged (for a review of literature, see Brems, 1995). Although no one model 
appears to account for the magnitude of differences sufficiently, the depression sex ratio 
does not appear to stem from methodological or other types of confounding and is most 
likely to be a result of a complex interplay between biological and psychosocial factors 
(Gater et al., 1998; Kaelber et al., 1995).   
2.3.4 Summary 
Depressive affect is common; however, if severe, prolonged, and untreated, it can 
cause severe impairment in all areas of functioning and lead to suicide. Depression is 
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complex and encompasses physiological, affective, behavioral, and cognitive signs. In a 
clinical field, depressed mood is included in several disorders as a symptom. However, 
categorically-based diagnostic tools fail to account for other maladaptive conditions 
involving depressive states, and the best system of depression classification is still to be 
devised. Depression rates run high among adolescents and adults (including clinical and 
nonclinical samples) and are particularly high in college students. On average, depression 
is seen twice as often in women than men, with sex differences first appearing in 
adolescence and somewhat equivocal support for sex differences among college students.  
 
2.4 Relationship Between Anxiety and Depression 
2.4.1 Comorbidity of Anxiety and Depression 
Although anxiety is not the only comorbid condition of depression, it is by far the 
most common and robust one (D. A. Clark et al., 1999; L. A. Clark, 1989). It is 
noteworthy that current first-line treatment for both depression and anxiety symptoms is 
antidepressants, indicating a possibility of a similar neurological basis. Further, certain 
anxiety disorders (e.g., GAD) share genetic susceptibility and linkage to depression 
(Kendler, 1996; Kendler et al., 1995, cited in Widiger & Clark, 2000). Correlations 
between anxiety and depression have been frequently found in diverse subject samples 
and with various types of assessment (Watson & Kendall, 1989). Comorbidity rates of 
anxiety and depression have reported to range from 15% to 75%, with children and 
adolescents showing the highest co-occurrence (L.A. Clark, 1989; Kessler et al., 1996; 
both cited in Mineka et al., 1998; Kovacs, 1990; cited in Petersen et al., 1993; Rhode, 
Lewinson, & Seeley, 1991; Young, Mufson, & Davies, 2006). Comorbid depression-
anxiety expression in adults and adolescents is often associated with an earlier onset of 
depressive symptoms, more severity, more persistence, poorer post-treatment outcomes, 
greater impairment in social and occupational functioning, greater use of mental health 
services and medications, and a greater risk of suicide than “pure” symptomatic 
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expression (e.g., Fava et al., 2000; Joormann, Kosfelder, & Schulte, 2005; Lewinsohn et 
al., 1997; Mineka et al., 1998; Moffitt et al., 2007; Pine et al., 1998; Young et al., 2006).   
In terms of a temporal relationship between anxiety and depression, several 
findings have emerged, pointing to either anxiety or co-occurring anxiety/depression 
condition preceding major depression and/or serving as a risk factor for future 
depression, but not vice versa (Alloy, Kelly, Mineka, & Clements, 1990; Kendler et al., 
2002; Lewinsohn et al., 2000; Mineka et al., 1998; Pine et al., 2001; Parker et al., 1999; 
Rhode, Lewinson, & Seeley, 1991). It is argued that depression without anxiety is much 
more rare than anxiety without depression (Mineka et al., 1998). Overall, there appears to 
be much stronger evidence that “pure” anxiety tends to develop into a mixed depression-
anxiety condition rather than “pure” depression turning into a mixed disorder (Fava et al., 
2000). In a recent longitudinal study, Moffitt et al. (2007) found that pure GAD had risk 
factors similar to comorbid GAD and MDD participants, while pure MDD did not. In 
women, presence of an anxiety disorder is sometimes seen as contributing to the 
increased chance of an initial depressive episode (Breslau, Schultz, & Peterson, 1995, 
cited in Parker & Hadzi-Pavlovic, 2001). Further, sex differences can be an important 
factor when identifying anxiety disorders that precede, coincide with, and follow 
depression (Fava et al.; Parker & Hadzi-Pavlovic, 2004).  
Findings of comorbidity among clinical disorders of anxiety and depression seem 
mostly consistent, although the estimates vary depending on whether it is an anxiety 
disorder with comorbid depression or depression with comorbid anxiety. L.A. Clark’s 
(1989) meta-analysis of clinical studies indicated similar comorbidity rates for any 
anxiety disorder with depression (57%) and any depressive disorder with anxiety (56%). 
In their review of literature, Brown and Barlow (1992) estimated that 50% of those with 
principal anxiety disorder had at least one other clinical anxiety and depressive disorder. 
Kessler et al.’s (1996) review of the National Comorbidity Survey yielded 58% lifetime 
prevalence rates of anxiety with depression. In a study by Zimmerman, McDermut, & 
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Mattia (2000), more than one half of the patients with depression met the full DSM-IV 
criteria for an anxiety disorder. 
When reviewers zero in on the comorbidity of depression with specific anxiety 
disorders, the rates differ greatly across disorders (e.g., Mineka et al., 1998) and across 
studies. For example, Brown and Barlow (1992) found that GAD and PD with 
agoraphobia had the highest comorbidity rates with depression, while specific phobia had 
the lowest. Similarly, in the National Comorbidity Survey (community research), most of 
lifetime depression cases were comorbid, with highest rates for GAD, followed by PD, 
PTSD, agoraphobia, simple phobia, and social phobia (Kessler, Nelson, McGonagle et 
al., 1996; cited in Hadzi-Pavlovic, 2001). In a more recent study with a clinical adult 
sample with MDD by Fava et al. (2000), comorbid anxiety disorder diagnoses were 
present in 50.6% of these participants, with social phobia being the most prevalent 
(27.0%) and agoraphobia being the least prevalent (5.5%). Based on epidemiological 
research, several studies reported that 27-75% of PD client receive an additional 
diagnosis of MDD (Breier, Charney, & Henninger, 1984; Dealy, Ishiki, Avery, Wilson, 
& Dunner, 1981; both cited in Joormann et al., 2005).  
Frequently, the greatest rates of co-occurrence are seen between MDD and GAD 
(Brown, Chorpita, & Barlow, 1998; Kendler et al., 1995, cited in Widiger & Clark, 2000; 
Kessler et al, 1996, cited in Moffitt et al., 2007). Mineka et al. (1998) concluded that 
specific phobia demonstrates the lowest association with depression, although noted that 
the diversity of findings obfuscates any definitive inferences about which anxiety 
disorders manifest the highest comorbidity. Further, Levine et al. (2001) summarized the 
results from several epidemiological studies on lifetime comorbidity of anxiety and major 
depression: GAD (20-60%), PD (30-50%), OCD (30%), social phobia (30-35%), PTSD 
(30-40%), and anxiety symptoms (60%). The data converge on the conclusion that 
comorbidity of specific anxiety disorders with depression is typically lower than that with 
generalized anxiety (with the exception of social phobia). Indeed, clinically-defined 
depression and generalized anxiety disorder share many of the same symptoms, such as 
irritability, insomnia, crying, restlessness, and fatigue, whereas specific anxiety disorders 
 22 
and conditions appear to share fewer diagnostic symptoms with depression and have 
seemingly disparate themes (Endler & Kocovski, 2001). Therefore, specific anxiety 
disorders could be more easily differentiated from depression than the condition of 
generalized anxiety (Epkins, 1996; Ingram et al., 1987; Sanz & Avia, 1994).  
It must be added that the comorbidity between anxiety disorders and depression is 
complicated by a significant overlap among disorders within the anxiety group. For 
example, Brown et al. (1998) found that among anxiety disorders, one of the strongest 
correlations was between OCD and GAD. Taken together, the findings above indicate a 
close link between depression and anxiety (as well as within anxiety group) and have 
prompted theorists to try to explore the nature of their connection and differences.  
2.4.2 Theoretical Explanations of the Anxiety-Depression Relationship 
Relationship between depression and anxiety has been a topic of lengthy debates, 
as they have been viewed at different time as discrete (Akiskal, 1985; cited in Mineka et 
al., 1998; Roth et al., 1972, cited in Levine et al., 2001) or closely related conditions. 
Theoretically, anxiety and depression can be construed as two separate entities that 
frequently appear together or appear at different levels, as reflections of the same 
phenomenon, or as sharing a common factor (Levine et al.). Additionally, an anxiety-
depression disorder can be conceptualized as distinct from either one of the two taken 
separately. Currently, given the diagnostic comorbidity, nonspecific drug response in 
both groups, and substantial correlations between the self-report measures, which are 
reported to run as high as .66 - .70 for referred and nonreferred populations (Dobson, 
1985; D.A. Clark et al., 1990; L.A. Clark & Watson, 1991), it is well accepted that 
anxiety and depression have common components and should be examined together 
(Watson, 1999). A gap between theory and practice is evident, as most psychosocial 
treatment approaches to anxiety and depression are founded on an assumption that they 
represent two different conditions (van Lang, Ferdinand, Ormel, & Verhulst, 2006).  
The modern search for conceptualization of the anxiety-depression relationship 
mirrors that of any co-occurring psychopathological states. Specifically, the study of the 
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depression-anxiety relationship is marked by a lack of terminological precision in the 
field (L. A. Clark & Watson, 1991). The several meanings of the two constructs vary 
from study to study and could be difficult to differentiate, compounded by lack of firm 
agreement on whether to treat them as continuous or categorical variables (see L.A. 
Clark, 1989, for detailed discussion). Also, theorists, researchers, and clinicians differ in 
terms of how they view differences and similarities between the two disorders.  
Methodological factors commonly viewed as responsible for the high 
intercorrelation of the measures include poor discriminatory ability of the scales and a 
lack of symptom specificity/content overlap between the measures of anxiety and 
depression, which tend to assess general dysphoria (psychopathology) (Burns & 
Eidelson, 1998; L.A. Clark & Watson, 1991; Dobson, 1985; Endler et al., 1992; Endler, 
Denisoff, & Rutherford, 1998; Hollon & Kendall, 1980). Interrelatedness of the affective 
states and the correlation between the cognitive and affective variables pose a caveat for 
research, resulting in the issue of affective confounding. Ingram (1989b) emphasized that 
by examining a group of participants with one maladaptive condition, in reality, one 
would obtain a sample with multiple disturbances, which would obscure accurate 
interpretations of the study.  
A categorical diagnostic approach of the DSM-IV treats depression and anxiety as 
mostly conceptually and empirically discrete phenomena (L.A. Clark & Watson, 1991). 
No temporal predictions of the relationship between anxiety and depression can be 
currently made using the DSM model, although it does not preclude that one may develop 
into another over time (L.A. Clark & Watson). A diagnosis of Mixed Anxiety-Depressive 
Disorder is mentioned in the appendix as an avenue for further research (DSM-IV-TR, 
2000). This comorbid condition includes depressed mood and several other symptoms, 
e.g., concentration/memory difficulties, sleep disturbance, fatigue/low energy, irritability, 
worry, being easily moved to tears, hypervigilance, anticipating the worst, 
hopelessness/pessimism about future, and low self-esteem/feelings of worthlessness 
(DSM-IV-TR).  
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Those favoring continuity rely on current longitudinal and cross-sectional 
research that supports anxiety and depression being expressed at different points in time, 
i.e., either being points on a continuum or being alternate manifestations of a common 
vulnerability factor (L.A. Clark & Watson, 1991; Widiger & Clark, 2000). Many 
researchers (e.g., L.A. Clark & Watson) also gravitate towards a ‘common factor’ 
approach that is speculated to account for the research findings. According to this popular 
view, comorbidity between anxiety and depression, as well as among anxiety disorders, is 
proposed to be due to them being comprised of features that are present in varying 
degrees in all emotional disorders (Brown et al., 1998). This factor has been labeled 
differently by different theorists (e.g., ‘general distress’, ‘neuroticism’, ‘negative 
affectivity’) but appears to reflect a similar shared concept (Watson et al., 2005; cited in 
Moffitt et al, 2007; Krueger et al., 1998). Overall, there is insufficient evidence to 
abandon the categorical system and particularly clinical cutoffs altogether (Haslam, 2003; 
cited in Norton, 2006; Kessler, 2002), despite the fact that much research points in favor 
of the dimensional approach.   
Many explanations of a temporal dimension of the anxiety-depression relationship 
have been offered. It has been proposed that an overlap between anxiety and depression 
occurs only at high severity levels (e.g., Akistal, 1990; cited in L.A. Clark & Watson, 
1991) or that anxiety predominates at lower levels of distress, while depression may be 
dominant at higher levels of distress, corresponding to a temporal order of the persons 
responding to major life stressors (Alloy, Kelly, Mineka, & Clements, 1990; cited in 
Rohde et al., 1991; D.A. Clark & Steer, 1996). The accumulated evidence in favor of 
continuity approach is substantial (Fava et al., 2000) 
Overall, when devising new models of affective psychopathology, theorists are 
urged to move towards more complex, multilevel hierarchical models that classify groups 
of symptoms based on varying levels of specificity, whereby some symptoms will be 
applicable to a wide range of disorders, while other symptoms will apply to a selected 
few (Widiger & Clark, 2000).  
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2.4.3 Summary 
Anxiety and depression show intercorrelations between self-report measures, a 
significant overlap in their diagnoses, possible similar genetic origins. Additionally, 
anxiety often serves as a risk factor for future depression or comorbid anxiety-depression 
condition. There has been much debate about the nature of such co-occurrence, and 
literature suggests that the relationship between anxiety and depression would benefit 
from a more dimensional approach regardless of the fate of a categorical one. Currently, 
anxiety and depression are viewed by many as developmental entities that are likely to 
share a common factor of general distress. Comorbidity rates of depression with 
generalized anxiety disorder or anxiety symptoms are higher than those with other types 
of anxiety. Moreover, specific anxiety disorders do not manifest a significant 
symptomatic overlap with depression. Thus, they are hypothesized be more easily 
differentiated from it.  
 
Cognitive theorists provided detailed accounts of ways to integrate common and 
specific factors in anxiety and depression, which generated a substantial body of research.  
Prior to addressing cognitive differentiation of anxiety and depression, which is a 
centerpiece of this dissertation, terminology and the basic tenets of the cognitive system 
and its role in psychopathology are examined. Special attention is paid to the automatic 
cognitions as a crucial element in content differentiation of anxiety and depression.  
 
2.5 Cognitive View of Psychopathology 
2.5.1 Cognitive System: Overview 
In cognitive psychology, an information-processing approach has been one of the 
dominant paradigms. According to this view, most types of behavior could be viewed in 
relation to how an individual collects, assesses, transforms, encodes, recodes, and utilizes 
information (Ingram, 1984). Individuals actively seek and use both internal and 
environmental information, compare it to some internal representation, and then adjust 
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their behavior accordingly (Ingram). Cognitive theorists focus on the cognitive system as 
a major unit of personality. Although biological, interpersonal, and social factors and 
their interaction should always be considered if one wants to obtain a comprehensive 
picture of a maladaptive condition, from a cognitive perspective, the importance of 
cognitive components cannot be underestimated (Ingram & Malcarne, 1995).  
The cognitive system is described as a reciprocal interaction between cognitive 
structures, cognitive processes, and cognitive products (D. A. Clark & Beck, 1989). 
These three primary components are involved in the representation and transformation of 
meaning, based on the sensory input from the environment (D. A. Clark et al., 1999). 
Cognitive structures, such as schemas, are a core concept within most cognitive models. 
Schemas are usually defined as relatively stable hypothetical “internal structures of stored 
generic or prototypical features of stimuli, ideas, or experience that are used to organize 
new information in a meaningful way, thereby determining how phenomena are 
perceived and conceptualized” (D. A. Clark et al, p. 79). Schemas usually vary in their 
content and structure. They are developed through repeated interactions with the 
environment, experience, and according to the already existing cognitive structures. 
Schematic content is comprised of beliefs, attitudes, assumptions, and judgments, which 
are sometimes referred to as cognitive propositions (Kendall & Ingram, 1987; Swallow & 
Segal, 1995). Repeated access of the schema strengthens it and makes the probability of 
its activation higher than that of the less developed schema.  
Cognitive processes (or cognitive operations) are the paths through which 
elements of the cognitive system interact with each other (D.A. Clark et al., 1999; Ingram 
& Kendall, 1987). They are procedures that facilitate the feedback loop between 
cognitive structures and awareness (Kendall & Ingram, 1987). Cognitive products, such 
as automatic thoughts, perspectives, and appraisals are the output of the cognitive system 
(D. A. Clark et al.). Cognitive products are proposed to reflect both state and 
dispositional (trait) tendencies of the individuals (D. A. Clark et al.). Like cognitive 
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structures, cognitive products are comprised of informational content (Hollon & Kriss, 
1984).  
The cognitive system and its components are important to study because when 
malfunctioning, it has been implicated in the development of psychopathology. A faulty 
cognitive mechanism is rigid and prevents an individual from adequately adapting to the 
environment. It can subsequently lead to various maladaptive physiological, behavioral, 
affective, and motivational symptoms (D. A. Clark & Beck, 1989). Regardless of whether 
cognitive variables play a causal role in the onset of the psychological disorders, the 
efficacy of cognitive therapy in their treatment is substantial (Abramson, Alloy, & 
Metalsky, 1988). A theoretical account of the role of the cognitive system in 
psychopathology is presented below. 
2.5.2 Cognitive System in Psychopathology 
Among several cognitive models of psychopathology, Aaron Beck’s schema 
model (A.T. Beck, 1976; D. A. Clark & Beck, 1989) holds a prominent place. Beck notes 
that although one’s schemas are generally adaptive, when an individual develops 
maladaptive schemas, they result in the malfunctioning information processing and 
distorted cognitive products, which, in turn, reinforce a dysfunctional schema. 
Maladaptive schemas may be dormant or latent for prolonged periods of time but can be 
activated in stressful situations and can replace more adaptive schemas that guide 
individual’s functioning most of the time (A.T. Beck). Activation of maladaptive 
schemas is thought to be the basis for the cognitive dysfunction (D. A. Clark et al., 1999), 
although more recent studies have lead researchers to speculate that those without 
psychopathology can also have biases in schematic processing (Segal, 1988). According 
to Beck’s theory, once the schema is activated, the attention gets locked up on the 
specific content, and then it stays activated until the activating circumstances are no 
longer present. There is a rivaling explanation that frequent activation of schemas result 
in a state of “chronic construct accessibility” (Higgins, Klein, & Strauman, 1985, cited in 
Dykman & Abramson, 1990). However, all individuals possess the capacity to shift their 
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mental processes to constructive cognitive structures and, thus, transition from 
dysfunctional mental sets to adaptive ones (D. A. Clark et al.). 
A maladaptive schema can cause a bias in information processing and selection in 
favor of the schema-relevant stimuli, when “people selectively perceive, remember, and 
interpret experiences so as to filter out information that disconfirms their cognitive 
[structures]” (D. A. Clark & Beck, 1989; Zeidner, 1988, p. 187). Such bias results in the 
cognitive products that are strongly associated with the dominant schema. The presence 
of a bias ensures that information that is consistent with the bias is processed quickly and 
effortlessly, through the allocation of most of the individual’s resources towards the 
biased information (D. A. Clark & Beck). Thus, some individuals may experience 
intrusive and mostly unproductive thoughts that have been labeled differently in various 
disorders and fields of study, although they essentially capture the same process. The 
terms used include ‘rumination’ (typically used in depression literature), ‘worry’, 
‘obsession’ (both from anxiety literature), ‘mind-wandering’, and ‘daydreaming’ 
(Klinger, 1996; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Those maladaptive cognitive processes involve 
uncontrollable, repetitive, difficult-to-dismiss cognitive activities that focus a person’s 
attention on an instrumental theme (Borkovec, Shadick, & Hopkins, 1991; cited in 
Segerstrom et al., 2003; Chang, 2003; Nolen-Hoeksema; Segerstrom et al.). Maladjusted 
individuals may also experience distractive responses, which presumably take an 
individual’s mind off psychopathology and refocus it on pleasant or neutral activities 
(Chang; Nolen-Hoeksema). When looking at how an individual performs on a cognitive 
task, a process conceptually related to rumination and distraction has been termed 
cognitive interference, which can be defined as occurrence of unwanted thoughts due to 
cognitive processing that it is not under the individual’s control, i.e., a bias in attention, 
judgment, and memory (Gotlib et al., 1996; Segal, 1996).  
Another cognitive process involved in faulty cognitive processes is cognitive 
errors. A. T. Beck proposed that there are specific types of cognitive errors, which are 
systematic flaws or biases in the individual’s information processing that result from 
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information being filtered through a maladaptive schema (A.T. Beck, 1976; Sacco & 
Beck, 1995) and are found to be associated with various psychopathological conditions 
(e.g., Smith, Aberger, Follick, & Ahern, 1986). Catastrophization, arbitrary inference, 
personalization, selective abstraction, and dichotomous thinking are all examples of 
cognitive errors.  
 
As prevalent and co-occurring psychopathological conditions with distinct 
cognitive elements, anxiety and depression have been the focus of attention in cognitive 
research. Before the models attempting to differentiate between the two based on 
cognitive content could be presented, cognitive systems in anxiety and depression are 
summarized.  
 
2.6 Cognitive System Differentiation of Anxiety and Depression 
Cognitive theorists have long disagreed on how they view the nature of the 
cognitive-affective relationship of affective and mood disorders. For example, Ellis 
(1977) advocated a generality hypothesis, postulating that a few core beliefs can lead to 
irrational automatic cognitions, which can mediate any of several emotional states. 
However, most current researchers favor specificity approach, while attempting to 
account for the common factors of the anxiety and depression (e.g., L.A. Clark & 
Watson, 1991; Ingram & Kendall, 1987).  
Prior to reviewing specificity in a cognitive domain, several issues need 
clarification. Firstly, generally speaking, specificity in psychopathology can be viewed as 
the ability of a measure or a construct to reliably set apart those with a particular 
condition or disorder. Thus, one has to address both within- and between-condition 
specificity, as well as differentiation of pathology from the adaptive functioning. Second, 
R. Beck and Perkins (2001) cautioned that there is some confusion in the literature 
regarding the term ‘cognitive content specificity’. They suggested making a distinction 
between ‘cognitive specificity’ and ‘cognitive content specificity’, based on the 
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taxonomy offered by Kendall and Ingram (1989). Thus, hereby ‘cognitive specificity’ 
term is used to broadly describe any cognitive variable specific to either depression or 
anxiety (e.g., memory, cognitive biases, cognitive products), whereas ‘cognitive content 
specificity’ refers to a more specifically circumscribed content (reflective of themes in 
automatic cognitions).  
2.6.1 Cognitive System in Anxiety 
In their review of literature, Freeman and DiTomasso (1994) summarized the 
basic assumptions of the cognitive model of anxiety about the role of the cognitive 
system as follows: (1) “the cognitive system plays a vital and essential role in appraising 
danger and resources and activating the physiological, motivation, affective, and behavior 
systems…” (p. 78); (2) it “mediates its influence through repetitive unpremeditated and 
rapid involuntary thoughts and/or images of which the individual is unaware…” (p. 78), 
which are often referred to as ‘worry’; (3) “in trigger situations, anxiety disordered 
individuals have a tendency to activate danger/threat schemas by which they selectively 
screen in stimuli that indicate danger and screen out those stimuli that are incompatible 
with danger” (p. 78); (4) those individuals have “impaired objectivity and ability to 
evaluate their threat bound cognitions in a realistic manner” (p. 78); and (5) they “exhibit 
systematic errors in processing information by, for example, catastrophizing, selectively 
abstracting, thinking dichotomously, and making arbitrary inferences” (p. 78). Moreover, 
cognitive factors, such as abnormalities in information processing and beliefs, can serve 
as important predisposing and precipitating factors in the development of anxiety 
disorders (A.T. Beck et al., 1985; Freeman & DiTomasso). Specifically, certain beliefs 
(e.g., a belief that anxiety symptoms have harmful consequences) may predispose 
individuals to specific anxiety disorders, whereas other beliefs (e.g., that uncertainty is 
unacceptable) may be crucial for their maintenance (Starcevic & Berle, 2006). Thus, 
cognitive theorists agree that individuals with anxiety exhibit systematic biases in 
cognitive processing due to interpreting of anxiety symptoms as catastrophic or 
threatening (Armstrong & Khawaja, 2002). Misinterpretation, although varying in 
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content (e.g., regarding bodily symptoms, intrusive thoughts, aspects of the traumatic 
event, consequences of the traumatic event), is thought to be a common feature of several 
anxiety disorders.  
2.6.1.1 Differentiating Among Various Anxiety Conditions 
Due to heterogeneity of anxiety, cognitive models frequently assert that parts of 
cognitive system are specific to particular anxiety disorders. Researchers have long been 
intrigued by cognitive differentiation among different types of anxiety. Based on their 
review of research on cognitive specificity, Kendall and Ingram (1989) concluded that 
general and specific anxiety disorders are indeed associated with different cognitive 
patterns. These differences may result from a situational activation of anxious states by 
different threatening stimuli and a variation in cognitions within the anxiety disorder 
group (D. A. Clark & Beck, 1989; Kendall & Ingram). For example, it has been proposed 
that specific anxiety conditions can be differentiated based on themes corresponding to 
their trait fear content components, i.e., social evaluation, physical danger, daily routines, 
separation, etc. (Endler & Kocovski, 2001). Thus, each of the many facets of trait anxiety 
can be viewed as corresponding to major anxiety disorders (Sanz & Avia, 1994). 
However, differences in profile can also be due to the interaction of depression and 
anxiety that produces an effect that is different from either one of disorders taken 
separately (Kendall & Ingram). In addition to the differences in schematic content, each 
anxiety disorder presumably has interference-based clinical symptoms, with the specific 
content varying from one disorder to the other (Segal, 1996). 
Over the last two decades, cognitive models of anxiety outlining specific 
components of the disorder have been developed for various clinical disorders, e.g., PD, 
GAD, social phobia, OCD, and PTSD. While it is widely accepted that anxiety disorders 
share at least a few cognitive symptoms, such as negative thought content (Chambles & 
Hope, 1996, cited in Breitholtz et al., 1999), certain beliefs have come to be associated 
with specific disorders (e.g., a belief that one’s thoughts affect the occurrence of external 
events is linked with OCD) (Starcevic & Berle, 2006). In addition to beliefs, other 
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cognitive mechanisms and constructs (most of them not explicitly defined by Beck’s 
cognitive theory) have been implicated in the etiology and maintenance of specific 
anxiety disorders. For example, social anxiety disorder has been associated with fear of 
negative evaluation and an increase in self-focused attention; PD with fear of fear and 
anxiety sensitivity; GAD with pathological worry, positive or negative beliefs about 
worry, and intolerance of uncertainty; OCD with thought suppression, doubts regarding 
one’s memory, attaching importance and need to be responsible for one’s intrusive 
thoughts; and PTSD with negative appraisals of the trauma, expectations of unpredictable 
danger following the trauma, and poorly integrated memory of trauma (Starcevic & 
Berle). In a study by Ball, Otto, and Pollock (1995), social phobia and PD differed in 
their fear of negative evaluation and assertiveness, although did not differ in anxiety 
sensitivity and catastrophic beliefs about panic attacks.  
Within-class specificity of anxiety disorders may not be absolute (e.g., Ball et al., 
1995; Starcevic & Berle, 2006), suggesting a possibility of an underlying common 
cognitive component or an additional moderating variable. Cognitive-affective models of 
anxiety, in which there is a common general distress factor and lower-level 
differentiating factors (e.g., Brown, 2002; Brown et al., 1998; D.M. Clark & Wells, 1995; 
Goldberg, 1996; Norton & Hope, 2005; Zinbarg & Barlow, 1996) strive to explain 
common and unique features within the group of anxiety disorders. Thus far affective 
factors have been more successful at differentiating some anxiety disorders than others. 
2.6.2 Cognitive System in Depression 
Many cognitive theorists have attempted to describe the depressive symptoms and 
patterns and to elucidate depression mechanisms. Aaron Beck’s cognitive theory of 
depression (1967, 1976) gave rise to a substantial body of research. Beck proposed that a 
cognitive system of depressive individuals is composed of three major tenets, i.e., 
schema, negative cognitive triad, and cognitive errors. Depressogenic schemas may be 
related to real or perceived loss and have state-dependent quality (A.T. Beck, 1976). 
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Activation of those schemas will result in a cluster of affective, behavioral, somatic, and 
motivational symptoms (A.T. Beck; Sacco & Beck, 1995).  
Negative cognitive triad is postulated to be the content of the depressogenic 
schema and relates to the notion that depressed individuals hold a dysfunctional view of 
themselves, the future, and the world. Dominant cognitive structures of individuals with 
depression are characterized by pessimistic and self-deprecating content that helps 
perpetuate depressive affect (Ingram & Malcarne, 1995). Depressed individuals see 
themselves as unloved, unworthy, and incapable of attaining happiness, due to a lack of 
the attributes necessary for this task. They view everyday experiences in a negative 
manner and misinterpret their interactions with environment as signs of their defeat and 
deprivation. Demands placed on them by the world are seen as unreasonable and 
outrageous, and the world is perceived as producing hindrances that impair their ability to 
reach goals (A.T. Beck, 1976; A.T. Beck et al., 1979). Their future expectations are 
usually characterized by themes of anticipated failure, rejection, and dissatisfaction. 
Depressed individuals believe that their hardships would continue indefinitely (A.T. 
Beck).  Empirical evidence is supportive of the cognitive triad (Asarnow & Bates, 1988; 
A.T. Beck, Riskind, Brown, & Steer, 1987; A.T. Beck, Steer, Epstein, & Brown, 1987; 
Blackburn, Jones, & Lewin, 1986; Brown & Beck, 1989; D.A. Clark, Beck, & Brown, 
1989; Greenberg & Beck, 1989; Space & Cromwell, 1980). 
In addition to the cognitive triad schematic content, A.T. Beck et al. (1983, 1987) 
proposed a distinction between two trait types of schematic content, i.e., autonomous 
(high achievement concerns) and sociotropic (high interpersonal concerns), which serve 
as vulnerability factors for depression when achievement or interpersonal stressors, 
respectively, are experienced. There is still much work to be done to establish a unique 
link between depression and Beck’s cognitive constructs (for review of literature, see 
Nietzel & Harris, 1990). Specificity studies in this area (e.g., Alford & Garrety, 1995; 
2003) have not yielded support for sociotropy and autonomy as vulnerability markers, 
although preliminary evidence appears to support sociotropy more than autonomy (e.g., 
Burke & Haslam, 2001; Sato & McCann, 2000; both cited in Keller & Nesse, 2006). 
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Further, compared to nondepressed individuals, those with depression have been found to 
demonstrate more negative schematic content, higher accessibility, stability and 
interconnectedness of self-elements within the schemas, and more availability of the 
stored content (Dozois, 2007; Dozois & Frewen, 2006; Ingram, 1984; Segal, 1988). 
Besides differences in schematic content, individuals with depression are 
hypothesized to have processing biases, such as major cognitive errors (e.g., 
overgeneralization, selective abstraction, catastrophization, and personalization), 
selective processing, rumination, and cognitive interference (A.T. Beck et al. 1979; Ellis 
& Ashbrook, 1987; cited in Dombeck et al., 1996; Gotlib et al., 1996). Current empirical 
evidence speaks for the presence of cognitive biases in depressive processing (Ellis, 
Moore, Varner, Ottaway, & Becker, 1997; M.F. Lefebvre, 1981; Pierce et al., 1998). 
Consistent with Beck’s theory, those with depression attend to information that is 
loss/failure related and ignore the positive features of the situation. Depressed individuals 
also tend to ruminate, i.e., they frequently revisit personal disappointments and mistakes, 
question the quality of life, focus on feelings of despondency and isolation, and dwell on 
personal inadequacies (Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). They also ruminate about 
depressive symptoms, causes, consequences, and meaning. Such process leads to more 
extended episodes of depression (Segerstrom et al., 2003) because it augments existing 
maladaptive thinking, interferes with attentional resources, and contributes to a biased 
recall of information (Chang, 2003).  
Thus, both anxiety and depression appear to have biased cognitive systems, with 
similar constructs involved in dysfunctional processing. This makes reliable cognitive 
differentiation a worthy cause. Before the models of content specificity in depression and 
anxiety are introduced, the concept of automatic thoughts, including their role in 
psychopathology in general and in anxiety and depression conditions in particular, is 
expounded on.  
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2.7 Cognitive Content Specificity of Anxiety and Depression: Automatic Thought 
Differentiation 
2.7.1 Automatic Thoughts 
Automatic thoughts are one example of cognitive products. They are transient, 
involuntary, and situation-dependent streams of consciousness in verbal or visual form 
(A.T. Beck et al., 1987; D. A. Clark & Beck, 1989). Automatic thoughts are often viewed 
as part of internal dialogue, or self-talk. Burnett (1996) noted that there is confusion in 
the literature as to conceptualization and terminology related to the self-talk phenomenon. 
A few largely synonymous terms used in the literature include ‘self-statements’, ‘inner 
speech’, ‘inner dialogue’, ‘private speech’, ‘private self-talk’, ‘internal dialogue’, ‘self-
referent verbal statements’, ‘speech-to-self’, ‘verbal self-regulation’, ‘self-directed 
speech’, and ‘self-cognition’ (Burnett). Furthermore, some researchers ( Kleijn, van der 
Ploeg, & Topman, 1994; Spielberger & Vagg, 1987; Topman, Kleijn, van der Ploeg, & 
Masset, 1992) distinguish between ‘cognitions’ (resulting from cognitive structures and 
beliefs) and ‘task-related thoughts’(which are part of the internal dialogue and self-
referent speech). 
In this manuscript, the terms cognitions and automatic thoughts are used 
interchangeably, as it is believed that most automatic thoughts, however task-related, are 
likely to be a product of interplay of cognitive structures and environment. It is implicit 
that some portion of self-talk is instructional in nature (Conroy & Metzler, 2004). 
Instructional self-statements are “aimed at directing thought or behavior positively and at 
influencing task control and completion” and are related to stress coping and 
psychological adjustment (Calvete & Cardeñoso, 2002, p. 477). Examples of such 
cognitions include: “I don’t have to get upset”, “Just relax and let the words come,” and 
“Just say what you have to say” (Kendall & Chansky, 1991; cited in Calvete & 
Cardenoso). Instructional talk was not of immediate interest to the current study. 
Researchers struggle to adequately capture the introspective information. Being 
easily accessible to awareness, automatic thoughts lend themselves to convenient 
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measurement and have been at the center of various instruments in the clinical and 
psychoeducational fields of study (e.g., internalizing disorders, psychotic disorders, social 
evaluative anxieties, and stress and coping). Examples of various aspects of automatic 
cognitions include valence (positive, negative, or neutral), frequency, content, sequence, 
orientation or mode (present, past, or future), intensity, believability, ease of removal or 
controllability, intrusiveness, importance, impact on functioning, individual reactivity, 
unacceptability, and personal responsibility for the outcome (D.A Clark, 1986; Di Nardo 
& Barlow, 1990; Glass & Arnkoff, 1997; Heimberg et al., 1987; Ingram & Kendall, 
1987; Kroll-Mensing, 1992; cited in Klinger, 1996). Methods of assessment include 
recognition, recall (with or without prompt), projective, expressive, and naturalistic. 
Examples of assessment techniques are statements (including self-statements), questions 
(typically, as part of structured questionnaires), thought-listing, think-aloud procedures, 
and videotape-aided thought reconstruction. The nature of the thought-evoking stimuli 
can differ, e.g., real-life, role-played, videotaped, or imagined. Real-life scenarios are 
expected to evoke more valid responses than imagined situations (Kendall & Hollon, 
1981). Self-statement measures are typically completed after a particular task. The 
subjects are asked to indicate how frequently each thought occurred to them while they 
were working on the task. In thought-listing procedure, subjects list their thoughts in 
response to stimuli and the thoughts are later coded. Ratings of self-statements are 
hypothesized to lead to judgments of a general nature, which may be reflective of the 
existing cognitive structures (Bruch, 1996) and are, therefore, frequently used in 
cognitive research.  
 
 
2.7.2 Automatic Thoughts in Psychopathology 
Early cognitive theorists (Butler, 1983; Ellis, 1962; Meichenbaum, 1977, cited in 
Bruch, 1996) proposed the link between inner speech and how people feel and behave. 
Most cognitions are adaptive in nature, and it is the intrusion of maladaptive cognitions 
 37 
into consciousness that is deemed by some the immediate cause of psychopathology 
(Kendall & Hollon, 1981). Dysfunctional automatic thoughts are emotionally distressing 
and reflect biased representation of reality, including the self, by the cognitive system 
(J.S. Beck, 1995; D.A. Clark et al., 1999). Hollon and Garber (1980) posit that changing 
cognitive products (or surface cognitions) is paramount for the treatment of the disorder 
(i.e., immediate stress alleviation). 
Valence, form, content, and sequence of cognitions (although the latter not 
sufficiently explored in the literature) have all been hypothesized to be of significance in 
psychopathology. For example, Meichenbaum (1977) suggested that, in contrast to 
maladjusted individuals who dwell on the negative thoughts, well-adjusted people may 
initially generate negative thoughts, subsequently counteracting them with positive ones 
(cited in Bruch, 1996). Considered crucial for the maintenance of the processing bias, the 
valence of automatic thoughts has been included as a dimension of many cognitive 
measures. Both positive and negative cognitions play an important role in the mediation 
of cognition and affect (Ingram & Wisnicki, 1988; Kendall & Ingram, 1987). Positive 
and negative dimensions of self-talk and evaluation are believed to be bivariate 
(Cacioppo & Gardner, 1997) but are not necessarily independent (Calvete & Cardeñoso, 
2002). Neutral self-talk has not been tied to dysfunction as a distinct variable (Bruch, 
Heimberg, & Hope, 1991; Heimberg, Bruch, Hope, & Dombeck, 1990), although it has 
been inferred that neutral thoughts along with negative ones interfere with cognitive tasks 
in the form of distracting cognitions (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Sarason et al., 1986).  
There are several important hypotheses on how the valence of automatic thoughts 
can be implicated in maladaptive conditions. One approach focusing on the role of 
positive thoughts suggests that increased positive thinking is associated with better 
psychological adjustment (Taylor & Brown, 1988, cited in Joiner, Kistner, Stellrecht, & 
Merrill, 2006). Taylor and Brown have contended that in contrast to the disordered 
individuals, mentally healthy people show unwarranted optimism and unrealistically 
positive self-evaluations, or “illusory glow” (cited in Joiner et al.). An opposing camp of 
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researchers has focused on distortions characterizing psychopathology, which has been 
hypothesized to be linked with reduction in positive thoughts and increase in negative 
thoughts (Allport, 1937; Asendorpf & Ostendorf, 1998; A.T. Beck et al., 1979; Block & 
Thomas, 1955; Colvin et al., 1995; all cited in Joiner et al., 2006). An idea that low 
negative thinking can help differentiate adjusted individuals from those with emotional 
maladjustment has been termed “the power of non-negative thinking” by Kendall (1984) 
and has gained substantial research support (for reviews, see Arnkoff & Glass, 1989; 
Kendall & Hollon, 1981). Similarly, low positive thinking can assist in setting those with 
psychopathology apart from those without it (e.g., Ingram, 1989a; Ingram, Slater et al., 
1990; Ingram & Wisnicki, 1988). 
Joiner et al. (2006) further proposed that a relationship between mental distress 
and the valence of self-ratings could be curvilinear, whereby both very negative and very 
positive biases would be associated with psychopathology (although with a stipulation 
that a negative bias in self-cognition may be associated with more psychopathology than 
a positive one). A study by Calvete and Connor-Smith (2005) showed that high levels of 
positive thinking could be associated with higher intrusive, i.e., socially annoying 
behaviors, such as bragging, teasing, showing off, talking too much, and demanding 
attention.  
Another angle of valence interpretation in cognitions includes quantifiable ratios. 
The concept of ratios has long beguiled researchers. Ratios have been used to measure 
the percentage of positive, negative, and neutral cognitive constructs, including but not 
limited to automatic thoughts (Bruch, Heimberg, & Hope, 1991; Heimberg, Bruch, Hope, 
& Dombeck, 1990; Henriques & Leitenberg, 2002; Kendall & Hollon, 1981; Kendall, 
Howard, & Hays, 1991). Arguably, the most popular ratio taxonomy has been the one 
proposed by the States of Mind model and later by the Balanced States of Mind model.  
2.7.2.1 States of Mind and Balanced States of Mind Models 
The original States of Mind model (SOM; Schwarz & Garamoni, 1984; 1986, 
1989) was empirically-driven and established a proportion of positive thoughts in self-
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dialogue of positive and negative thoughts as an indicator differentiating pathology from 
adaptive functioning. The SOM ratios are calculated as the sum of positive cognitions 
divided by the sum of both negative and positive cognitions. The ratio of .618 was 
postulated to reflect an optimal proportion of positivity and necessary attention to 
negative events (Schwarz & Garamoni, 1989). Based on the empirical evidence, neutral 
cognitions were not included in the model (Schwartz & Michelson, 1987; cited in 
Schwartz, 1992). The authors of the model had suggested a total of five states of mind, 
characterized by different empirically-based SOM set values and ranges. However, the 
model has been challenged in terms of appropriateness of its optimal ratios, as some 
studies found it to be higher than .62 (Fichten, Amsel, Robillard, & Tagalakis, 1991; 
Haaga, Davison, McDermut, & Hillis, 1993; both cited in Heinrichs & Hofmann, 2005; 
Topman et al., 1992).  
Recently, the original SOM model has been reformulated. The new approach, 
which was termed ‘Balanced States of Mind’ (BSOM) model (Schwartz, 1997), draws on 
the work of a mathematical psychologist Vladimir Lefebvre (1985, 1990). In his reflexive 
theory of consciousness, Lefebvre proposed that humans have an “inner computer” that 
“allows them to regulate the ratio of positive and negative thoughts and feelings in a 
variety of human contexts” (Schwartz et al., 2002, p. 440). Lefebvre’s theory establishes 
a link between the varying degrees of adjustment and cognition in that it yields a 
prediction that depending on the mood state, the individual’s likelihood of positive self-
evaluation (cognitive and affective) will fall within the specific ratios from 0.0 to 1.0. It is 
a balance view, where the individual’s cognitive-affective system is a homeostatic 
mechanism governed by precise mathematically-derived logic. The concept of ‘balance’ 
is not new. Since the early days of ancient Egypt, China, and Greece, people have been 
trying to put a math ratio behind beauty, health, and mind. It has been given many names, 
including “golden ratio”, “golden section”, and “divine proportion”. Prior to the BSOM 
model, the notion of balance was widely used in psychology, particularly in the area of 
stress and coping styles.  
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The BSOM model has yielded new intervals and set points, which were based on 
the ratios, calculated the same way as in the original model and associated with not just 
pathology and normality but also with optimal states of functioning. With its 
mathematically-derived values, the BSOM model represents a considerable improvement 
over its predecessor. Two new theoretically-sound categories were added (making a total 
of seven) and set points were revised, resulting in finer differentiation between 
categories. Also, in contrast to the previous SOM model, the BSOM approach now 
provides for the incorporation of the thought content and situational demands. Table 1 
features the BSOM interval categories and their associated quantitative and qualitative 
features (Friedman, 2001; Schwartz, 1997). Very low, low, or very high ratios are 
associated with more maladaptive functioning, whereas moderately high ratios are linked 
to normal functioning.  
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Table 1 













    Low 
    Mod 










       N 
       O 
       SO 
PM 
 
.00 - .09 
 
 
.10 - .33 
.10 - .15 
.16 - .22 
.23 - .33 
.34 - .41 
 
 
.42 - .58 
 
.59 - .66 
 
 
.67 - .90 
.67 - .77 
.78 - .84 
.85 - .90 
.91 - 1.00 
 
Complete despair and profound psychopathology (i.e., 
profound depression or anxiety, self-loathing, withdrawal, and 
panic) 
Severe psychopathology and chronic negative rumination (i.e., 
hopelessness, severe depression or anxiety, low self-esteem, 
and agitation) 
 
Moderate psychopathology and impaired self-esteem (i.e., 
pessimism, worry, guilt, moderate depression or anxiety) 
 
Presence of mild psychopathology (i.e., doubt, indecision, 
ambivalence, mild depression or anxiety) 
Successful management of negative events (i.e., positivity, 
realism in the face of stress and/or negative situations) 
Well-balanced evaluations: 
Positive self-evaluations in neutral mood 
Positive self-evaluations in positive mood  
Positive self-evaluations in deep positive mood 
Excess positivity, may be adaptive short-term (i.e., unrealistic 
optimism, denial, and radical optimism, or mania).  
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Note. NM – Negative Monologue; ND – Negative Dialogue, Mod – Moderate; CD – 
Conflicted Dialogue; SCD – Successful Coping Dialogue; FCD – Failed Coping 
Dialogue; PD – Positive Dialogue: SO - Superoptimal, O - Optimal, N - Normal; and PM 
– Positive Monologue. 
 
2.7.2.2 Empirical Support for the SOM and BSOM Models  
The original States of Mind model received empirical support for being able to 
differentiate between functional and dysfunctional groups (Glass & Furlong, 1990; 
Heimberg et al., 1990; Michelson, Schwartz, & Marchione, 1992; Myszka et al., 1986; 
Nasby & Russell, 1997; Topman et al., 1992). Research has also yielded support for the 
model as a useful tool for measuring therapy outcomes, i.e., as patients undergo 
treatment, their SOM ratios shift in a positive direction (Bruch et al., 1991; Haaga et al., 
1993; Heimberg, 1994; Garamoni, Reynolds, Thase, Frank, & Fasiczka, 1992; Myers, 
Lynch, & Bakal, 1989; Schwartz, 1993; Schwartz & Michelson, 1987). There is 
inconsistent evidence that the SOM ratios are superior predictors or are more informative 
of emotional responses, compared to negative thoughts alone (Beazley, Glass, 
Chambless, et al., 2001; Bruch, 1997; Bruch et al., 1991). However, they do appear to be 
better predictors of psychopathology than positive thoughts (Calvete & Connor-Smith, 
2005; Calvete et al., 2005; Ronan & Kendall, 1997). Schwartz and Garamoni (1986, 
1989) postulated that the ratios should remain stable regardless of the assessment method 
used; however, several studies (Burgess & Haaga, 1994; Heimberg, Bruch, Hope, & 
Dombeck, 1990; Myszka et al., 1986) found it not to be the case. At this point, it appears 
that self-statements yield more adaptive ratios and account for more variance in criteria 
measures than alternative automatic thought assessment methods, such as thought listing 
(Bruch, Hope, & Dombeck, 1990; Heimberg et al., 1990; Sturmer, Bruch, Haase, & 
Amico, 2002, Myszka et al., 1986). 
Unfortunately, the predictions of the new BSOM model have not been extensively 
tested empirically (for exceptions, see Calvete et al., 2005; Calvete & Connor-Smith, 
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2005; Friedman, Schwartz, & Haaga, 2002). Also, the SOM/BSOM research has 
generated ambiguous findings regarding the potentially debilitating nature of a relative 
excess of positive cognitions. Contradicting the theoretical predictions of the BSOM 
model, Friedman et al. (2002) using affective ratios found that relatively high levels of 
positivity (i.e., high BSOMs) are not dysfunctional (also, see Amsel & Fichten, 1998; 
Haaga, Davison, McDermut et al., 1993; McDermut & Haaga, 1994). 
 
Next, an overview of theory and research in content and valence for both anxiety 
and depression is presented.  
2.7.3 Automatic Thoughts in Anxiety 
2.7.3.1 Content 
In anxious individuals, automatic thoughts result from activation of the future-
related threat schema, and their cognitions revolve around themes of danger, vigilance, 
fear, and rejection (D. A. Clark et al, 1999; Ingram & Malcarne, 1995). According to 
A.T. Beck et al. (1985), the source of the threat within the “personal danger” schema 
varies across anxiety disorders, resulting in different content of cognitions. Thus, it is 
possible to differentiate between cognitive themes typical of some anxiety disorders. PD 
and GAD in particular have generated a substantial body of research supporting their 
specific cognition content (Breitholtz, Westling, & Öst, 1998; Hibbert, 1984; Rapee, 
1985; Westling & Öst, 1993). Specifically, individuals with PD were found to show more 
thoughts related to physical catastrophes (e.g., illness, death, injury, losing control, and 
having a heart attack) and physical sensations. In contrast, patients with GAD reported 
more thoughts about mental catastrophes (e.g., inability to cope or to control, social 
embarrassment or threat), which included self-centered cognitions (competence or 
failure), interpersonal themes (e.g., acceptance or rejection, conflict, concern about life 
and health of others), and worry over minor matters. Cognitions of social phobia are 
typically dominated by a theme of negative evaluation. Various other facets found within 
negative anxious content reflect its heterogeneity and include hostility, meaninglessness, 
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hopelessness or existential matters, and worry or rumination about own mental processes 
and future negative events) (R. Beck et al. , 2003; Breitholtz et al., 1999; Schniering & 
Rapee, 2004). It must be noted that the aforementioned differences within anxious 
cognitions within across disorders have been mostly investigated with negative content. 
Positive content’s themes remain to be explored.  
2.7.3.2 Valence 
Along with content, the valence of cognitions is also seen as an important factor 
in anxiety-relevant thoughts. Consistent with their schema, those with anxiety manifest 
more negative thoughts that are associated with dysfunctional cognitive processes, such 
as worry and obsessions, than those without anxiety (Borkovec & Inz, 1990, cited in 
Molina et al., 1998; Kendall & Hollon, 1989; Kocovski et al., 2005; Stopa & Clark, 1993; 
Tanner et al., 2006) and less positive thoughts (Glass, Merluzzi, Biever, & Larsen, 1982; 
Gressner, 2006). The pattern of increased negativity is typically observed across various 
clinical anxiety conditions, such as generalized anxiety, panic disorder, and social phobia.  
Anxiety and the SOM and BSOM Models. 
The SOM model has been empirically validated with anxiety in that the SOM 
ratios distinguished between those with and without pathology and/or supported 
treatment improvement in the following disorders: agoraphobia (Michelson, Schwartz, & 
Marchione, 1992; Schwartz & Michelson, 1987), social phobia (Bruch et al., 1991; Glass 
& Furlong, 1990; Heimberg et al., 1990), test/evaluation anxiety (Arnkoff, Glass, & 
Robinson, 1992; Topman et al., 1992), and PTSD (Nasby & Russell, 1997). No 
inferences can be made from the model as to whether it can differentiate between several 
anxiety disorders.  
2.7.4 Automatic Thoughts in Depression 
2.7.4.1 Content 
Cognition content of the typically-studied unipolar depression has not yielded the 
same multitude of facets as that of anxiety disorders. In general, automatic thoughts of 
depressed individuals are believed to be products of the past-related cognitive schema of 
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loss and are focused on past personal failures, deprivation, and harm (A.T. Beck, 1976; 
Watson & Kendall, 1989). Despite relative uniformity, depressive cognitions have been 
found to have several intracontent elements, such as negative self-concept (including 
negative self-evaluation, self-blame, and failure), dissatisfaction (a negative view of 
circumstances and a desire for one’s life to be different), and inability to cope (difficulty 
starting/completing actions and helplessness) (Calvete & Connor-Smith, 2005). Similar 
to anxiety, it is the negative portion of depressive thinking that was tested for the within-
content heterogeneity, while positive intracontent elements have not been widely 
explored.  
2.7.4.2 Valence 
Arguably, the valence of automatic thoughts has been more frequently implicated 
in conceptualizations of depression than in those of anxiety. In Beck’s cognitive model, 
two hypotheses address valence of the depressive content directly. The negativity 
hypothesis states that all types of depression are “characterized by the presence of 
absolute and pervasive negative self-referent thinking about the self, world, and the 
future” (D. A. Clark et al., 1999, p. 115) and that such thinking can be present only 
during depressive mood states (A.T. Beck, 1976; D. A. Clark & Steer, 1996). Thus, the 
automatic cognitions of the individuals with depression are expected to be 
overwhelmingly negative and reflect their overall pessimistic tendencies, low self-
esteem, hopelessness, and self-deprecation (D.A. Clark et al.). The exclusivity hypothesis 
reads that “depression is characterized by the exclusion of positive self-referent thinking” 
(D. A. Clark et al., p. 115). It implies that, in addition to heightened negativity, 
depression is accompanied by a relative, not absolute, reduction in positive thoughts. The 
exclusivity hypothesis indicates that the decline in positive cognition is a distinct 
phenomenon and is as essential for depression as the increased negativity (D.A. Clark et 
al.).  
In their review of the empirical support for Beck’s negativity and exclusivity 
hypotheses, D.A. Clark and Steer (1996) note that evidence for the negativity hypothesis 
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appears to be considerable, even with varying methodologies. Negative cognitions have 
been found to be uniquely associated with depression at the mood, symptom, and 
syndrome levels. Research on automatic thoughts in depressed participants in both 
clinical and nonclinical samples shows that they score higher on the measures of negative 
self-referent cognitions than controls (Crandell & Chambless, 1986; Dobson & Shaw, 
1986; Kendall et al., 1989; Harrel & Ryon, 1983; Kendall et al., 1989; Ross, Gottfredson, 
Christensen, & Weaver, 1986) and that negative self-referent thinking is associated with 
the transient depressive mood or depressive symptomatology  Blackburn, Jones, & 
Lewin, 1986; Hedlund & Rude, 1995; Hollon & Kendall, 1980; Hollon, Kendall, & 
Lumry, 1986). As depressed individuals improve, they tend to get more positive and 
fewer negative cognitions (Dozois, 2007). However, a number of studies (Ingram, 1990; 
Ingram & Wisnicki, 1988) failed to show that negativity is exclusive to depression. 
Some studies have provided support in favor of the exclusivity hypothesis, 
although the evidence is not consistent. For example, when compared to nondepressed 
persons, individuals with depression endorse fewer positive automatic thoughts  Ingram, 
1989b; Ingram & Wisnicki, 1988). Moreover, inducing positive mood in patients with 
depression results in reporting of more positive thoughts (Ingram et al., 1995). However, 
analyses of literature indicate that due to methodological and conceptual flaws in 
research, most findings do not lend strong support for the decline in positive thinking in 
depression, when compared to other conditions, such as anxiety (for reviews of literature, 
see D.A. Clark et al., 1999; D.A. Clark & Steer, 1996). The exclusivity hypothesis has 
also been challenged in terms of its universality of application to all depressive disorders, 
as some think it may not be applicable to all subtypes of depression (Abramson, 
Metalsky, and Alloy, 1989; cited in D.A. Clark & Steer, 1996) or is outdated altogether 
(Haaga, Dyck, & Ernst (1991). 
After reviewing relevant research, Kendall and Hollon (1981) came to the 
conclusion that the frequency of positive cognitions may have a weaker association with 
depression than the frequency of negative cognitions.  
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Depression and the SOM and BSOM Models. 
Kendall, Howard, and Hays (1989) conducted a test of the original SOM model in 
depression with college student and clinical adult samples (cited in Schwartz, 1992). 
They found support for the model in that nondepressed controls exhibited positive and 
negative cognitions that fit the “golden section” SOM predictions, whereas depressed 
students’ cognition ratios fell within the predicted lower range of internal dialogue of 
conflict. Psychiatric depressed patients were within the lower range. Similarly, Burgess 
and Haaga (1994) established that positive cognitions theoretically specific to depression 
fit the predictions of the SOM model. Another study by Garamoni et al. (1991) in a 
clinical sample also yielded support for the SOM model in depression. Additionally, 
Schwartz et al. (2002) supported the utility of the revised BSOM point for tracking 
treatment changes in depressed patients.  
 
Next, the theoretical models of content differentiation of anxiety and depression 
are introduced and the empirical support for those models reviewed.  
2.7.5 Models of Cognitive Specificity of Anxiety and Depression 
2.7.5.1 Cognitive Content Specificity Model 
Thought content has been well studied (Kendall & Ingram, 1989) and yields 
stronger evidence for specificity than most other variables (Kendall & Watson, 1989). 
The cognitive content specificity (CCS) hypothesis, originally postulated by A. T. Beck 
(1976), reads that each psychopathological condition has a distinct cognitive profile that 
is manifested primarily in the content and form of the cognitions and processes associated 
with it. Presumably, CCS hypothesis can allow one to differentiate within a variety of 
maladaptive conditions. However, it has been mostly used when looking at depression- 
and anxiety-relevant cognitions and in conjunction with Beck’s valence-based negativity 
and exclusivity hypotheses (discussed above). Thus, within Beck’s model, depression-
relevant cognitions have been typically regarded as more negative (pessimistic) than 
those of anxiety. No specific predictions were generated regarding a comorbid condition, 
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although it was implicit in Beck’s theory that such condition would produce the most 
dysfunctional cognitions than either those with anxiety or depression, due to the presence 
of both anxious and depressogenic schemas. 
In addition to content, the CCS hypothesis includes such intracognitive 
components as form (mode), degree of certainty, and degree of modifiability. It has been 
long hypothesized that depression is uniquely manifested in automatic thoughts that are 
definitive, self-referent, past-oriented, and rigid; whereas anxious thoughts tend to be 
more future-oriented (involve uncertainty about the future), less absolute, and more 
situation-dependent (A.T. Beck et al., 1987; D.A. Clark et al., 1999; Ingram & Kendall, 
1987; Watson & Kendall, 1989). Various explanations for this have been offered that 
reflect complementary or alternative explanations to Beck’s model. For example, Dobson 
(1985) suggested that both disorders involve a perception of threat (to self-esteem, 
happiness, or ability to cope), only in anxiety a threat is potential, whereas in depression 
it is either imminent/certain or has already occurred. Tellegen (1985) speculated that 
“depressive states are characterized by affective disengagement and that the associated 
[cognitions] are indicative of an “oriented” or “knowing” mode; in contrast, affectively 
engaged states such as anxiety reflect an “orienting” or “asking” mode (A.T. Beck et al., 
1987, p. 182). Klinger (1996) proposed that when “an individual encounters a cue that 
arouses emotions because of its association with one of the individual’s current 
concerns,” a shift in the topic content occurs (p. 19). Anxiety is a response to the cues 
indicating a threat to the individual’s goal; therefore, the thought content is future-
oriented. Depressed individuals seem to think that their goal pursuit is blocked and, thus, 
strive to disengage themselves from the “lost cause” (Klinger).  
2.7.5.2 Empirical Evidence for Cognitive Content Specificity 
Content specificity hypothesis has spawned prolific research tapping into 
cognitive differentiation of anxiety and depression, including development of research 
instruments that could be used to test its theoretical assumptions. Unfortunately, the 
aspects of cognitions other than content and valence received little empirical attention. In 
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one study by D.A. Clark (1986), participants were compared on several parameters. 
Frequency of depressive thoughts was found to uniquely correlate with depression, 
whereas it was the intensity of thought that was found to characterize anxiety. In some 
studies (Epkins, 1996, with children), the future orientation of anxious cognitions was 
inferred from cognitive errors of generalization and personalization that appeared to 
differentiate socially anxious children from depressed ones.  
Results of CCS studies vary depending on characteristics of samples. In clinical 
and referred samples, the results have been mostly conclusive. Research supports the 
depression-anxiety group differences, as well as a closer association between thoughts of 
loss and failure and depressed mood and between cognitions of harm and danger and 
anxiety (A.T. Beck, Brown, Steer et al., 1987; D.A. Clark, Beck, Brown, 1989; D.A. 
Clark, Beck, & Beck, 1994; D.A. Clark, Steer, Beck, & Snow, 1996; Woody et al., 1998).  
In contrast, support for CCS in nonclinical populations including college students 
(or mixed nonclinical and referred adult samples) has been more ambiguous. Some (Sanz 
& Avia, 1994) found considerable evidence for the anxiety-depression differentiation. 
Others (Bruch, Mattia, Heimberg et al, 1993; Calvete et al., 2005a; D.A. Clark, 1986; 
Ingram, 1989b) found more support for depression content specificity relative to anxious 
cognitions. For example, Calvete et al. (2005a) discovered that depressive symptoms 
were uniquely associated with depressive cognitions, but anxiety scores were associated 
with both anxious cognitions and depressive cognitions. An investigation of the content 
of worry in a clinical sample yielded more specificity for depression and less for anxiety 
(Diefenbach et al., 2001). Further, Burgess and Haaga (1994) showed specificity of 
positive cognitions to depression rather than anxiety. In contrast, a few studies (Rholes, 
Riksind, & Neville, 1985; Wickless & Kirsch, 1988) found more evidence in favor of 
specificity of anxious cognitive content rather than that of depression. In Wickless and 
Kirsch’s (1988) study, anxiety was uniquely predicted by cognitions of threat, whereas 
depression was predicted by cognitions of both threat and loss, although both anxiety and 
depression showed close association with their respective cognition themes. In Rholes et 
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al.’s (1985) study, threat cognitions were associated with anxiety only, whereas loss 
cognitions were related with both depression and anxiety. Calvete et al. (2005b) 
established that in addition to vulnerability to harm/illness schema specific to anxiety, 
dependence schema (traditionally associated with depression) contributed to anxious 
thoughts in addition to depressive thoughts. It was also discovered that consistent with 
the CCS predictions, the mixed group was frequently the most dysfunctional (Bruch et 
al., 1993; Woody et al., 1998), with an implication that depression and anxiety may have 
an additive effect on the level of pathological cognitions resulting in cognitive distortions 
beyond those with “pure” manifestation of either disorder.  
The findings of the studies on cognitive products with children and adolescents 
have been mixed. While some supported content specificity (Schniering & Rapee, 2004), 
others did not lend unequivocal support in that depressive cognitions were shown to 
correlate with both depression and anxiety (Epkins, 1996; Rholes, Riskind, & Neville, 
1985) and depressive cognitions evidenced better group differentiation than anxious 
cognitions (Jolly, 1993; Laurent & Stark, 1993). Based on a frequent lack of specificity 
with nonclinical populations and children it has been speculated that higher levels of 
distress may result in better manifestation of the specificity hypothesis (D.A. Clark & 
Steer, 1996). Recently, R. Beck and Perkins (2001) conducted a meta-analysis of 
correlational research on cognitive content specificity. They found only partial support 
for the hypothesis, revealing some degree of specificity for the depressive content but 
little specificity for the anxiety content. An additional finding was that the measures of 
depressive and anxious content were highly correlated (r = .66). The authors concluded 
that such lack of specificity for the anxiety measures can be in part due to a 
multidimensional nature of the anxiety construct, which was measured too broadly in the 
reviewed studies, or the high correlation between the measures of cognitive content.  
 While the original CCS hypothesis outlines cognitive factors that differentiate 
between anxiety and depression, its conceptualization of their overlapping features is less 
clear and is better described by the tripartite model (presented below). 
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2.7.5.3 Tripartite Model 
The tripartite model has evolved from the two-factor positive-negative affect 
model (Watson, Clark, & Carey, 1988; Watson & Tellegen, 1985), which emphasized 
two basic orthogonal dimensions of emotion, i.e., negative affect and positive affect. The 
construct of negative affectivity is characterized by nervousness, hostility, fear, somatic 
complaints, negativity, and low self-esteem. Conversely, positive affectivity is marked by 
activity, enthusiasm, and excitement (D.A. Clark et al., 1999; Kendall & Brady, 1995). 
Hierarchical in nature, the tripartite model (L.A. Clark & Watson, 1991) has emerged as 
a main competitor to the single-level CCS model. Although considered mostly affective 
rather than cognitive, the tripartite model is frequently extrapolated to account for the 
differences in cognitions between depression and anxiety. The model proposes that 
depression and anxiety have negative affectivity in common (a higher-order, nonspecific 
factor), whereas only depression involves low positive affectivity (anhedonia) and only 
anxiety involves heightened physiological arousal (as part of lower-level specific factors) 
(L. A. Clark & Watson).  
Based on the tripartite model, it can be assumed that both depression and anxiety 
would be associated with more negative cognitions, whereas only depression would be 
related to less positive cognitions (a prediction similar to Beck’s exclusivity hypothesis). 
Due to the absence of direct predictions about comorbidity, it can be inferred that it 
would be characterized by low positive affectivity (fewer positive cognitions), high 
negative affectivity (more negative cognitions), and high physiological arousal 
(Shankman & Klein, 2003).  Thus, the predictions of the tripartite and CCS models differ 
in their view of negative thinking. In the latter, negativity is linked to depression 
exclusively and not to both. Other affective structural models of anxiety and depression 
that yield predictions similar to the tripartite model (e.g., Davidson, 1998; Heller & 
Nitschke, 1998; both cited in Shankman & Klein) have also surfaced (for a review, see 
Shankman & Klein). 
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2.7.5.4 Empirical Evidence for the Tripartite Model   
Support in favor of the affective aspects of the tripartite model has been 
substantial in adult clinical samples (Brown et al., 1998; Dyck, Jolly, & Kramer, 1994; 
Steer, Clark, Beck, & Ranieri, 1995), college students (e.g., Joiner, 1996), mixed clinical 
and college samples (e.g., Watson, Clark, Weber et al., 1995), and children (Chorpita, 
Plummer, & Moffit, 2000; Joiner, Cantaranzaro, & Laurent, 1996). However, studies 
investigating its specific cognitive predictions have not been numerous (D.A. Clark, 
Steer, & Beck, 1994; Watson, Weber, Assenheimer et al., 1995) and most of such studies 
were either tests of the CCS model or examples of integrative efforts (discussed below in 
more detail).  
Overall, literature provides considerable support for the tripartite model in that 
negative affectivity and related negative cognitions have been found to associate with 
both depression and anxiety and have failed to differentiate between psychopathology 
groups in a variety of samples (for a review of affective studies, see L.A. Clark, Watson, 
& Mineka, 1994). Westra and Kuiper (1996) found that besides depression and anxiety, 
Type A personality and bulimia were characterized by increased negativity of cognitions 
typical of depression, providing support for the common factor model with college 
students. In contrast, a positive affectivity factor has not been consistently linked to 
depression alone or shown to be more specific to depression than negative affectivity 
(D.A. Clark et al., 1994). Studies supporting the uniqueness of positive affectivity have 
demonstrated that low frequency of positive automatic thoughts clearly discriminates 
between depression and mixed depression-anxiety condition and other disorders, such as 
anxiety (Jolly et al., 1994) and that positive thoughts correlate more strongly with 
depressive symptoms (e.g., Burgess & Haaga, 1994). Conversely, others have 
demonstrated that low frequency of positive cognitions may be characteristic of both 
anxiety and depression (Ingram, 1989b). Further, Burns and Eidelson (1998) reanalyzed 
the tripartite model, using some of Watson, Weber et al.’s (1995) student and clinical 
samples, as well as an additional clinical sample. Their results did not yield a fit with the 
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model’s predictions but, rather, with its predecessor, the two-factor model, prompting 
researchers to conclude that anxiety and depression are distinct entities although they 
may share common etiology.  
2.7.5.5 Towards Improved Cognitive Content Specificity: Theory and Empirical 
Evidence 
Many attempts to augment the original Beck’s cognitive content specificity 
hypothesis have been made. Most such efforts include integrating several models and 
reformulating specific predictions, using a specific type of anxiety, and improving 
methodology. The tripartite model and Beck’s CCS hypothesis are complementary (R. 
Beck et al., 2003) and can be successfully integrated, as the common factor can account 
for the correlation between cognitive measures of anxiety and depression. Also, cognitive 
content could be at the lower level of the hierarchy, while valence could be at its upper 
tier. One of the earliest endeavors to devise a framework that would account for both 
common and unique factors in various disorders (such as the tripartite model), yet 
incorporate familiar cognitive terminology, was made by Ingram, Kendall, and their 
colleagues in a cognitive component model of psychopathology  Ingram & Kendall, 1987; 
Ingram & Malcarne, 1995; Kendall & Ingram, 1987; Kendall & Ingram, 1989). Their 
model is very useful when comparing a large body of research in depression and anxiety 
on cognitive variables. The three components of the model are: (1) critical or unique 
features, e.g., schematic content, temporal distortion, task-irrelevant thoughts (anxiety), 
anxiety- or depression-linked cognition, and content of automatic thoughts; (2) features 
common to several disorders, e.g., structural aspects of schema, self-absorption, 
predominant automatic processing accompanied by inability to reflect on thought 
accuracy, capacity limitations, and cognitive asymmetry in the balance of positive and 
negative thoughts; and (3) error variance, i.e., unpredictable individual differences in the 
expression of a disorder.  
Recent revisions of the CCS hypothesis (D.A. Clark & Beck, 1989; D. A. Clark et 
al., 1999) reflect reformulation of Beck’s original model in terms of Ingram’s taxonomic 
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system. For example, Richard Beck and his colleagues (R. Beck et al., 2001; R. Beck et 
al., 2003) attempted to integrate the tripartite and CCS literature in anxiety and 
depression in order to create a more holistic picture of these conditions that would 
include cognitive, emotional, and physical components. They found initial empirical 
support for the improved model. High negative affectivity was found to correlate with 
worry, whereas low positive affectivity correlated with the construct of hopelessness 
(explored in a helplessness/hopelessness model of depression not addressed here). Thus, 
the unique factors differentiating depression from anxiety were low positive affectivity, 
as well as self-critical and hopeless thoughts. Anxiety was closer associated with 
physiological arousal, which was accompanied by panic-content automatic cognitions.  
Other empirical evidence also speaks in favor of integration of the structural 
affective model (two-factor or tripartite) and CCS approach (Calvete & Connor-Smith, 
2005, Cho & Telch, 2005; D.A. Clark, Beck, & Stewart, 1990; D.A. Clark, Steer, & 
Beck, 1994; Jolly, Dyck, Kramer, & Wherry, 1994; Jolly & Kramer, 1994; McGrath & 
Ratliff, 1993), although the obtained results were sometimes mixed. For example, there 
was conflicting support for specificity for depression, with some finding less specificity 
(Cho & Telch), yet others showing more specificity (e.g., Jolly et al., 1994). Also, studies 
differ in how much support was found for the common factor of the tripartite model, with 
more support for commonality than specificity in some studies (e.g., Jolly et al., 1994) 
and more support for CCS predictions in others (Cho & Telch). In Cho and Telch’s study 
both positive and negative anxious self-statements were unique to anxiety, negative self-
statements were unique to depression, but positive depressive self-statements were 
related to both depression and anxiety. Jolly and Kramer (1994) tested the two-factor 
model (i.e., negative and positive affectivity as higher-order factors) integrated with 
cognitive aspect of the CCS. Their study data, however, supported the tripartite-CCS 
integration model (i.e., a single negative affectivity common factor) (Jolly & Kramer).  
As the tripartite model has been criticized for failing to address heterogeneity 
within the group of anxiety syndromes, Mineka et al. (1998) and Watson (2000) proposed 
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incorporating Barlow’s (1991; Zinbarg & Barlow, 1996) hierarchical model of anxiety 
into the tripartite framework. In Mineka et al.’s model, the common component of 
anxiety and depression, i.e., broad distress (in Barlow’s model – negative affect), remains 
similar to the tripartite model, but each anxiety and depressive disorder includes lower-
level unique distinguishing components (1998). Hughes et al. (2006) found preliminary 
evidence for the affective aspect of the improved tripartite model. Recently, Watson 
(2005) proposed further enhancements to the tripartite model by proposing a distinction 
within the anxiety disorder group: (1) distress disorders (GAD and PTSD, group with 
MDD and DD) and (2) fear disorders (PD, agoraphobia, social and specific phobias, and 
possibly OCD). He also noted that there is evidence that positive affectivity is not 
uniquely linked to depression but also shows consistent negative associations with social 
phobia (e.g., Brown et al., 1998; Watson, Clark, & Carey, 1988; Watson, Gamez, & 
Simms, 2005; both cited in Watson, 2005). Further theoretical elaborations and research 
are needed for the crystallization of the cognitive dimensions of specific disorders.  
Ambrose and Rholes (1993) hypothesized that the relationship between anxiety 
symptoms and threat mode cognitions is curvilinear and would depend on the frequency 
of negative cognitions. According to these researchers, it is likely that at low levels of 
negative cognitions, loss cognitions are associated with both anxious and depressive 
symptoms and only threat cognitions are associated with anxiety symptoms. However, at 
higher levels of negativity, both loss and threat cognitions may be highly associated with 
depression rather than anxiety because at those high levels, “perceived threat becomes 
partially equivalent to perceived loss, leading to a shift from anxiety to depressive 
symptom formation” (Ambrose & Rholes, 1993, p. 304). Empirical evidence for 
curvilinearity is equivocal. Jolly et al. (1994) found evidence to support this view with a 
clinical adult sample. In contrast, a study by D.A. Clark, Steer, Beck, and Snow (1996) 
did not find support using two different psychiatric adult samples.  
The CCS model can be also integrated with the SOM/BSOM model. According to 
the SOM/BSOM model, specific disorders should be differentiated by the “direction, 
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magnitude, duration, and frequency of deviation from the optimal level” (Garamoni et al., 
1991). Depressed or very anxious individuals are mostly hypothesized to be within the 
four lowest-ratio categories, depending on the degree of severity, from the lowest 
(Conflicted Dialogue) to the highest (Negative Monologue). Little research in adults has 
been conducted to test the integrated model, with most results being equivocal. Calvete 
and Connor-Smith (2005) mostly found support for the integration. In contrast, 
McDermut and Haaga (1994) established cognitive specificity of depression based on the 
depression-relevant SOM, but there was no cognitive specificity found when anxiety-
related thoughts were explored in relation to anxiety. Similarly, mixed support was found 
for the integration of the SOM and content specificity when using children samples 
(Kendall & Treadwell, 1996; Ronan & Kendall, 1997). McKellar, Malcarne, and Ingram 
(1996) integrated the tripartite model with the SOM model. They examined self-
statements of college students in varying affective states, including negative affectivity 
(NA), depression, and anxiety. Participants who were comorbid in depression, anxiety, 
and NA had lower ratios than those with “pure” condition manifestation, which in turn 
were lower than those for control group. Calvete et al. (2005a) found that the BSOM 
ratios and negative self-statements were closer associated with the symptoms of 
depression, anxiety, and anger than positive self-statements.  
In addition to integrating several models, some attempted to analyze the 
relationship between specific anxiety disorders and depression in order to improve 
specificity. It has been proposed that specific forms of anxiety would show better 
cognitive content differentiation from depression than generalized anxiety measures (R. 
Beck & Perkins, 2001; Cho & Telch, 2005; Ingram et al., 1987; Kendall & Ingram, 
1989). Arguably, social phobia has generated the most substantial body of content 
specificity research of all clinical anxiety disorders, possibly due to the availability and 
popularity of self-statement instruments in the area. However, most specificity studies of 
social phobia and depression produced mixed results (Bruch, Mattia, Heimberg, & Holt, 
1993; Ingram, 1989a, 1989b; Johnson, Johnson, & Petzel, 1992; Sanz & Avia, 1994). The 
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results suggested difficulties in linking positive cognitions to depression and their 
variability depending on depression severity and, more importantly, depression and social 
anxiety having negative valence in common. Using structural equation modeling, Cho 
and Telch’s (2005) findings supported cognitive content specificity of social anxiety and 
depression, with positive and negative anxiety-specific self-statements uniquely 
associated with social anxiety and negative depressive statements more closely associated 
with depression. However, positive depression-specific cognitions were linked to both 
anxiety and depression, contradicting the tripartite and CCS models. Similarly, Ingram 
(1989b) established specificity of negative content for depression but failed to find 
specificity of positive self-statements in college students when compared to depression, 
as they were related to both depression and social anxiety.  Also, in first study by Bruch 
et al. (1993), depression-specific negative thoughts covaried only with depression and 
social-anxiety negative content covaried with both social anxiety and depression. In a 
second study by the same researchers, which tested college students with social phobia 
varying in depressive affect (no, low-moderate, and high), those with highest levels of 
depression reported a lower percent of positive thoughts and significantly more negative 
thoughts than those with no comorbidity. Thus, Bruch et al.’s research offered evidence 
for specificity of depression but not social anxiety. In contrast, Sanz and Avia (1994, 
study 2) provided support for specificity of negative anxious content of social anxiety, 
which was found to be more related to social anxiety than to depression.  
When looking at panic disorder, Woody et al. (1998) found that its cognition 
profile was uniquely different from that of depression but that depression profile included 
cognitions about terrible things that might happen (worry), which falls within the anxiety 
domain, in addition to depression-specific thoughts. Additionally, a comorbid group had 
troubles in social-evaluative and somatic domains, indicating an additive effect of social 
phobia and depression. D.A. Clark, Beck, and Beck (1994) also found support for theme-
differentiated cognitions of participants with depression and PD but not for generalized 
anxiety disorder (cited in D.A. Clark & Steer, 1996), confirming the hypothesized 
difficulties of GAD and depression cognitive content differentiation.  
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A few researchers have attempted to include disorders or conditions other than 
anxiety and depression in their specificity designs, e.g., anger (Calvete et al., 2005a), 
externalizing behaviors (Calvete & Connor-Smith, 2005), and bulimia and Type A 
personality (Westra & Kuiper, 1996). For example, in a study by Westra and Kuiper 
(1996), cognitions pertaining to failure and loss were unique to depression, whereas 
interpersonal evaluation concerns were more unique to anxiety. An overlap in cognitive 
content was also observed, as performance evaluation concerns and a subset of 
depressive cognitions (including low self-worth) were also related to anxiety, as well as 
to bulimia and Type A personality. Other studies including additional conditions had 
mixed results (Sanz & Avia, 1994; Calvete et al., 2005), failing to differentiate between 
all disorder groups on all variables and supporting validity of the common-factor 
approach.  
Finally, some researchers speculated that that the ambiguity of findings can be 
attributed to the flaws in methodology and assessment (Feldman, 1993; Ingram, 1989a; 
Jolly et al., 1994; McGrath & Ratliff, 1993). Some suggested that content discrimination 
between anxiety and depression measures could be improved by including items that 
contain more specific cognitions (R. Beck et al., 2003; D.A. Clark, Steer, Beck, & Snow, 
1996). Recent CCS research has focused on refining anxiety content measures. For 
example, Molina et al. (1998) discovered that anxiety (GAD) was associated with higher 
frequency of somatic anxious words, catastrophization, and rigid, rule-bound 
interpretation, compared with depressed and control participants. Also, R. Beck et al. 
(2003) successfully used a multidimensional cognitive assessment tool to address the 
heterogeneity of anxious cognitive content. 
2.7.6 Summary 
Since most believe that depression and anxiety are not the same construct, 
differentiating between the two based on their relevant cognitive elements has become 
the focus of many cognitive theorists. In devising various theoretical explanations, the 
researchers have centered on automatic cognitions. The predominant models in the area 
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are Aaron Beck’s content specificity hypothesis (often used with Beck’s negativity and 
exclusivity hypotheses) and the tripartite model. According to Beck’s conceptualization, 
depression and anxiety have their unique cognitive content reflective of specific schemas. 
Additionally, depressive content is more negative, self-focused, and less positive, 
compared to that of anxiety. The rivaling tripartite model indicates that depression and 
anxiety have high negative affect in common, while they could be differentiated based on 
low positive content (unique to depression) and high physiological arousal (unique to 
anxiety). Content specificity research yields mixed results, with specificity not as 
consistent in certain populations (e.g. in nonclinical samples and youths), with more 
generalized types of anxiety and measures, and measures of anxiety symptoms. Literature 
indicates that integrating several models of cognitive specificity, investigating specific 
types of anxiety, and using measures with better discriminant validity may be beneficial 
for the detection of differences between depression and anxiety 
Test anxiety is one of well-studied specific forms of anxiety. Conceptualization of 
test anxiety is introduced next, along with its prevalence, course, and sex differences. 
Subsequently, a cognitive system of test anxiety and theoretical and empirical 
underpinnings of cognitive content specificity of test anxiety and depression are 
reviewed. 
2.8 Test Anxiety 
2.8.1 Conceptualization 
In the current age of technology, evaluations are so widespread and pervasive that 
they have become a powerful source of anxiety for many. “We live in a test-conscious, 
test-giving culture in which the lives of people are in part determined by their test 
performance” (S.B. Sarason, 1959, p. 26). The tendency of a person to become anxious 
under evaluative conditions, particularly testing, has come to be known as test anxiety. 
The official start of the large-scale anxiety research dates back to the early 1950s. Since 
then, much theoretical work has been done in capturing this elusive concept. Test anxiety 
has been defined within various frameworks including motivational/drive models  
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Atkinson & Feather, 1966; Mandler & Sarason, 1952; Spence & Spence, 1966); 
personality models (e.g., Hill, 1972); cognitive-attentional models (Wine, 1980, 1982; 
Sarason & Sarason, 1986); cognitive-motivational models (Carver & Scheier, 1991; 
Covington, 1992); and transactional (interactionist) models (Spielberger & Vagg, 1995; 
Zeidner, 1997; Zeidner, 1998). Additionally, dual-deficit models (Meichenbaum & 
Butler, 1980) and social learning theory (Bandura, 1977, 1989; cited in Smith, Arnkoff, 
& Wright, 1990) contributed to the field of test anxiety study. Research in test anxiety 
has been criticized for being “decontextualized”, but more comprehensive models are 
starting to surface (e.g., Bodas & Ollendick, 2005). Arguably, a model that takes into 
consideration the entire complexity of test anxiety is yet to be developed (Zeidner, 1998). 
Currently, interactionist approaches, which focus on the connections between the 
multitude of test anxiety elements, appear to be most popular in the field.  
Test anxiety research often parallels or borrows from that on general anxiety. For 
example, researchers differentiate between cognitive (irrelevant thinking), physio-
emotional (body reaction and perceived tension), and behavioral (avoidance of testing 
situations and procrastination) aspects of test anxiety. Testing appears to be a universally 
stressful process, and most people experience elevations in physiological arousal prior to 
and during testing, whether they are regarded test anxious or not (Deffenbacher & 
Hazaleus, 1985; cited in Carver & Scheier, 1986). However, it is students’ cognitive and 
behavioral responses to the evaluative situation that are believed to be crucial in the 
differentiation of high and low levels of test anxiety (Carver & Scheier, 1986; Zeidner, 
1998). Therefore, these aspects of test anxiety are considered particularly relevant for 
research and practice.  
Like general anxiety, test anxiety is often viewed in terms of trait and state 
components and is most frequently defined as a situation-specific trait, i.e., one’s 
disposition to react with elevated worry, mental confusion, intrusive thoughts, tension, 
and physiological arousal when exposed to evaluative situations (Sarason & Sarason, 
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1990; Spielberger & Vagg, 1995). Those high in trait test anxiety, presumably, show a 
higher increase in state anxiety in evaluative situations than those low in trait test anxiety.  
Liebert and Morris (1967) were the first to outline the distinction between worry 
and emotionality within test anxiety (cited in Spielberger et al., 1995). Their research 
exemplifies how the conceptualization of test anxiety influenced the study of general 
anxiety. In the test anxiety domain, a cognitive element of worry is defined as a concern 
about one’s performance on a test, as well as about implications and consequences of 
failure (Zeidner, 1998). Emotionality encompasses affective and physioemotional 
reactions, i.e., autonomic arousal (e.g., sweating, shaking, increased heart rate, muscle 
tension, and upset stomach). In addition to worry and emotionality, other dimensions of 
test anxiety may include cognitive interference and lack of confidence (Sarason & 
Sarason, 1990; Stober, 2004). Self-efficacy (or being able to control demands of the 
environment by engaging in some activity) has also been seen as contributing to test 
anxiety as a correlate of worry (Schwartzer & Jerusalem, 1992). Despite a consensus that 
worry and emotionality are present within test anxiety and anxiety in general and likely to 
contribute the most to its content (Hodapp & Benson, 1997), there is still a disagreement 
on how these concepts fit with other dimensions of anxiety. Some researchers believe 
worry to fall in the category of trait anxiety, whereas emotionality is thought to 
correspond to state anxiety (e.g., Sapp, 1999). Thus, research work on refining the 
conceptualization of test anxiety continues.  
Test anxiety is frequently linked with poor test outcomes (particularly, its state 
worry component), overall academic underachievement, and compromised assessment 
validity (Hembree, 1988; O’Neil & Fukumura, 1992; O’Neil & Abedi, 1992; Spielberger, 
Gonzalez, Taylor, Algaze, & Anton, 1978; Tryon, 1980; Zeidner, 1998). However, the 
much researched direct association between test anxiety and performance is currently 
debated (Zeidner, 1998), as test anxiety has been proposed to be just one variable out of 
an array of multiple cognitive, emotional, motivational, physiological, and environmental 
factors that contribute to achievement. For example, Chapell and his colleagues found 
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that although female participants in their study had higher test anxiety, they also had 
higher GPAs (2005). Environmental and individual factors that have been implicated in 
test anxiety include students’ academic abilities, study habits, school attitudes, classroom 
environment, enrichment opportunities, self-perception, and health (Zeidner, 1998). 
Increased test anxiety has been associated with the degree of test importance. High-stakes 
testing is thought to cause more test anxiety than low-stakes tests (O’Neil & Abedi, 
1992). Test anxiety appears to be a cross-cultural phenomenon: although it does not exist 
outside of cultural context, it has not been always shown to be impacted by ethnicity 
(Zeidner, 1990; Zeidner, 1998).  
2.8.2 Test Anxiety and Other Anxiety Disorders 
Test anxiety is not classified as a clinical anxiety disorder and, thus, is not 
included in the DSM-IV-TR (2000). Consequently, unlike other anxiety disorders, it has 
been less subject to a categorical distinction and mostly treated as a dimensional concept. 
However, the issues in interpretation of test anxiety remain, since the condition that is 
most often mentioned in relation with test anxiety, i.e., social phobia, has a similar profile 
and is a clinical disorder in the DSM-IV-TR. “Social phobia is characterized by the desire 
to perform well in situations involving interaction with or observation by others, coupled 
with the fear that one will fail, and as a result, will meet with embarrassment, rejection, or 
negative evaluation” (Chambless & Hope, 1996, p. 345). Social phobia occurs far in 
advance to the exposure to threatening stimuli and, if intense and comorbid with other 
conditions, is associated with increased suicide ideation (DSM-IV-TR).  
Test anxiety and social phobia have similar physiological, cognitive, affective, 
and behavioral symptoms and common antecedent correlates (Chambless & Hope, 1996; 
Sarason & Sarason, 1990; Purdon et al., 2001; Zeidner, 1997). Those with test anxiety 
and social phobia negatively evaluate the quality of their performance, are preoccupied 
with how others are judging them and how they appear to others, and anticipate failure 
and loss of regard by others. However, social phobia is manifested in the context of both 
social interaction and performance, while test anxiety is present only in the evaluative 
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domain of performance. In contrast to social phobia, which can be generalized (present in 
all social situations) and specific (e.g., fear of public speaking, fear of eating in public), 
test anxiety is fairly homogeneous across evaluative situations. It must be noted that 
specific subject test anxieties (e.g., math, statistics, and foreign language) are considered 
somewhat different from generalized test anxiety because they include a content 
component in addition to the performance component (Benson, 1989).  
Zuriff (1997) advocates interpretation of test anxiety as a possible manifestation 
of social phobia, warranting special accommodations under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (1990) for those who have the symptoms and have an educational need 
(e.g., much lower performance than could be expected based on the student’s potential). 
Beidel and Turner (1988) found that 60% of the highly test anxious schoolchildren in 
their study met the DSM criteria for an anxiety disorder, with social phobia being a 
common diagnosis (cited in King, Mietz, Tinney, & Ollendick, 1995).  
Many view test anxiety as a special case of the broader class of evaluative anxiety 
disorders (which also include performance anxiety and social phobia) (A.T. Beck & 
Emery, 1985; Trower, Guilbert, & Sherling, 1990; Wine, 1982; Zeidner, 1998). Trower 
and his colleagues contend that individuals experience similar evaluation anxiety across 
different situations, which can be grouped into three categories: (1) social situations (e.g., 
a party); (2) school or vocational situations (e.g., taking a test, having one’s performance 
evaluated, or participating in athletic competition); and (3) interactions with the outside 
world (e.g., shopping or traveling) (1990). According to this view, both test anxiety and 
social phobia would be classified as evaluative anxiety disorders. Overall, it is not clear 
how test anxiety should be addressed clinically and whether it is (1) a separate disorder 
that frequently co-occurs with social phobia, (2) merely one of the manifestations or 
symptoms of social phobia, or (3) a disorder that shares vulnerability or a common factor 
with it.   
Most research in the area of test anxiety has been psychoeducational and 
generated models that are specific to test anxiety and do not necessarily allow for the 
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inclusion of other types of anxiety disorders (Sarason, Sarason, Keefe, Hayes, & Shearin, 
1986; Wine, 1980). Test and evaluation anxiety have been investigated predominantly 
with nonreferred undergraduate students rather than clinical populations. On the other 
hand, popular clinical models involving anxiety (A.T. Beck, 1976) have not been well 
explored using test anxious individuals. Test anxiety has generated a large body of 
intervention programs and therapeutic techniques. Also, it is generally mentioned as one 
of the key contributors to the decrease in physical and mental health and school 
adjustment (Hembree, 1988; Spielberger, Gonzalez, Taylor, Algaze, & Anton, 1978; 
Zeidner, 1998). Lastly, test anxiety construct may prove useful when generalizing to 
other evaluative anxiety disorders. Thus, research of test anxiety has clinical utility. 
2.8.3 Prevalence and Course of Test Anxiety 
Prevalence of test anxiety is evident, albeit not widely documented, partly due to 
methodological and definitional problems. High test anxiety levels may be present in as 
many as 25-30% of American school-age students (Nottelmann & Hill, 1977; cited in 
McDonald, 2001). Prevalence of test anxiety might have increased over time, due to 
exposure to testing at a younger age and increased reliance on testing, although the 
estimates may differ depending on the assessment method (McDonald, 2001). In college 
student populations test anxiety rates run at approximately 15% and may be higher (Hill 
& Wigfield, 1984). In the study by Zeidner and Nevo (1992), 16% of the college 
admission sample from Israel rated themselves high in overall test anxiety (measured by 
the high frequency on at least 50% of endorsed symptoms). In Chapell et al.’s (2005) 
study, approximately 16% of the mixed-sex undergraduate sample reported high test 
anxiety, compared to 17% from the graduate sample. No differences in test anxiety were 
found within the graduate group, i.e. between master’s and doctoral students (Chapell et 
al.). 
Scanty research in developmental patterns of test anxiety highlights a consistent 
rise in levels of test anxiety through elementary school (stabilizing towards its end), then 
a peak in junior high school, leveling off or a mild decline throughout the rest of high 
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school, and a slow decline in college (Hill & Sarason, 1966; Manley & Rosemier, 1972; 
Pekrun & Frese, 1992; Wigfield & Eccles, 1989). Overall, literature suggests that by the 
end of high school, students may have established levels of test anxiety that are less likely 
to fluctuate over time. The following explanations for the age increases throughout grade 
school have been offered including: (1) increased demands for academic achievement 
from significant others over the school years; (2) increased value of social (peer) 
comparison; (3) increased complexity of learning materials and tasks/increased frequency 
of testing; (4) cumulative effects of failures and other aversive experiences; (5) decrease 
in children’s defensiveness; and (6) increase in the accuracy and reliability of self-report 
over the school years (McDonald, 2001; Zeidner, 1998).  
2.8.4 Sex Differences in Test Anxiety 
Being a woman or a man is often believed to have an effect on test anxiety’s 
development and manifestation. Group sex differences have pointed to overall higher test 
anxiety levels in grade-school and college women across various countries (Benson, 
1989; El-Zahhar & Hocevar, 1991; Seipp, 1991; Sowa & Lafleur, 1986; Spielberger et 
al., 1980; Zeidner, 1990). Hembree’s (1988) meta-analysis highlights that sex differences 
start emerging during the middle years of elementary school and persist through high 
school and college. However, despite the consistent observations of findings, the 
magnitude of these differences is relatively small and could vary depending on the level 
of anxiety. The meta-analytic reviews of literature found sex groups separated by less 
than one third of a standard deviation, with the difference larger on the emotionality 
factor than on the worry factor (Hembree; Seipp & Schwartzer, 1996). A large-scale 
study with undergraduate and graduate students Chapell et al. (2005) found that the actual 
differences were not of great magnitude: high test anxious undergraduate women (i.e., at 
least one standard deviation above the mean) constituted approximately 16.5% of the 
sample, compared to about 14.5% men. In a graduate sample, about 18% of women 
reported high test anxiety versus 14% men (Chapell et al.). In a study by Sowa and 
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LaFleur (1986), women reported greater symptom intensity for both social anxiety and 
test anxiety. 
Several explanations have been proposed to account for differential manifestation 
of test anxiety in women and men. Drawing on the psychodynamic theory, women have 
been considered to be more uncomfortable and self-conscious in testing situations. 
Research generally supports women’s evaluative sensitivity (Arch, 1987; Lewis & 
College, 1987; both cited in Zeidner, 1998). For example, women have been frequently 
found to undervalue and underpredict their performance compared to men (see Wine, 
1980, for a review), and their self-efficacy appears to be lower than that of men (Arch, 
1987; cited in Zeidner, 1998).  
Some hypothesized that women and men yield disparate interpretations and 
responses in evaluative circumstances, with men perceiving testing as a challenge 
(facilitating their performance), and women viewing it as a threat (performance-
debilitating) (Lewis & College, 1987; cited in Zeidner, 1998). Couch, Garber, and Turner 
(1983) validated the hypothesis, showing more debilitating anxiety in women. Similarly, 
Jerusalem (1985) suggested that individual’s sex is an important moderator in a test 
anxiety-performance relationship. In contrast, studies by Zeidner (1990) and by Payne, 
Smith, and Payne (1983b) did not show one’s sex to interact with test anxiety in affecting 
performance, although facilitating and debilitating anxiety were not assessed separately. 
Spielberger et al.’s (1980) research found a weak association between test anxiety and 
performance for both men and women.  
A psychosocial approach names differential socialization and styles of child 
rearing of boys and girls responsible for sex differences (Deaux, 1977; Maccoby & 
Jacklin, 1974; both cited in Zeidner, 1998). Society tends to be more tolerant of test 
anxiety in women, making its expression socially acceptable and reinforcing (Hill, 1972; 
Hill & Sarason, 1966). For men and boys, on the other hand, it is less acceptable to admit 
their feelings, which leads to their higher defensiveness scores and, ultimately, to sex 
differences in test anxiety report (Hill & Sarason, 1966). The differential report 
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hypothesis has received some empirical support in that when using different cutoffs for 
the test anxiety-assessing instruments for different sexes, the gap in scores tends to 
disappear (e.g., Turner, Beidel, Hughes, & Turner, 1993; cited in McDonald, 2001).  
2.8.5 Cognitive System in Test Anxiety 
It has been observed that some students with good study habits and preparation 
experience test anxiety even on routine examinations, leading theorists to suggest that test 
anxiety, at least in part, could be attributed to pathological beliefs and resulting 
maladaptive thoughts. Lending credibility to the cognitive model, cognitive therapy has 
been found effective in reducing test anxiety and seems to generalize from individual 
settings to school settings (Sarason & Sarason, 1990). As early as 1978, Irwin Sarason 
hypothesized that test anxiety results from (1) expectations that a task is too difficult or 
the person is inadequate (or both) and (2) anticipation of failure. Although it is the 
emotionality component that has received the most attention from empirical researchers 
and theorists (Spielberger et al., 1980), cognitive processing components of test anxiety, 
such as metacognition, cognitive, attentional, and memory biases, cognitive capacity, 
cognitive interference, and cognitive appraisal have been investigated in many recent 
studies (Arkin, Dutchon, & Maruyama, 1982; Cassady, 2004; Cassady & Johnson, 2002; 
Dewhurst & Marlborough, 2003; Everson et al., 1994; Friedman and Bendas-Jacob, 
1997; Hedl, 1987; Hunsley, 1985; Lang et al., 1983; Spada et al., 2006). Cognitive 
aspects of test anxiety have been also implicated in several contemporary models (Dutke 
& Stober, 2001; Keogh, Bond, French, et al., 2004) and measures of test anxiety 
(Friedman & Bendas-Jacob, 1997; Cassady & Johnson, 2002). The existence of faulty 
beliefs in test anxiety has been empirically supported (Pekrun, 1984).  
Consistent with the mode of threat, high test anxious students allocate a 
disproportionately large share of resources to the threatening stimuli of an evaluative 
nature, exaggerating the objective dangers generated by the environment and 
downplaying the safety-related stimuli (D. A. Clark & Beck, 1989; Dombeck, Siegle, & 
 68 
Ingram, 1996). Once an exam approaches, the student’s orientation becomes linked with 
a possibility of failure and includes such potential consequences as “a blow to…self-
esteem, an obstacle to future plan, a personal defeat, a disgrace in the eyes of…friends, 
[and] disappointment to…family....As the notion of threat takes hold, there is an 
automatic shift in [the] cognitive organization to a ‘vulnerability set’….Attention is 
drawn to various possible weaknesses – omissions in [the] coverage of the material, 
deficiencies in comprehension, difficulties in collating and expressing what…has [been] 
learned” (A.T. Beck, 1989, p. 109). As the test goes on, the flaws in knowledge, 
understanding, and responses are exaggerated. Students with high levels of test anxiety 
cannot alter their vulnerability set. Some may go from the defensive phase to the helpless 
phase or respond with a panic attack (A.T. Beck).  
In contrast to non-test-anxious individuals, those with test anxiety tend to 
frequently experience task disengagement and are flooded with involuntary thoughts that 
are highly distractive (Carver & Scheier, 1986; Zeidner, 1998). Individual’s trait test 
anxiety may predispose one to experience interference on tasks across many situations 
that are perceived as evaluative, e.g., athletics and social interaction (Pierce et al., 1996). 
An elevated state test anxiety component will ensure that an individual will experience 
intruding thoughts on a particular test. Studies of cognitive interference found a 
considerable support for the process occurring in test anxiety (Blankenstein et al., 1989; 
Frantisek, Stuchlik, & Hagtvet, 1992; Sarason et al., 1986; Zatz & Chassin, 1985).  
Besides cognitive interference, cognitive processes in test anxiety are 
characterized by biases in attention, memory, and selection. Test anxious students 
typically exaggerate the negative or recall similar experiences of physiological arousal 
and/or failure. They also tend to downplay the positive and disregard any successes or 
pleasant evaluative experiences (Purdon, Antony, Monteiro, & Swinson, 2001; Zeidner, 
1998). Highly test-anxious participants accept more of the negative anxiety-relevant 
material as self-descriptive than their low anxious counterparts (Lang et al., 1983; 
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Mueller & Thompson, 1984). The results point to the existence of the selective 
attentional negative bias congruent with the test anxious schema.  
2.8.6 Automatic Thoughts in Test Anxiety 
Test anxious cognitions have been widely researched, mostly due to the 
aforementioned link with performance (e.g., via cognitive interference process). In terms 
of their content, the intrusive automatic thoughts of test anxious students are thought to 
focus on the following themes: (1) the self (e.g., perception of inadequacy and doubts 
about ability to cope with threatening situations and about academic competence); (2) the 
task (e.g., performing well on the test and perceived difficulty of the questions); (3) 
escape from a threatening situation (e.g., off-task matters); and (4) social evaluation (e.g., 
meeting expectations of others, comparing themselves with other students, and perceived 
possibility of negative evaluation) (Carver & Scheier, 1987; Hunsley, 1987; Pierce, 
Henderson, Yost, & Loffredo, 1996; Sarason et al., 1986; Sarason & Sarason, 1990; 
Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1992; Zeidner, 1998).  
Notably, the cognitive aspects of the self, social evaluation, and avoidance have 
also been investigated in social phobia research (Alden, Mellings, & Ryder, 2001; Beidel, 
Turner, & Dancu, 1985; Clark & Wells, 1995; Glass & Furlong, 1990; Hope, Gansler, & 
Heimberg, 1989; Leary, 2001; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Stopa & Clark, 1993; Tanner, 
Stopa, & De Houwer, 2006; Wilson & Rapee, 2006; Vassilopoulos, 2004). Interested 
reader is also referred to the reviews of literature in the area (Alden & Taylor, 2004; 
Allen & Page, 2005; Amir & Foa, 2001; Foa, Franklin, & Kozak, 2001; Hirsch & Clark, 
2004; Hofmann, Heinrichs, & Moscovitch, 2004; Hook & Valentiner, 2002; Spurr & 
Stopa, 2002). Thus, it appears that it is the task- (test-) related content (including escape 
from the evaluative situation) that sets test anxiety apart from social phobia.   
Self-preoccupation and self-focused attention under evaluative circumstances is 
postulated by some researchers to be the most salient characteristic of test anxious 
individuals compared to their low test anxious peers (Carver & Scheier, 1987; Sarason, 
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1980; Wine, 1980, 1982; Zeidner, 1998). Research corroborates the self-related thought 
patterns of test anxious individuals compared to low anxiety persons (Blankenstein, 
Toner, & Flett, 1989; Galassi, Frierson, & Sharer, 1981a, 1981b; Sarason et al., 1986). 
Task-relevant as well as task-irrelevant content of test anxious cognitions have been also 
supported by research (King et al., 1995; Sarason et al., 1986).  
The valence of automatic thoughts in test anxiety has been examined in various 
aspects, alone and in conjunction with other cognition parameters, e.g., quantity of 
negative and/or positive thoughts, frequency of negative and positive thoughts, and the 
degree of one’s belief in negative thoughts. Overall, research results indicate that those 
with high test anxiety generate a negatively-colored cognition stream, characterized by 
higher numbers and frequency of negative and lower frequency and numbers of positive 
thoughts, compared to those with low test anxiety (Blankstein & Flett, 1990; Blankstein, 
Flett, Boase, & Toner, 1991; Bruch, Kaflowitz, & Kuethe, 1986; Galassi et al., 1981a, 
1981b; Hunsley, 1987b; King et al., 1995; Zatz & Chassin, 1983). The same tendency is 
evident in social phobia (Beidel, Turner, & Dancu, 1985; Stopa & Clark, 1993). 
Additionally, test anxious individuals believe more in the plausibility of their self-
deprecatory cognitions than their low test anxious counterparts (Bruch et al., 1986). 
Minor and Gold (1986) measured test anxiety during an exam and one week later. They 
discovered that negative thoughts (as well as self-reported arousal) were consistent over 
time, while positive thoughts were unstable, pointing to the possibility of negative 
thoughts being a more ingrained part of the test anxious schema. When reviewing self-
statement research, Zeidner (1998) underscored that the relationship of test anxiety and 
negative thoughts has not received consistent support in the literature, prompting some 
researchers (e.g., Blankstein et al., 1991) to speculate that test anxiety is related more 
strongly to low positive rather than high negative cognition. However, the connection 
between high negative cognition and test anxiety continues to intrigue researchers, as 
even imagining a testing situation is likely to evoke negative thinking in test anxious 
students (Heimberg, Nyman, & O’Brien, 1987; cited in Zeidner, 1998). 
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2.8.6.1 Test Anxiety and the SOM and BSOM Models 
Robert Topman and his colleagues from the Netherlands found that the SOM 
ratios of the highly test anxious students (.4; Failed Coping Dialogue in the BSOM 
model) were more dysfunctional than those of students with low test anxiety (.9; Positive 
Dialogue) (Topman et al., 1992). Another study by the same group of researchers found 
that highly test anxious freshmen had a mean SOM ratio of .49 (Conflicted Dialogue in 
the BSOM model), versus .66 (upper end of Successful Coping Dialogue) in students 
with moderate test anxiety and .81 (Positive Dialogue) in those with low test anxiety 
(Topman, Kleijn, & van der Ploeg, 1997). In a study of evaluation anxiety in graduate 
students, Arnkoff, Glass, and Robinson (1992) demonstrated the connections between the 
SOM model and test anxiety in different phases of an evaluative situation. However, 
negative thoughts alone were also related to test anxiety. Glass et al. (1995) investigated 
cognitions during a career-related exam. In their study, it was negative thoughts and not 
the SOM ratios that uniquely contributed to test anxiety. 
2.8.7 Summary 
Test anxiety is a well-researched construct with practical applications. It has 
multiple components and has been conceptualized in a number of ways from various 
perspectives, with no one model capturing it in its entirety. Test anxiety is closely 
associated with the clinical condition of social phobia but is typically measured as a 
continuous variable through self-report instruments. It is highly prevalent in youths and 
although it may stabilize during college years, the rates remain high. Preponderance of 
test anxiety in women over men seems to be consistent throughout the world, although 
the differences are not of great magnitude and it is still unclear whether they could be 
mostly attributed to differential endorsement on self-report measures. Test anxiety has 
been linked to the biased cognitive processing, frequent dysfunctional automatic thoughts 
interfering with test performance, and few positive thoughts. Although research in test 
anxiety has been mostly in the educational field, the condition lends itself to further 
examination, with the possibility of its integration into the clinical models.   
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2.9 Cognitive Content Differentiation of Test Anxiety and Depression 
2.9.1 Comorbidity of Test Anxiety and Depression 
Like clinically-defined anxiety disorders and anxiety symptoms, test anxiety has been 
found to co-occur with depression (Beidel & Turner, 1988; King et al., 1995; McDonald, 
2001). Several correlational studies found a mild-to-moderate association between the 
two conditions, ranging from .36 to .50 (Comunian, 1989; Flett & Blankstein, 1994; 
Zeidner, 1994). Comorbidity of test anxiety and depression is common among college 
students. Strack, Blaney, Ganellen, and Coyne (1983) found that depressed students had 
significantly higher levels of test anxiety than nondepressed students (cited in Gotlib, 
1984). Both conditions are associated with important clinical variables, such as suicide 
ideation (DSM-IV-TR, 2000; Lee, Wong, Chow, & McBride-Chang, 2006). In addition to 
the overlap with the symptomatic measures of depression, test anxiety has been 
theoretically and empirically connected to the same cognitive variables traditionally 
associated with depression, e.g., self-focused cognitions and high frequency of negative 
cognitions and low frequency of positive cognitions (see sections 2.7.4 and 2.8.6).  
2.9.2 Empirical Evidence for Cognitive Content Specificity  
of Test Anxiety and Depression 
Despite comorbidity of test anxiety and depression and the similarity of the 
cognitive constructs implicated in the maintenance of those disorders, specificity research 
investigating a cognitive link between the two conditions has been insufficient. 
Leitenberg, Yost, and Carroll-Wilson (1986) tested cognitive processing in depressed and 
test anxious children. They discovered that cognitive errors were common in both, 
implying a lack of differentiation between the two conditions at younger ages. There have 
been only a handful of studies in the area that addressed cognitive content specificity of 
test anxiety and depression in adults. Sanz and Avia (1994, study 1) were interested in the 
cognitive differences between self-report of college students with social phobia versus 
those with depression. Acknowledging the overlap between test anxiety and social phobia 
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and potential confounding issues, they included a test anxious group in their study in 
addition to socially anxious, control, and comorbid (depressed and socially- or test-
anxious) groups. Test anxiety was found to have a cognitive profile different from that of 
social phobia in that test anxious students reported more interfering thoughts related to 
test situations. However, specificity of test anxiety compared to depression could not be 
established directly, since both comorbid and test anxious groups scored high on 
cognitive interference (relevant to test anxiety) and there was no “purely” depressed 
group.  
Ingram et al. (1987) conducted the only cognitive specificity study that looked at 
the differences between depressed, test anxious, comorbid, and asymptomatic groups of 
college students. They compared subjects on several cognitive measures, including 
information processing and current cognitive activity. The data provided evidence for the 
patterns of both differences and similarities in depression and test anxiety. Favoring 
specificity, depressed students tended to engage in more negative self-referent automatic 
cognition, and recall more self-referent depressive information. In contrast, test anxious 
students reported more interfering cognitions and manifested selective processing of 
anxiety-specific information. The comorbid group reported more dysfunctional 
cognitions than any one of the other groups.  
 
2.10 Statement of the Problem 
The idea of cognitive content specificity implies that depression and anxiety have 
several unique cognitive features and, therefore, can be differentiated based on their 
respective content, which is typically exemplified by automatic thoughts (A.T. Beck, 
1976). Within the CCS model, cognitions specific to depression reflect themes of loss, 
whereas anxiety-related thoughts revolve around themes of threat (A.T. Beck; D. A. 
Clark et al., 1999). Additionally, depression is thought be linked to more negative and 
less positive cognitions than anxiety. In contrast, hierarchical structural models (e.g., the 
tripartite model) propose that although depression has a unique feature of low positivity, 
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anxiety and depression have negative cognitions in common (L.A. Clark & Watson, 
1991). The CCS model and the tripartite model have been explored with both clinical and 
nonclinical populations, children and adults, and using different methods. The data are 
somewhat ambiguous in that they favor depression specificity more than anxiety 
specificity (Ambrose & Rholes, 1993; A.T. Beck et al., 1987; Ingram et al., 1987; 
Laurent & Stark, 1993; Rholes, Riskind, & Neville, 1985). Research also indicated 
stronger support for negative content, but depression was not found to be uniquely 
characterized by low positive cognitions (Bruch et al., 1993). Such ambiguity in 
specificity research can be attributed to various factors, such as (1) the use of a 
nonspecific anxiety condition/disorder; (2) need for more integrative approaches to CCS; 
(3) the lack of appropriate assessment instruments and methodological limitations; and 
(4) characteristics of the sample.  
Specific anxieties show less comorbidity and less diagnostic symptom overlap 
with depression than more generalized types of anxiety (DSM-IV-TR, 2000; Levine et al., 
2001). Cognitive theorists proposed that in contrast to generalized anxiety, specific forms 
of anxiety have more narrowly-circumscribed schematic content and, therefore, they 
would be expected to manifest better differentiation from depression on cognitive 
measures (Epkins, 1996). For example, social phobia shows lower correlations with 
depression than several other specific anxiety disorders (Kessler et al., 1996; cited in 
Hadzi-Pavlovic, 2001; Mineka et al., 1998). Further, research on specificity of social 
phobia and panic disorder against depression has yielded mostly optimistic results (D.A. 
Clark et al., 1994; Sanz & Avia, 1994; Westra & Kuiper, 1996; Woody, Taylor, McLean, 
& Koch, 1998). As a specific nonclinical form of anxiety with well-studied cognitive 
components that is often grouped in the same class as social phobia and shows relatively 
little symptomatic overlap with depression, test anxiety should also show good, if not 
better, content differentiation from depression (Ingram et al., 1987).  
Studying test anxiety has long been deemed important, given its prevalence and 
potentially debilitating emotional and performance-hampering effects. Test anxiety is 
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frequently comorbid with depression (McDonald, 2001) and, much like depression, it has 
been linked with increased negative and decreased positive thinking (Blankstein et al., 
1991; Blankstein & Flett, 1990). Thus, the subject of cognitive content differentiation of 
test anxiety and depression warrants further investigation. Research looking into the 
cognitive specificity of test anxiety and depression has been virtually non-existent, 
possibly due to test anxiety being studied almost exclusively within the 
psychoeducational field. The few relevant studies with college students (Ingram et al., 
1987; Sanz & Avia, 1994) involved differing methodologies and produced somewhat 
ambiguous findings. The current dissertation study built on previous research by 
examining automatic thoughts in test anxiety and depression.   
Secondly, although there have been many studies using an integrative approach to 
CCS with anxiety and depression (R. Beck et al., 2001; R. Beck et al., 2003; Calvete & 
Connor-Smith, 2005; Cho & Telch, 2005; D.A. Clark, Beck, & Stewart, 1990; D.A. 
Clark, Steer, & Beck, 1994; Jolly et al., 1994; Jolly & Kramer, 1994), few studies have 
incorporated the SOM ratios into the CCS model when looking at college students (for 
exceptions, see Calvete & Connor-Smith, 2005; Calvete et al., 2005a; McDermut & 
Haaga, 1994; McKellar et al., 1996). To the author’s knowledge, no study has yet looked 
at the difference in the cognitive ratios between depression and test anxiety on the 
disorder-relevant cognitions in college students. The BSOM approach (Schwartz, 1997) 
appears to have a potential for good differentiation because the ratios add greater 
quantitative precision to cognitive specificity and explain the role of positive cognition in 
psychopathology (Haaga, Dyck, & Ernst, 1991).  
Some researchers speculate that it is chiefly limitations in methodology (e.g., 
assessment and procedure) that are to blame for the lack of adequate differentiation of 
anxiety and depression. For example, failure of some studies to include a group with both 
anxiety and depression results in the affective confounding (Ingram, 1989a). Upon 
Ingram’s recommendations, this study included a comorbid group. Secondly, the present 
undertaking was the first one to use the measures of positive and negative automatic 
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thoughts relevant to depression and test anxiety within the framework of the combined 
CCS/Balanced States of Mind Model. Positive anxious cognitions have not been widely 
explored in specificity research, with exception of generalized anxiety and social anxiety 
studies (Bruch et al., 2003; Calvete et al., 2005a; Cho & Telch, 2005; McDermut & 
Haaga, 1994; Sanz & Avia, 1994). Yet positive self-statements are a useful tool in the 
CCS designs due to their role in psychopathology (Ingram & Wisnicki, 1988) and the 
tendency of depressed and anxious individuals to underreport positive thoughts. Also, the 
inclusion of the measures of test anxious positive and negative cognitions allowed for a 
direct comparison of the CCS and the CCS/BSOM models.  
Following recommendations in the area, the current study utilized self-statement 
measures. Despite a few criticisms of self-report measures, many believe that they are 
important for the assessment of both anxiety and depression because they involve high 
level of self-focus, self-perceptions, and subjective evaluations of personal feelings 
(Kendall & Warman, 1996). Also, these measures supposedly tap underlying belief 
systems rather than situation-specific cognitive content because of the general and 
absolute nature of item content (Myszka et al.; Sturmer et al.). Thus, self-statements may 
provide a close link with the underlying schemas, which serves to strengthen Beck’s 
theory. Furthermore, empirical research indicated that self-statements are not inferior to 
other assessment procedures in differentiating between anxiety and depression and 
remain stable representation of the subjects’ cognitions over time (Arnkoff & Smith, 
1988; Glass & Arnkoff, 1997). Methods of assessment other than self-statements (e.g., 
thought-listing procedure) may produce different SOM ratios and prevent adequate 
disorder differentiation. This has led researchers to conclude that to date self-statements 
remain the most reliable ways to calculate the SOM ratios (Bruch et al., 1990; Heimberg 
et al., 1990; Sturmer et al., 2002, Myszka et al., 1986). 
Finally, sample characteristics, such as age and sex of participants, have been 
viewed as hindering disorder differentiation in the previous CCS research. Children and 
adolescents exhibit more comorbidity and possess less self-awareness need to complete 
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the self-statement instruments; thus, it may be more difficult to achieve full 
differentiation with this age group. Moreover, since it has been established that women 
differ from men in the levels of anxiety and depression and in the tendency to report more 
pathology, sex may be a significant confounding variable in the CCS research. 
Additionally, for specificity research addressing group differences, small group size has 
also been an issue, resulting in lowered power. Thus, this study used a sample of college-
age women sufficient to form groups of a relatively large size.  
In sum, the literature indicates that there is an apparent need to improve cognitive 
discrimination of test anxiety and depression. Although theoretical specificity 
frameworks are fairly well developed, few researchers have attempted to incorporate 
them into one study of test anxiety and depression. The current study added to the body 
of literature by empirically evaluating the applicability of cognitive content specificity to 
test anxious and depressive symptoms in a nonclinical population of college women, 
using measures of positive and negative content and the BSOM ratios. The researcher 
replicated some of elements of Ingram et al.’s (1987) and Ronan and Kendall’s (1997) 
studies. The current study sought to address the limitations of those studies and existing 
CCS research in anxiety and depression by using a specific type of anxiety, a large 
sample of college women, direct measures of positive and negative cognitive products of 
test anxiety rather than processes, and comparing the results across two content 





Participants were college women from the Educational Psychology subject pool at 
the University of Texas at Austin, which was comprised of students from several 
undergraduate classes, including Individual Learning Skills, Human Sexuality, 
Adolescent Development, and Introduction to Statistics. Participant age ranged from 18 
to 52 years (M = 21; SD = 2.4). The overall sample was relatively young, with most 
students being either 20 (23%), 21 (35%), or 22 (19%) years old. Participants 24 years 
and older accounted for a 4% of the total sample.  
Out of a total of 1738 women who completed the packet of measures, 97% (n = 
1686) were undergraduates, with over half having senior status (55%, n = 962). The rest 
of the sample was comprised of juniors (25%, n = 438), sophomores (12%, n = 203), and 
freshmen (5%, n = 83). Additionally, approximately 3% of all participants had at least a 
Bachelor’s degree. Participants’ majors were largely representative of a wide variety of 
programs at the University of Texas at Austin, including liberal arts, communications, 
natural sciences, business, education, engineering, nursing, social work, and fine arts. Out 
of the total sample, 79% (n = 1377) participants had a midterm or final exam within three 
calendar days before or after data collection.  
Participation in the study was voluntary and course credit was given for 
participation. Upon data collection, the total sample was screened to meet the specified 
criteria (see section 3.4) and participants were subsequently sorted into groups, 
comprising the final sample (n = 206).  
3.2 Instrumentation 
3.2.1 Demographic Measures 
The demographic questionnaire asked participants for their age, major, and 
educational status (freshman, sophomore, junior, senior, or post-baccalaureate/graduate, 
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including completed Bachelor’s, Master’s, or Doctoral degrees), based on the number of 
hours completed, per the University of Texas specifications.  
3.2.2 Symptoms Independent Measures 
3.2.2.1 Test Anxiety  
The participants’ test anxiety levels were measured with the Test Anxiety 
Inventory (TAI; Spielberger et al., 1978; see Appendix A). The TAI is a popular, brief 
20-item self-report scale, which describes respondents’ reactions before, during, and after 
exam. It was devised to measure individual differences in test anxiety as a situation-
specific personality trait in high school and college students. The instrument captures 
various cognitive, emotional, physical, and behavioral symptoms of test anxiety. 
Respondents are asked how they generally feel on a four-point Likert scale, ranging from 
one (“almost never”) to four (“almost always”). The measure yields a total score based on 
all items and two subscale scores for worry and emotionality. Raw scores are generally 
converted into standardized T-scores with a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10.  
Construct validity of the TAI appears to be good. For example, Hedl’s (1985) 
factor analysis supported its trait-state and worry-emotionality distinction. Vispoel (1998) 
corroborated the utility of using a total score of the TAI by demonstrating that worry and 
emotionality were moderately correlated (r = .76). There is evidence of convergent 
validity in that the TAI correlates highly with other widely used test anxiety measures, 
e.g., it has .69-.83 correlation with the Test Anxiety Scale and .61-.86 correlation with the 
A-State Scale when given during the testing situations. Further, correlations with five 
other anxiety measures (ranging from .51 to .82) have also been cited as contributing to 
establishing the measure’s convergent validity (Spielberger et al., 1980). Reliability 
evidence is adequate: three-week rest reliability is .80, one-month reliability is .81, and 
internal consistency for the total score is .92-.96 (Spielberger et al.).  
3.2.2.2 Depression 
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; A.T. Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & 
Erbaugh, 1961) is arguably the most widely used self-report measure of depression in 
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adult populations and has been used to screen for various symptoms and features of 
depression, as well as to assess their severity. The new revision of the BDI, the BDI-II 
(A.T. Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996), which was used in the present study, overcomes 
some psychometric limitations of the original measure and is consistent with the DSM-IV 
(2000) symptoms criteria for depressive disorders. The BDI-II is a brief and easy-to-
administer 21-item instrument that is applicable to ages 13 and over. Each item is 
comprised of several statements varying in severity of the symptom. Those statements 
were selected due to a lack of association with any particular theory of depression (A.T. 
Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988). Participants are instructed to choose the response that best 
reflects the way they have been feeling during the last two weeks. Each item requires a 
response on a 0-3 scale. A single total score is obtained by adding responses to all items 
and can range from 0 to 63, with higher scores reflecting greater depressive affect.  
The BDI-II shows good construct validity, as it adequately discriminates between 
levels of depression severity (Whisman, Perez, & Ramel, 2000) and patients diagnosed 
with Major Depressive Disorder have been shown to score significantly higher on the 
BDI-II than those without diagnosis (Arnau, Meagher, Norris, & Bramson, 2001). 
Moreover, convergent validity was found to be .93 with the original BDI (Dozois et al., 
1998, in a nonclinical college student sample), .68 with the Revised Hamilton Psychiatric 
Rating Scale for Depression, and .71 with the Beck Hopelessness Scale (A.T. Beck et al., 
1996). Most factor analytic studies with the BDI-II (A.T. Beck et al., 1996; Dozois et al., 
1998; Steer & Clark, 1997; Storch, Roberti, & Roth, 2004; Whisman et al., 2000) yielded 
a two-factor model consisting of cognitive-affective and somatic components (initially 
proposed by A.T. Beck et al., 1996). A few, however, supported a three-factor model 
(e.g., Al-Musawi, 2001, in a Middle Eastern student sample; Carmody, 2005), and the 
exact item content of the factors remains unclear (Storch et al., 2004).  
In terms of reliability, the BDI-II has shown to have adequate internal consistency 
for nonclinical college samples, including ethnically diverse ones, with coefficient alpha 
ranging from .89 to .93 (A.T. Beck et al., 1996; Carmody, 2005; Dozois et al., 1998; 
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Steer & Clark, 1997; Storch et al., 2004; Wiebe & Penley, 2005) and more specifically 
for women (coefficient alpha = .91; Dozois et al., 1998). Test-retest reliability ranged 
from .73 in non-referred students (Wiebe & Penley, 2005) to .96 in referred students 
(Sprinkle, Lurie, Insko, et al., 2002). Computerized and paper-and-pencil forms of the 
BDI-II have shown to produce equivalent results (Schulenberg & Yutrzenka, 2001).  
3.2.3 Cognitive Dependent Measures 
3.2.3.1 Test Anxiety-Relevant Measures of Positive and Negative Cognitions 
The subjects’ self-statements that occurred during the testing situation were 
measured with the Checklist of Positive and Negative Thoughts (CPNT; Galassi et al., 
personal communication, July 25, 2000). This measure of test anxious thoughts was 
based on many sources, including interviews with test anxious students, theoretical 
elaborations in the field (e.g., the model of test anxiety developed by Meichenbaum & 
Butler, 1980), and various popular self-report measures. According to Galassi et al. 
(1981a), the specific content of the scale deals with “evaluation of the fairness of the test; 
worrying about performance, possible consequences, and evaluation by others; 
concentrating and controlling one’s reactions to the test; ruminating too long over an 
answer; and thoughts…of inadequacy” (p. 53). The CPNT consists of 18 positive and 19 
negative thoughts and yields two separate scores for the number of positive and negative 
thoughts checked by each student. The measure has been shown to successfully 
differentiate between high test anxious and low test anxious individuals (Galassi et al., 
1981a). Also, in the study by Arnkoff and Smith (1988), the CPNT negative scale score 
was related to test anxiety at various points of assessment, adding to the evidence of 
construct validity. Galassi et al. (1981a) reported internal consistency coefficients of .77 
and .79 for the positive and negative thought subscales, respectively. Additionally, 
concurrent and retrospective measurement with the CPNT did not yield significant 
differences (Galassi et al., 1981b). The CPNT was originally designed to provide 
information only about the content the cognitions, whereby participants are instructed to 
check off the thoughts that occurred to them during tests. In this study, in order to ensure 
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comparability with other measures, the CPNT scoring was modified to assess the 
frequency of cognitions on a five-point Likert scale, from one (“never”) to five (“very 
often”). A higher score on the negative subscale and a lower score on the positive 
subscale were reflective of more test anxious cognitions (Galassi et al., 1981a).  
3.2.3.2 Depression-Relevant Measures of Positive and Negative Cognitions 
Negative and positive situation-specific cognitions were measured with the 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ, hereby referred to as ATQ-N for distinction, 
as it contains negatively-valenced items; Hollon & Kendall, 1980; see Appendix B) and 
Positive Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ-P; Ingram & Wisnicki, 1988; see 
Appendix C). Both instruments were developed and validated using groups of depressed 
and nondepressed participants and were, therefore, considered depression-relevant. They 
do not necessary reflect a specific cognitive model and have been used to test various 
theoretical predictions.  
The ATQ-N incorporates 30 all-negative statements about the self (e.g., “There’s 
something wrong with me” and “I can’t finish anything”). Participants are asked to rate 
on a five-point Likert scale how frequently each statement has occurred to them during 
the last week, from one (“not at all”) to five (“all the time”). A total score on the ATQ-N 
is the sum of participants’ ratings, with higher scores on the measure reflective of more 
depressive automatic thoughts. Hollon and Kendall (1980) reported the instrument’s good 
internal consistency (i.e., split-half reliability = .97; coefficient alpha = .96) and adequate 
convergent validity, as it correlated with the Beck Depression Inventory and the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-Depression scale (r’s ranged from .45 to 
.70). Hollon et al. (1986) found that the ATQ-N possessed good specificity and was 
linked to a syndrome of depression (as measured by the BDI), reflecting depressogenic 
state-dependent cognitions.  
 The ATQ-P is the ATQ-N’s positive cognition counterpart and measures the 
frequency of positive self-referent thoughts (e.g., “There’s nothing to worry about” and 
“My future looks bright”). The format is identical to the ATQ-N and includes 30 
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statements that participants rate on how frequently the specified thought (or a similar 
one) occurred to them over the past week. The ATQ-P has good reliability characteristics, 
including coefficient alpha = .95 (Burgess & Haaga, 1994), split-half reliability = .92, 
test-retest reliability = .80, and stability over time ranging from .91 for one week and 
averaging .73 over nine weeks (Ingram, Kendall, Siegle, Guarino, & McLaughlin, 1995). 
Ingram et al. (1995) reported adequate construct validity, as the measure differentiated 
distressed participants from nondistressed and inversely correlated with the measure of 
depression BDI (r = - .33 to -.45). The authors also note that the ATQ-P has a relatively 
low correlation with the ATQ-N (r = .29; Ingram & Wisnicki, 1988), as predicted by 
theory. They acknowledge problems with the scale’s specificity to a particular affective 
syndrome (the ATQ-P consistently correlates with both the BDI and State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory).  
3.3. Procedure 
Administration of the measures took place over the course of three semesters. 
Upon being assigned to the study, participants were directed onto the researcher’s 
website. Participants were told that the study was about their feelings, thoughts, and 
perceptions of academic experiences and everyday situations. To ensure elevated levels 
of test anxiety, participants were also asked if they had a major examination (i.e., 
midterm or final) within three calendar days of completing the measures. A major 
examination was defined as one that accounted for at least 25% of the course total grade. 
Participants completed the measures at their convenience. The items on cognitive 
measures were randomly combined for each disorder (per Ingram & Wisnicki, 1988). All 
items were computer-administered online in a single session, using an individual format. 
It was estimated that it took the subjects approximately one hour on average to complete 
the study. All participants were instructed to read and accept the electronic consent form. 
Subjects who did not sign the consent form were not eligible for participation. Upon 
completion, the participants were presented with a debriefing page, which explained the 
purpose of the study.  
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3.4 Group Selection 
Sample size was determined using Laüter’s (1978) table for k-group MANOVA 
power analysis (cited in Stevens, 1996). For a 4-group MANOVA and a power of .70, 
assuming a moderate to large effect size of d = .75 to 1.00, a sample size of 36-62 per 
group was needed. In order to qualify for the final sample, the participants had to have a 
midterm within three days of completing the measures and meet the specified cutoffs on 
the depression and test anxiety measures.  
The last quartile on the TAI was used as a cutoff point determining elevated test 
anxiety, whereas the first quartile was a set point for the absence of test anxiety (e.g., see 
Thyer & Papsdorf, 1982). For the BDI-II, A.T. Beck et al. (1996) suggested cutoffs for 
student populations: 0-13, asymptomatic; 14-19, mildly depressed; 20-28, moderately 
depressed; and 29-63, severely depressed. Similarly, Dozois et al.’s (1998) study yielded 
empirically supported cutoffs for the student populations as follows: 0-12, nondepressed; 
13-19, dysphoric; and 20-63, depressed. In the current study, the item addressing suicidal 
ideation was removed from the BDI-II for ethical purposes, as it is was not feasible for 
the study administrator to provide assistance to those in need. The prorated BDI-II cutoffs 
were as follows: at or above 19, elevated depression; at or below 11, low depression.  
Those who scored in the last quartile on the TAI and at or below 11 on the BDI-II 
were classified as test anxious-only. Ideally, those who scored above 19 on the BDI but in 
the first quartile on the TAI would be considered depressed-only. As it was difficult to 
obtain an adequate number of subjects with elevated depression but with low test anxiety 
(see Sanz & Avia, 1994, for a similar problem), ultimately the participants with elevated 
depression and scores on the TAI below 50th %-ile were selected for this group. The rest 
of the groups were matched as much as possible with the depressed group on age, 
educational status, major, and the time of test completion. Those who scored above the 
cutoffs on both the TAI and the BDI-II met the study’s criteria for the comorbid group, 
whereas those who scored below the designated cutoff scores constituted the control 
group.  
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After the screening, the sample contained 58 subjects with elevated depression, 
110 subjects with elevated test anxiety, 144 subjects with comorbid test anxiety and 
depression, and 326 controls. The following four groups of participants were formed 
from the that sample: (1) 51 with elevated test anxiety and non-elevated depression 
(hereby referred to as “purely” test-anxious), (2) 51 with elevated depression and non-
elevated test anxiety (hereby referred to as “purely” depressed), (3) 52 with elevated 
levels of both test anxiety and depression (hereby referred to as “mixed” group), and (4) 
52 with non-elevated levels of test anxiety and depression (hereby referred to as control 
group). Participants in four groups were, on average, 21 years old. Most participants were 
seniors (53-60% of each group), followed by juniors (29-31% of each group) and 
sophomores (12-16% of each group). Thus, the final sample was representative of the 
total pre-selection sample.  
3.5 Ethical Considerations 
This study complied with the ethical standards of research required by the 
American Psychological Association and the University of Texas at Austin. Prior to 
conducting the study, the research proposal was submitted and approved by the 
Institutional Review Board of the University of Texas at Austin and the departmental 
review committee of the Educational Psychology department. All participants were 
informed of their right to complete or not to complete the study and indicated their 
consent electronically. They had the right to refuse participation, terminate the testing 
session, or not complete the measures; alternate course assignment was provided for 
those students. Online answers were confidential: participants were automatically 
assigned a random unique number once they completed the measures. Names of the 
participants did not appear on any of the materials in the study. There was a slight 
possibility that by participating in the study, the subjects would become increasingly aware 
of the emotional states of test anxiety and depression and, therefore, might become 
vulnerable. Thus, upon completion, they were provided with the web links and phone 
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numbers to the University Counseling and Mental Health Center where they could access 
treatment and look up information on test anxiety and depression.  
 
3.6 Experimental Design, Hypotheses, and Expected Results 
3.6.1 Experimental Design 
This study used a multivariate design with four independent groups to test for 
cognitive content specificity. This type of design has been used in previous CCS research 
(e.g., D.A. Clark, Beck, & Stewart, 1990; Laurent & Stark, 1993).  
3.6.2 Hypotheses 
Due to this study’s focus on evaluating the differences between “purely” depressed, 
“purely” test anxious, “mixed” participants, and controls on several continuous dependent 
variables, comparisons were based on a one-way four-group multivariate analysis of 
variance (MANOVA). A one-way analysis, recommended by Ingram (1989a) and 
Kendall and Ingram (1989), allowed for “comparison of differences between a control 
group and the three dysfunctional groups, as well as for differences among three 
dysfunctional groups” (Bruch et al., 1993, p. 10). Further, MANOVA helped control the 
Type I error rate and allowed the researcher to account for the correlation between the 
measures (Stevens, 1996).  
The following hypotheses regarding cognitive content specificity in depression 
and test anxiety were explored in this study: 
3.6.2.1 Hypothesis 1 – CCS Model.  
It was expected that, based on a four-group (“purely” depressed, “purely” test-
anxious, “mixed”, and control) MANOVA, there would be significant mean differences 
between the four groups on a linear composite of the self-reported cognitions. 
Specifically, “purely” test anxious individuals would manifest overall different patterns 
of cognitions from those of “purely” depressed, “mixed”, and control individuals, such 
that the four groups would obtain different scores on the four cognitive measures, 
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including the ATQ-N, the ATQ-P, and the CPNT (positive and negative scales; frequency 
rating modification). 
Rationale. 
According to the cognitive specificity approach (A.T. Beck, 1976; Ingram & 
Kendall, 1987; Kendall & Ingram, 1989), the content of automatic cognitions would 
allow one to differentiate between anxiety and depression. Additionally, researchers have 
proposed that both positive and negative cognitive content are important for anxiety and 
depression (Jolly & Kramer, 1994). Depression has been uniquely characterized by the 
presence of negative self-focus and decreased positive thinking manifested across 
situations (D. A. Clark et al., 1999). Compared to those of depressed individuals, 
cognitions of highly test-anxious individuals are tied to specific evaluative situations and 
intrude upon them while performing evaluation tasks (I.G. Sarason et al., 1986). Their 
cognitive content has also been described as negative and relates to evaluations of self, 
task performance, and how others view them, while positive thoughts are few (Galassi et 
al. 1981a, 1981b; Sarason et al., 1986).  
Empirical evidence has supported the assertion that depression and anxiety 
conditions can be successfully differentiated based on their respective cognitive content. 
More specifically, social anxiety studies with college students indicated the presence of 
group differences (Bruch et al., 1993; Ingram, 1989b; Sanz & Avia, 1994) and a close 
association between automatic thoughts and subclinical expression of depression and 
anxiety (e.g., Calvete et al., 2005a; Cho & Telch, 2005). Further, CCS studies of 
depression and test anxiety (Ingram et al., 1987; Sanz & Avia, 1994), however few, 
corroborate group differentiation, especially on depression-relevant measures.  
Although the CCS hypothesis (A.T. Beck, 1976) does not make explicit 
predictions regarding comorbid condition, Beck’s cognitive theory explains that the 
presence of both emotional states in an individual is likely to result in the manifestation 
of both depression- and anxiety-related cognitive processing biases, as they stem from 
two different dysfunctional schemas. The presence of a dual bias is likely to lead to more 
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psychopathology than a single dominant bias in “pure” conditions. Thus, the comorbid 
group was expected to show an overall higher level of maladjustment than “purely” 
depressed and “purely” test anxious groups or controls. Several specificity studies with 
college students supported the notion of comorbidity being different from the anxiety-
only and depression-only conditions (e.g., Bruch et al., 2003; Ingram et al., 1987; Sanz & 
Avia, 1994), although the evidence was stronger for negative content.  
In contrast, controls do not typically demonstrate significant dysfunctional 
thinking even in the face of a stressful stimulus, such as a testing situation, because 
hypothetically speaking, they do not have dysfunctional schemas or their schemas are not 
activated as easily by specific stressful events (A.T. Beck, 1976). Several empirical 
studies indicated that control group engaged in the least overall maladaptive thinking 
compared to other groups with psychopathology (Bruch et al., 2003; Ingram et al., 1987).  
Provided Hypothesis 1 was supported, subhypotheses 1a) through 1d) would be 
generated. The expected directional differences for the subhypotheses are presented in 
Table 2 below. A contrast was considered primary if it provided a test of the cognitive 
content specificity hypothesis. A contrast was considered exploratory if directional 
differences could not be predicted by the model.  
Table 2  
Expected Directional Means for Cognitive Measures 
  







D > TA 
D < TA 
D < TA 
D >TA 
 
TAD > TA 
TAD < TA 
TAD ? TA 
TAD ? TA 
 
D ? TAD 
D ? TAD 
D < TAD 
D > TAD 
 
TA ? C 
TA ? C 
TA > C 
TA < C 
 
D > C 
D < C 
D ? C 
D ? C 
 
TAD > C 
TAD < C 
TAD > C 
TAD < C 
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Note. TA – “purely” test anxious group; D – “purely” depressed group; TAD – “mixed” 
test anxious-depressed group; and C – control group. Relationships marked with a “?” are 
exploratory.  
 
Subhypothesis 1a) – Depression-Relevant Negative Cognitions. 
“Purely” depressed participants would have significantly higher scores on the 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ-N) than “purely” test anxious participants and 
controls. Additionally, “mixed” participants would have significantly higher scores on the 
same measure than “purely” test anxious participants and controls.  
Rationale. The negativity hypothesis (A.T. Beck, 1976), which is an integral part 
of Beck’s model, posits that a depressive state is uniquely characterized by the increased 
negative self-referent cognitions (D. A. Clark et al., 1999). This negativity is due to the 
activation of the schemas of loss and is considered pervasive. There appears to be 
considerable empirical support for this hypothesis (see D.A. Clark & Steer, 1996, for a 
review). A rivaling tripartite model (L.A. Clark & Watson, 1991) asserts that anxiety and 
depression share a common factor of negative affect or general psychopathology, which 
would support a lack of differences between the depressed and test anxious groups on 
depressive negative content. Thus, a task of differentiating depression-specific negative 
content becomes particularly relevant when comparing depression with anxiety disorders.  
Specificity studies looking into negative automatic cognition in college students 
confirm that when compared to those with anxious symptomatology (including social 
anxiety and test anxiety) and those without significant symptoms of psychopathology, 
individuals with depressive symptoms tend to have more negative thoughts on the 
instruments theoretically associated with depression (e.g., Bruch et al., 2003; Ingram, 
1989b; Ingram et al., 1987) and negative cognitions are uniquely associated with 
depression (Cho & Telch, 2005).  
According to Beck’s model (A.T., Beck, 1976), due to the presence of 
depressogenic schema (hypothesized to be predominantly negative), those with comorbid 
expression of depression and anxiety were expected to show more negative cognitions on 
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depression measures than either anxiety-only individuals or those relatively free of any 
psychopathology, who are both hypothesized to not have a depressogenic schema. 
Several empirical studies with college students confirmed that comorbid group indeed 
tended to score higher than anxious or control groups on the measures of depressive 
negative cognitions (e.g., Bruch et al., 2003; Ingram, 1989b).  
Subhypothesis 1b) – Depression-Relevant Positive Cognitions. 
“Purely” depressed participants would have significantly lower scores on the 
Positive Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ-P) than “purely” test anxious 
participants and controls. Additionally, “mixed” participants would have significant 
lower scores on the same measure than “purely” test anxious participants and controls.  
Rationale. Some researchers have argued that the notion of positivity in automatic 
thinking may be a useful variable when comparing depression and specific anxieties 
(Burgess & Haaga, 1994). According to Beck’s exclusivity hypothesis (A.T. Beck, 1976) 
and the tripartite model (L. A. Clark & Watson, 1991), decreased positivity in cognition 
and affect is a unique characteristic of depression (D. A. Clark et al., 1999). Therefore, 
depressed individuals would be expected to have less positive cognitions than either 
anxious individuals or controls. Although empirical evidence for this proposition is 
somewhat equivocal, there is a body of literature using mostly depression-relevant 
instruments with clinical populations that supports it (for review, see D. A. Clark et al., 
1999). Several cognitive specificity studies with college students (Bruch et al., 2003; 
Ingram, 1989b) have demonstrated that, contrary to predictions, depressed group scored 
the same as anxiety group on the measure of positive cognitions despite having lower 
scores than controls.  
For those with comorbid anxiety and depression Beck’s theory (A.T. Beck, 1976) 
would predict lower scores on depression-specific positive thinking instruments than for 
anxiety-only individuals and controls (consistent with more dysfunctional profile), due to 
the presence of depressogenic cognitive structures. Empirical research, however, has 
been anything but unequivocal. Some studies reported comorbid group’s highly 
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dysfunctional profile, with the lowest scores of all groups (Bruch et al., 2003), while 
others found this group to score lower than controls but equivalent to other groups 
(Ingram, 1989b). Still there were a few that obtained no differences at all (McKellar et 
al., 1996).  
Subhhypothesis 1c) – Test Anxiety-Relevant Negative Cognitions. 
“Purely” test anxious participants would have significantly higher scores on the 
negative subscale of the Checklist of Positive and Negative Thoughts (CPNT-N) than 
“purely” depressed participants and controls. Additionally, “mixed” participants would 
have significant higher scores on the same measure than “purely” depressed participants 
and controls.  
Rationale. According to the tripartite model (L.A. Clark & Watson, 1991) and its 
cognitive-affective reformulations (e.g., Mineka et al., 1998), negativity in affect and 
cognitive content is common to both depression and anxiety group disorders, especially 
social anxiety. This assertion supports a lack of differences between the depressed and 
test anxious groups on anxious negative content. The uniqueness of negative content in 
anxiety compared to depression has not been established in theory, although the CCS 
model would not contradict the anxiety-depression group distinction.  
There have been only a few specificity studies that compared both test anxiety 
and depression on their cognitions (i.e., Ingram et al., 1987; Sanz & Avia, 1994, study1), 
but the measure used in those studies did not contain valenced content. Thus, although 
the results are supportive, their generalization is limited. In light of scarcity of test 
anxiety CCS research, studies with college students that looked at specificity of negative 
cognitions associated with particular anxiety versus depression, as well as clinical 
literature, deserve attention. A handful of clinical studies supported specificity of 
negative anxious content (e.g., A.T. Beck et al., 1987; Clark et al., 1989). The results of 
Bruch et al.’s (1993) and Sanz and Avia’s (1994) studies indicated that the socially 
anxious group was not significantly different from the depressed group but higher than 
control group on the measure of social anxiety-relevant negative cognitions. Additionally, 
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non-CCS research in test anxiety has indicated that, similar to depression, its levels were 
directly related to the frequency of negative automatic thoughts (e.g., Arnkoff & Smith, 
1988; Blankstein et al., 1991; Galassi et al., 1981a, 1981b; King et al., 1995). Due to a 
lack of solid empirical validation for the CCS prediction, the current study used a 
measure of negative cognitions specific to test anxiety (i.e., CPNT-Negative Scale) in 
order to maximize the chances of finding specificity.  
Based on the implications from Beck’s model (A.T. Beck, 1976), those with the 
comorbid condition were expected to have higher scores on the measure of depressive 
negative cognitions than those with depression-only and controls, due to the presence of a 
dysfunctional anxious schema in addition to the depressogenic one. Empirical research 
with college students has provided some evidence in favor of this statement (Bruch et al., 
2003, study 1; Sanz & Avia, 1994, studies 1 and 2) in social anxiety. In two out of three 
studies above, comorbid group scored higher than all other groups, including social 
anxiety group. 
Subhypothesis 1d) – Test Anxiety-Relevant Positive Cognitions. 
“Purely” test anxious participants would have significantly lower scores on the 
positive subscale of the Checklist of Positive and Negative Thoughts (CPNT-P) than 
“purely” depressed participants and controls. Additionally, “mixed” participants would 
have significantly lower scores on the same measure than “purely” depressed participants 
and controls.  
Rationale. The tripartite model (L.A. Clark & Watson, 1991) does not yield 
predictions regarding low positive thinking in anxiety, although theorists note that low 
positivity is seen in both anxiety and depression (Watson, 2005). The CCS hypothesis 
(A.T. Beck, 1976) proposes that there would be differences between anxious and 
depressed groups on the content measures. Therefore, in the absence of concrete 
predictions, positive content specificity of anxiety does not contradict this model’s 
premises. CCS research on comparing test anxiety and depression on the frequency of 
positive automatic thoughts has been nonexistent. Further, as with positive statements 
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that are depression-relevant, empirical support for specificity of social anxiety-relevant 
positive cognitions has been ambiguous and scanty. In the studies comparing social 
anxiety and depression, it was found that (1) anxiety group was lower than depressed or 
control group (e.g., Bruch et al., 2003, study 1) or (2) there were no differences between 
the “pure” groups and between “pure” groups and controls (Sanz & Avia, 1994, studies 1 
and 2). Non-CCS literature has shown that test anxiety (Blankstein et al., 1991; 
Blankstein & Flett, 1990; Galassi, 1981a, b) and social phobia (Beidel, Turner, & Dancu, 
1985) are characterized by less frequent positive thoughts. 
As stated elsewhere in this manuscript, the “mixed” group would be expected to 
have two maladaptive schemas and, therefore, significantly less positive anxiety thoughts 
when compared to those with depression-only and without considerable psychopathology 
(A.T. Beck, 1976). Similar to the area of the negative content, the empirical evidence for 
test anxiety specificity is missing. Further, the CCS research in social phobia has 
generated mixed results. The study by Sanz and Avia (1994, study 1) produced no 
differences in positive social anxiety-relevant positive cognitions between comorbid 
group and all other groups. In contrast, in Bruch et al.’s (2003) study, comorbid group 
had the lowest frequency of positive cognitions), compared to all other groups. 
3.6.2.2 Hypothesis 2 – CCS/BSOM Model 
Hypothesis 2 tested for specificity of cognitive content in the form of cognitive 
ratios. These ratios are hereafter referred to as the BSOM ratios for distinction, to denote 
that the predictions are based on the reformulated Balanced State of Mind model 
(Schwartz, 1997) rather than the original SOM model (Schwartz & Garamoni, 1989). The 
Balanced States of Mind ratios relevant to depression are referred to as the BSOM-D, 
whereas the ratios for test anxiety are referred to as the BSOM-TA. Prior to addressing 
relationships involving cognitive ratios, the methodology of their calculation must be 
discussed.  
 
BSOM Ratio Calculation. 
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To calculate the BSOM-D ratio for each participant, the total score on the ATQ-P 
(i.e., positive cognitions relevant to depression) was first divided by the sum of total 
scores for the ATQ-P and ATQ-N (negative and positive cognitions relevant to 
depression), i.e., BSOM-D = ATQ-P / (ATQ-P + ATQ-N). Similarly, the BSOM-TA 
equaled the score on the CPNT-Positive Scale (positive cognitions relevant to test 
anxiety) divided by the sum of both scales of the CPNT (positive and negative cognitions 
relevant to test anxiety), i.e., BSOM-TA = CPNT-P / CPNT. Thus, the ratios were 
derived from content-specific positive and negative cognitions but were not their linear 
transformations. 
Next, the BSOM ratios for each group had to be revised. First, following the 
example of McDermut and Haaga (1994), the BSOM-TA ratios were adjusted for an 
unequal number of items on the CPNT positive and negative scales. To accomplish this, 
each score for BSOM-TA was multiplied by 1.056 (19/18). Thus, the formula became: 
BSOM-TA = CPNT-P * 1.056 / ((CPNT-P * 1.056) + CPNT-N). Second, in theory, the 
BSOM ratios range from 0.0 to 1.0 (Schwartz, 1997). However, there is range restriction 
due to the self-statement measures being scored on a five-point Likert-type scale. Thus, 
for a 30-item measure, such as the ATQ-N or ATQ-P, the ratio would range from .167 to 
.833, i.e., from the lowest 30 / (30+150) to the highest 150 / (150+30) (Schwartz & 
Garamoni, 1989). This can be corrected by simple constant subtraction, recommended by 
Amsel and Fichten (1990). Thus, a constant of 30 was subtracted from each subject’s 
ATQ-N and ATQ-P scores, while a constant of 19 was subtracted from each participant’s 
CPNT-N and CPNT-P (adjusted for item count) scores. This allowed to shift downward 
by one point (from 1 = “hardly ever” through 5 = “almost always” to 0 = “hardly ever” 
through 4 = “almost always”). Thus, the modified formula became: BSOM-D = (ATQ-P - 
30) / ((ATQ-P + ATQ-N) – 60); BSOM-TA = ((CPNT-P * 1.056) -19) / (((CPNT-P * 
1.056) + CPNT-N) -38). While the two adjustments above (i.e., multiplication by a 
constant or subtracting a constant) did not affect group differences, they did impact the 
actual BSOM intervals, as even a small variation in the BSOM ratio calculation leads to 
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changes in the number of subjects falling within each interval category. Thus, the issue of 
the BSOM adjustment was only applicable to Hypothesis 3.  
Hypothesis. 
It was expected that, based on a four-group (“purely” depressed, “purely” test-
anxious, “mixed” depressed-test anxious, and control) MANOVA, there would be 
significant mean differences between the four groups on a linear composite of the BSOM 
ratios derived from self-reported cognitions relevant to test anxiety and depression. 
Specifically, “purely” test anxious individuals would manifest overall different patterns 
of cognitions from those of “purely” depressed, “mixed” depressed-test anxious, and 
control individuals, such that the four groups would obtain different scores on the 
dependent variables, including the BSOM-D and BSOM-TA ratios.  
Rationale. According to both the original SOM (Schwartz & Garamoni, 1989) 
and reformulated BSOM model (Schwartz, 1997), psychopathological conditions, such as 
test anxiety and depression, are characterized by low relative shares of positive 
cognitions in the sum of positive and negative cognitions, as compared to conditions 
without negative affective components. Furthermore, based on the CCS hypothesis (A.T. 
Beck, 1976) and cognitive conceptualization of depression and test anxiety in Beck’s 
model (A.T. Beck, 1976; A.T. Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1996), both depressed and test 
anxious individuals should have unique profiles that are characteristic of their respective 
schemas, i.e., of loss (with resulting pessimism about the self, the world, and the future) 
and evaluative threat (with resulting worry about task performance and about how they 
will be judged by others). Further, comorbidity was expected to engender the most 
dysfunctional profile.  
The literature has long pointed to the need of using integrative approaches to 
CCS, in order to achieve better cognitive differentiation of anxiety and depression (e.g., 
Haaga, Dyck, & Ernst, 1991; Kendall, Howard, & Hays, 1989; McDermut & Haaga, 
1994; Schwartz & Garamoni, 1989). As a more general model of psychopathology, the 
BSOM model can potentially augment the CCS model by offering (1) more specific 
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predictions regarding group differences (i.e., BSOM-D ratios in test anxious individuals 
versus controls and the BSOM-TA ratios in depressed participants versus controls) and 
(2) a more parsimonious solution to the dilemma of anxiety-depression differentiation in 
that more information is combined in a single ratios to achieve specificity. In such 
integrative view, the BSOM ratios are postulated to be unique to test anxiety and 
depression. 
Studies of the integrated CCS/SOM model in adults (Calvete and Connor-Smith, 
2005; Calvete et al., 2005; McDermut & Haaga, 1994) are scanty and yield inconsistent 
results. In their correlational analysis, McDermut and Haaga’s (1994) found evidence in 
favor of SOM-D specificity to depression, while evidence for the anxiety content was less 
convincing. Due to the overall paucity of research in the area, several studies of children 
were considered, although their findings cannot be easily generalized to college students. 
These studies (e.g., Ronan & Kendall, 1997) offered some evidence of group differences. 
Research by McKellar et al. (1996) and Ronan and Kendall (1997) also supported the 
dysfunctional content of comorbid group and adaptive nature of the BSOM ratios in 
controls. Schwartz and Garamoni (1989) also reported consistent empirical support for 
the distinction based on the SOM ratios in those with psychopathology and without it for 
various disorders in the non-CCS studies.  
Provided Hypothesis 2 was supported, Subhypotheses 2a) and 2b) would be 
generated. Expected differences on the specific dependent measures are presented in 
Table 3 below. Lower BSOM ratios reflect more psychopathology. A relationship was 
considered primary if it provided a test of the CCS hypothesis alone or of the joint 
CCS/BSOM model. A relationship was considered secondary if it did not test the CCS 
predictions. A contrast was considered exploratory if directional differences could not be 
predicted by a specific model.  
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Table 3  
Expected Directional Means for the BSOM Ratios 
  





D < TA 
D > TA 
  
TAD < TA 
TAD < TA 
 
D > TAD 
D > TAD 
 
TA ? C 
TA < C 
 
D < C 
D ? C 
 
TAD < C 
TAD < C 
Note. Italics type denotes secondary contrasts; “?” mark denotes exploratory contrasts. 
 
Subhypothesis 2a) – BSOM-D Ratios. 
“Purely” depressed participants would have significantly lower mean BSOM-D 
ratios than “purely” test anxious individuals and controls. Additionally, “mixed” 
participants would have significantly lower mean BSOM-D ratios than “purely” 
depressed participants and controls, while “purely” test anxious participants would have 
significantly lower BSOM-D ratios than controls.  
Subhypothesis 2b) – BSOM-TA Ratios. 
“Purely” test anxious participants would have significantly lower mean BSOM-
TA ratios than “purely” depressed and control individuals. Additionally, “mixed” 
participants would have significantly lower mean BSOM-TA ratios than “purely” test 
anxious participants and controls, while “purely” depressed participants would have 
significantly lower BSOM-TA ratios than controls.  
Rationale. The prediction that the anxiety and depression groups would differ on 
their disorder-relevant BSOM ratios could be explained only by the CCS hypothesis, 
while the rest of primary predictions were based on the postulates derived from both the 
CCS and the BSOM models. In regards to depressive content (Subhypothesis 2a), 
McDermut and Haaga (1994) found specificity of the SOM-D ratios using multiple 
regression analysis in that those ratios accounted for a higher proportion of unique 
variance in depressive symptoms than did the SOM-SA ratios. In a study by McKellar et 
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al. (1996), the SOM-D ratios of the depression group were significantly different than 
those of the anxiety group, but the differences were small. The depression-anxiety group 
differences were also found in children (Ronan & Kendall, 1997). In contrast, in a study 
on PTSD by Nasby and Russell (1997), the SOM-D ratios differentiated PTSD group 
from controls. In regards to anxious content (Subhypothesis 2b), McKellar et al.’s study 
provided little evidence of specificity of anxiety-relevant ratios to anxiety symptoms. 
After conducting secondary analyses, researchers concluded that such lack of specificity 
might have been due to the lack of specificity of positive thoughts to anxiety rather than 
methodological limitations. Similarly, Ronan and Kendall (1997) did not find group 
differences.  
Depressed individuals’ BSOM ratios were expected to be lower than those of 
controls. Although researchers investigated the SOM ratios for various anxiety disorders 
(e.g., Arnkoff et al., 1992; Bruch et al., 1991; Glass & Furlong, 1990; Heimberg et al., 
1990; Michelson et al., 1992; Nasby & Rusell, 1997; Schwartz & Michelson, 1987; and 
Topman et al., 1992) and depression (e.g., Garamoni et al., 1991; Schwartz et al., 2002) 
separately, research using simultaneous assessment of the BSOM ratios in anxiety and 
depression has been insufficient. A few of such studies indicated significant group 
differences (McKellar et al., 1996; Ronan & Kendall, 1997).   
Both the CCS and BSOM models predicted that individuals with comorbid 
depression and anxiety would have more dysfunctional (lower) ratios than that of either 
individuals with depression only or individuals with anxiety only. Additionally, comorbid 
group would have more maladaptive anxiety-relevant ratios, compared to the depression 
group, and more maladaptive depression-relevant ratios, compared to the test anxiety 
group. Preliminary evidence for the anxiety-depression differences on depressive content 
was found by McKellar et al. (1996) in college students and by Ronan and Kendall 
(1997) in children.  
Secondary predictions of both subhypotheses were based solely on the SOM and 
BSOM model’s contentions (Schwartz, 1997; Schwartz & Garamoni, 1989) that the more 
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pathological conditions would produce lower SOM ratios. For depressive content, the 
predictions are supported by McKellar et al. (1996) but not by Ronan and Kendall (1997). 
In contrast, the latter researchers did find support for the BSOM’s predictions on the 
anxiety content.  
3.6.2.3 Hypothesis 3 – BSOM Parameters Applied to the CCS Model  
  Hypothesis 3 predicated that all four groups would produce mean BSOM ratios 
for test anxiety and depression (i.e., BSOM-TA and BSOM-D, respectively) that would 
fall within the parameters specified by the BSOM model. Predicted intervals for each of 
the two disorder-specific mean BSOM ratios are reported in Table 4 below. For a review 
of the BSOM interval categories, see Table 1, section 2.7.2.1. 
Table 4  
Predicted BSOM Categories for Disorder-Relevant Group Means 
 Groups 
















Note. FCD – Failed Coping Dialogue; CD – Conflicted Dialogue; SCD – Successful 
Coping Dialogue; PD – Positive Dialogue. Interval categories with a “?” mark are 
exploratory.  
Rationale. 
The BSOM ratios can serve as valuable indicators of the level of stress and coping 
for each group. In the BSOM model (Schwartz, 1997), the Conflicted Dialogue (CD) is 
typically linked to the mild forms of psychopathology. College students with “pure” 
conditions are more likely, on the average, to demonstrate the BSOM ratios related to 
prodromal conditions, i.e., in the CD range. Thus, the mean BSOM-TA ratio for those 
with “pure” test anxiety and the mean BSOM-D ratio for those with “pure” depression 
were expected to mostly fall within the CD interval. Studies by McKellar et al. (1996) 
 100 
and Ronan and Kendall (1997) with sorted samples supported these predictions, whereas 
unsorted samples of college students yielded higher estimates in the Successful Coping 
Dialogue range (e.g., McDermut & Haaga, 1994). 
Comorbid conditions are typically associated with more pathology than “pure” 
conditions. Furthermore, for the current study, given that (1) college student demonstrate 
less severe psychopathology than clinical subjects; (2) for most subjects, the data 
collection took place during midterms, which are lower stakes tests than finals and (3) 
assessment had a retrospective recall nature, the students’ BSOM ratios were not 
expected to reflect severe psychopathology, despite stressful test conditions that they 
were either about to undergo or had recently experienced. Thus, their average group 
ratios were likely to be beyond the range of significant psychopathology, i.e., higher than 
Negative Monologue or Negative Dialogue. Overall, it was estimated that both mean 
BSOM ratios would fall within the interval of Failed Coping Dialogue (also see Ronan & 
Kendall, 1997), which has been associated with more moderate forms of 
psychopathology (Schwartz, 1997). 
In contrast, those with low levels of pathology or absence of stress were expected 
to exhibit symptoms consistent with adaptive coping, ranging from about .70 to .85 
(Positive Dialogue category; Schwartz, 1997). Data from sorted groups indicated that 
adult control group had a ratio slightly lower than predicted (SCD range), whereas 




Data analyses for this study included both descriptive and inferential statistics in 
preliminary and major analyses.  
4.1 Preliminary Analyses and Statistics 
Intercorrelations among the variables are presented in Table 5.  
Table 5 
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2 TAI  .31 -.06  .71 -.43 -.25 -.66 
3 ATQ-N   -.52  .54 -.37 -.92 -.51 
4 ATQ-P    -.23  .53  .76  .41 
5 CPNT-N     -.59 -.48 -.90 
6 CPNT-P       .49  .85 
7 BSOM-D        .56 
8 BSOM-TA        – 
Note. Correlations of r(204) = .14 are significant at p < .05; correlations of r(204) = .18 
are significant at p < .01; correlations of r(204) = .23 are significant at p < .001. 
 
Similar to the CCS research of social anxiety (e.g., Bruch et al., 1993; Ingram, 
1989a), the test anxiety and depression symptom measures were significantly but weakly 
correlated [r(204) = .23, p < .001], adding to the evidence of lower affective confounding 
between specific types of anxiety and subclinical depression. The moderate correlations 
between the cognitive self-statement measures of test anxious and depressive negative 
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content (r = .54) and positive content (r = .53) suggest adequate disorder specificity 
contained within the measures. Moderate negative correlations between negative and 
positive content for both test anxiety (r = -.59) and depression (r = -.52) are consistent 
with the idea that positive and negative thoughts may be related but are not a part of the 
same continuum (i.e., are orthogonal, as suggested by Watson & Tellegen, 1985, for 
affect). Some of the strongest correlations were between the symptomatic measures of 
test anxiety and depression and cognitive measures of negative cognitions (r = .71 and 
.65, respectively), suggesting a close link between the two. In contrast, the cognitive 
measures of positive cognitions yielded weaker correlations with the symptoms measures 
(r = -.59 for depression and -.43 for test anxiety). The BSOM-D ratios showed a 
moderate but highly significant inverse correlation with the symptoms of depression (r = 
-.72). Similarly, the BSOM-TA showed a moderate correlation of -.66 with the symptoms 
of test anxiety.  
Since this was the first administration of the frequency version of the CPNT, the 
measures of validity and reliability for the total sample were calculated for that measure. 
The internal consistency of both scales of the CPNT was very good (Cronbach’s alpha = 
0.96 and 0.95 for the negative and positive scales, respectively). The CPNT-N correlated 
moderately with the TAI (r = .78), providing evidence for adequate convergent validity, 
while the CPNT-P yielded a much lower correlation with the TAI (r = -.48). 
Preliminary analyses including one-way four-group ANOVA and chi-square tests 
were conducted on the interval and categorical variables, respectively, to determine 
whether groups were comparable on their demographic characteristics (i.e., age and 
educational status) and time of test in relation to measure completion (i.e., ‘before’, 
‘after’, and ‘before and after’). A univariate F-test (one-way, four-group) used to 
compare the mean ages yielded no significant differences in age, F (3, 202) = 0.46, p = 
0.71. Also, a Chi Square test of proportions was used to check if the groups had equal 
representation in terms of their educational status. These frequencies were not 
significantly different, χ2(15, n = 206) = 9.89, p = .083. The same test was used to test for 
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equal representation of those with the different time of measure completion. Similarly, 
the frequencies were not statistically significant for either those who had a major test 
prior to measure completion, χ2(3, n = 206) = 3.99, p = .26; after, χ2(3, n = 206) = 2.64, p 
= .45; or both, χ2(3, n = 206) = 1.00, p = .80. Additionally, when participants had an 
important exam had no bearing on the levels of test anxiety, as signified by a one-way 
ANOVA, F(2, 203) = 1.48, p = 0.23. 
Following the suggestion by Ingram (1990a) that was also implemented by Sanz 
and Avia (1994), group differences on selection measures were analyzed to determine if 
using cutoffs for group selection leads to confounding problems, such as “purely” test 
anxious group and control groups having significantly higher BDI-II scores than “purely” 
depressed and “mixed” group, or the latter groups having higher TAI scores than those 
with test anxiety or controls. One-way four-group MANOVA was conducted on the BDI-
II and TAI scores with group classification as an independent variable. As expected, the 
results were significant, Wilks’ lambda = .02; F (6, 402) = 395.17, p < .001. From the 
MANOVA, two one-way ANOVAs also showed significance for depression, F (3, 202) = 
335.19, p < .001 and test anxiety, F (3, 202) = 493.09, p < .001. The Newman-Keuls tests 
revealed that that the “mixed” and depressed group were equivalent on the BDI-II and 
were significantly higher than for the other two groups. On the TAI, the mixed group had 
the highest scores of all three groups, including test anxious group, and both groups 
scored considerably higher than depressed or control groups. Thus, the differences were 
in the expected direction. Descriptive statistics for the independent variable measures are 
presented in Table 6.  
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Table 6  




(n = 51) 
D 
(n = 51) 
TAD 
(n = 52) 
C 

















4.2 Main Analyses and Statistics 
Results for Hypotheses 1 through 3 are reported below. Data analyses were 
conducted using the NCSS statistical and power analysis software (NCSS, 1995).  
4.2.1 Analyses of Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that college women with elevated test anxiety would have 
significantly different scores from those with elevated depression and those with either 
high or low levels of both test anxiety and depression on the linear composite of 
measures of depression- and test anxiety-relevant negative and positive cognitions. 
Frequency responses were summed up in order to calculate each scale’s total score on the 
ATQ-N, ATQ-P, and CPNT (both scales). 
4.2.1.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics on the self-report continuous dependent variables are 
reported in Table 7.  
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Table 7  






(n = 51) 
D 
(n = 51) 
TAD 
(n = 52) 
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  48.61 (15.45) 
112.18 (17.93) 
 
  54.29 (9.65) 

















  35.60 (5.13) 
115.54 (19.73) 
 
  28.54 (6.72) 
  62.33 (13.40) 
 
4.2.1.2 Inferential Statistics 
In order to test Hypothesis 1, a one-way four-group (purely depressed, purely test 
anxious, mixed depressed and test anxious, and control) MANOVA was performed with 
four dependent variables, i.e., negative and positive depressive cognitions, and negative 
and positive test anxious cognitions. As expected, the MANOVA revealed significant 
effects of psychopathology on self-reported cognitions of depression and test anxiety that 
were reflected in group differences, Wilks’ lambda = .15; F (12, 527) = 45.34, p < .001.  
Analyses of Hypotheses 1a) through 1d). 
From Hypothesis 1, directional differences in the group scores were further 
predicted based on the CCS hypothesis. Specifically, Subhypotheses 1a) and 1b) 
predicted that on depression-relevant measures of differently-valenced cognitions, 
“purely” depressed participants would have higher scores on negative cognitions and 
lower scores on positive cognitions than either their test anxious counterparts or controls. 
Further, for Subhypotheses 1c) and 1d), it was predicted that on test anxiety-relevant 
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measures of differently-valenced cognitions, “purely” test anxious participants would 
have higher scores on negative cognitions and lower scores on positive cognitions than 
either depressed participants or controls.  
Inferential Statistics. Given that the MANOVA results were significant, the 
follow-up one-way four-group ANOVA F-tests were conducted to test for the differences 
between the groups on the ATQ-N, ATQ-P, and both subscales of the CPNT. One-way 
ANOVAs yielded significant group differences on all four dependent variables as 
follows: ATQ-N: F (3, 202) = 88.61, p < .001, •2 = .57; ATQ-P: F (3, 202) = 48.70, p < 
.001, •2 = .42; CPNT-N: F (3, 202) = 120.61, p < .001, •2 = .64; and CPNT-P: F (3, 202) = 
27.18, p < .001, •2 = .29. Effect sizes for all four measures within the CCS model were 
large (i.e., larger than .14, Cohen, 1988; cited in Stevens, 1996), with the smallest effect 
being for test anxious positive content and largest effect for test anxious negative content. 
Additionally, the Newman-Keuls post-hoc tests were conducted on each of the 
four measures to determine which pairs of group means differed significantly. The results 
indicated that each group was different from every other group on the measures of 
negative cognitions specific to depression (ATQ-N) and test anxiety (CPNT-N). 
Specifically, on the ATQ-N, control group scores were the lowest and comorbid group 
scored the highest, whereas depressed group, predictably, scored higher than the test 
anxious group. The pattern of scores was similar on the CPNT-N. On the ATQ-P and 
CPNT-P, only some groups showed differences. The table of obtained directional means 
is presented below.  
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Table 8 










D > TA 
D < TA 
D < TA 
D = TA* 
TAD > TA 
TAD < TA 
TAD > TA 
TAD < TA 
 D < TAD 
 D = TAD* 
 D < TAD 
 D > TAD 
TA > C 
TA = C* 
TA > C 
TA < C 
D > C 
D < C 
D > C 
D < C 
TAD > C 
TAD < C 
TAD > C 
TAD < C 
Note. An asterisk * denotes a lack of significance at .05 level. 
 
The results suggest that college women with varying degrees of test anxious and 
depressive symptomatology (i.e., high or low) have unique positive and negative thinking 
patterns, as evidenced by the significantly different group scores endorsed on the 
aggregate of measures, including the ATQ-N, ATQ-P, CPNT-N, and CPNT-P. Thus, 
Hypothesis 1 was supported. The results further suggest that “purely” depressed college 
women show higher levels of negative thinking and lower levels of positive thinking than 
“purely” test anxious women and those with low levels of depression and test anxiety, as 
evidenced by the significantly higher scores endorsed on the ATQ-N and significantly 
lower scores on the ATQ-P. Thus, Subhypotheses 1a) and 1b) were supported. Moreover, 
college women with elevated test anxiety appeared to have higher overall negative 
thinking than those with depression only and controls, as evidenced by higher scores on 
the CPNT-N scale. Thus, Subhypothesis 1c) was also supported. Despite showing less 
positive thinking than controls, participants with test anxiety did not exhibit any 
differences in their positive thinking related to test anxiety when compared to their 
“purely” depressed counterparts, as evidenced by similar scores on the CPNT-P scale. 
Thus, the cognitive content specificity component of Subhypothesis 1d) was not 
supported. All additional directional components within the Subhypotheses 1a) through 
1d) were supported. 
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4.2.2 Analyses of Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that four groups of college women with differing (high or 
low) levels of test anxiety and depression would have significantly different mean scores 
on a linear composite of BSOM ratios derived from test anxiety- and depression-relevant 
cognitions.  
4.2.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The means and ranges for test anxiety- and depression-specific BSOM ratios are 
presented in Table 9 below.   
Table 9 
Mean Scores, Standard Deviations, and Categories of the BSOM Ratios 
   
Groups 
  TA 
(n = 51) 
D 
(n = 51) 
TAD 
(n = 52) 
C 




























Note. PM – Positive Monologue; PD – Positive Dialogue: SO - Superoptimal, O - 
Optimal, N - Normal; SCD – Successful Coping Dialogue; CD – Conflicted Dialogue; 
FCD – Failed Coping Dialogue; ND – Negative Dialogue: Mod - Moderate; and NM – 
Negative Monologue.  
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4.2.2.2 Inferential Statistics 
In order to address Hypothesis 2, a one-way four-group (“purely” depressed, 
“purely” test anxious, “mixed” depressed-test anxious, and control) MANOVA was 
performed on a liner composite of two dependent continuous variables, i.e., the BSOM-
TA and BSOM-D ratios. The MANOVA revealed significant differences between 
groups, Wilks’ lambda = 0.19, F (6, 402) = 89.45, p < 0.001. Thus, Hypothesis 2 was 
supported. 
Analyses of Subhypotheses 2a) and 2b). 
 The main prediction of Subhypothesis 2a) was that using the ATQ-N and ATQ-P, 
“purely” depressed participants would have significantly lower mean BSOM-D ratios 
than controls. The main prediction of Subhypothesis 2b) was that using the CPNT-N and 
CPNT-P, “purely” test anxious participants would have significantly lower mean BSOM-
TA ratios than control individuals. 
Inferential Statistics. Given the significance of the MANOVA, separate 
univariate ANOVAs were performed, yielding significant differences on each of the two 
continuous dependent variables. For the BSOM-D, the ANOVA yielded F (3, 202) = 
129.56, p < 0.001, •2 = .66. Similarly, for the BSOM-TA, the results indicated that F (3, 
202) = 92.55, p < 0.001, •2 = .58. Both effect sizes were large. For the results of the 
multiple comparison Newman-Keuls post-hoc tests, see Table 10 below. 
Table 10 









D < TA 
D > TA 
 
TAD < TA 
TAD < TA 
 
 D = TAD* 
 D > TAD 
 
TA < C 
TA < C 
 
D < C 
D < C 
 
TAD < C 
TAD < C  
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Note. Boldface type denotes the relationships predicted by the CCS model alone. Italics 
type denotes secondary relationships predicted by the BSOM model alone. An asterisk * 
denotes a lack of significance at .05 level.  
 
Most of the directional differences were as predicted. Specifically, the results 
indicated that, on average, BSOM-D ratios of “purely” depressed women were lower than 
those of controls and “purely” test anxious women. Thus, Subhypothesis 2a) was 
supported. Similarly, the findings were reflective of lower BSOM-TA ratios for “purely” 
test anxious participants than for controls and “purely” depressed individuals. Thus, 
Subhypothesis 2b) was also supported. The only surprising result was that “mixed” 
(TAD) group did not differ from the “purely” depressed group on the BSOM-D ratios, 
while the same group showed lower BSOM-TA scores compared with the “purely” test 
anxious group.  
4.2.3 Analyses of Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that all four groups of participants would produce average 
disorder-relevant BSOM ratios that would fall within the precise qualitative and 
quantitative parameters predicted by the BSOM model.  
4.2.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The mean BSOM ratios and corresponding interval categories for test anxiety and 
depression are presented in Table 9 above. The predictions for the BSOM-TA ratios were 
supported across groups. In contrast, only one prediction for the BSOM-D ratio was 
supported (i.e., for the “purely” depressed group). The rest of the predictions for 
depressive content were not supported in that: (1) the mean ratio for the control group fell 
in the PM category instead of PD category (higher mean ratio than predicted) and (2) the 
average ratio for the “mixed” group fell in the same category as “purely” depressed 
group, i.e., CD instead of predicted FCD (higher mean ratio than hypothesized). Thus, 




The major purpose of this study was to examine content specificity of self-
reported cognitions in four groups of college women with varying affective 
symptomatology (i.e., high level of test anxiety, high level of depression, both test 
anxiety and depression, and without either). This task was accomplished using two 
models, i.e., (1) Cognitive Content Specificity (CSS) hypothesis (A.T. Beck, 1976), which 
addressed positive and negative content separately, and (2) CCS hypothesis integrated 
with the Balanced States of Mind (BSOM) model (Schwartz, 1997), which involved ratios 
of positive to the sum of positive and negative cognitions. Results indicate that although 
the CCS hypothesis yielded strong support for negative content across both disorders 
(Hypothesis 1), the addition of the BSOM model component (Hypothesis 2) aided in 
discriminating between test anxious symptoms and those of depression. Additionally, the 
applicability of the specific parameters of the BSOM model to disorder-specific content 
was ascertained (Hypothesis 3).  
In this chapter, the findings from the current study are first summarized and 
integrated with previous research in the field of cognitive content specificity of anxiety 
and depression. Theoretical and clinical implications from the current study are then 
explored. Lastly, the study’s strengths and limitations are discussed and suggestions for 
future research are provided. 
 
5.1 Discussion of Hypotheses and Integration of Results with Literature 
When examining the literature, it must be noted that most reviewed evidence 
came from studies of college students, unless otherwise indicated.  
5.1.1 Hypothesis 1: CCS Hypothesis 
 Hypothesis 1 predicted that college women with “pure” test anxiety, “pure” 
depression, both test anxiety and depression, and those without significant symptoms of 
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either would have a distinct profile of positive and negative cognitions. This hypothesis 
was supported. The results supported Hypothesis 1 and primary predictions of three out 
of four of its subhypotheses. The findings are in line with the CCS empirical research, 
which mostly concurs with group differences between subclinical expression of 
depression and social anxiety (e.g., Bruch et al., 1993; Ingram, 1989a). Additionally, the 
results help fill the gap in the body of literature on cognitive specificity of test anxiety 
and depression in college students, which does indicate distinctiveness of test anxious 
cognitive processes compared to depression (e.g., Ingram et al., 1987; Sanz & Avia, 
1994, study 1) but until now has not tested specificity of test anxious negative and 
positive content.  
5.1.1.1 Support for Subhypotheses 1a) through 1d) 
 From Hypothesis 1, four specific subhypotheses were generated about directionality 
of the group differences. Despite the significant group differences found on all four 
cognitive disorder-relevant dependent measures and large effect sizes, not all directional 
predictions were confirmed (see section 5.1.1.1 below). For details of contrast support 
within each subhypothesis, see Table 8, section 4.2.1.1. 
Subhypothesis 1a). 
Primary Relationships. Subhypothesis 1a) mainly predicted elevated negative 
cognitions in depressed college women on depression-specific measures, when compared 
to women with test anxiety-only and those without test anxiety or depression (i.e., D > 
TA, D > C). This subhypothesis was supported. Obtained support for Subhypothesis 1a) 
adds credibility to Beck’s proposition that in contrast to anxious individuals, depressed 
individuals exhibit increased self-referent negative thinking, which is pervasive and 
manifests itself cross-situationally (A.T. Beck, 1976; D. A. Clark et al, 1999). 
Empirically, support for Subhypothesis 1a) is similar to that of the body of clinical adult 
literature on depression, which has compared depressed group with controls (e.g., 
Crandell & Chambless, 1986; Dobson & Shaw, 1986; Harrell & Ryon, 1983; Kendall, 
Howard, & Hays, 1989) and anxiety group (A.T. Beck et al., 1987; Blackburn, Jones, & 
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Lewin, 1986; D.A. Clark et al., 1989; Hollon et al., 1986; Woody et al., 1998). The 
current results also concur with the CCS research in college students, which has been less 
convincing but still showed consistent empirical backing for specificity of negative 
content. Those with depressive symptoms scored higher on negative depressive content 
than those with social anxiety (e.g., Bruch et al., 2003; Ingram, 1989a; McDermut & 
Haaga, 1994) and test anxiety (e.g., Ingram et al., 1987), while they also scored higher 
than controls. There were a few exceptions that did not find support (e.g., McKellar et al., 
1996; Sanz & Avia, 1994, study 2).  
Additionally, within Subhypothesis 1a) it was expected that the “mixed” condition 
would yield more negative content cognitions related to depression than either test 
anxious or control condition (i.e., TAD > TA, TAD > C). These relationships were 
supported. Performance of the “mixed” group on depression-relevant negative content 
concurs with some clinical studies (e.g., Woody et al., 1998). Similarly, college student 
studies overwhelmingly found that this group was more dysfunctional than anxiety group 
(e.g., Bruch et al., 2003; Ingram, 1989a; Ingram et al., 1987; McKellar et al., 1996; Sanz 
& Avia, 1994, studies 1 and 2), contributing to specificity of depression. Elevated scores 
of the “mixed” group compared to controls further add to a convincing research base 
(e.g., Bruch et al., 2003; Ingram, 1989a; Ingram et al., 1987; McKellar et al., 1996; Sanz 
& Avia, study 1 and 2).  
Exploratory Relationships. Exploratory relationships for Subhypothesis 1a) 
involved those between the “mixed” group and “purely” depressed group and between 
the “purely” test anxious group and control group (i.e., TAD vs. D, TA vs. C). The 
comorbid group scored higher than the depressed group on negative depressive content, 
which is in line with several nonclinical studies (e.g., Ingram et al., 1987; McKellar et al., 
1996; Sanz & Avia, 1994) but contrary to a few others (e.g., Bruch et al., 2003; Ingram, 
1989a; Woody et al., 1998, clinical sample) that did not yield such differences. The 
finding that those with anxiety outscored controls on negative depressive content is 
similar to the outcome of the study by Calvete et al. (2005) but contradicts the findings of 
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other nonclinical studies, which found no group differences (e.g., Bruch et al., 2003; 
Ingram, 1989a, 1989b; McKellar et al., 1996; Sanz & Avia, 1994, study 2). 
Subhypothesis 1b). 
Primary Relationships. Subhypothesis 1b) stated that depressed college women 
would have lower positive automatic thinking scores on a depression-relevant measure 
than test anxious women or controls (i.e., D < TA, D < C). This subhypothesis was also 
supported. The finding that those with depression have fewer positive cognitions 
compared to those without it goes along with Beck’s proposition of low positive thinking 
in depression (A.T. Beck, 1976) and is mostly consistent with empirical evidence in 
clinical populations (see D. A. Clark et al., 1999 for a review of literature). However, the 
results are only partially consistent with ambiguous and scanty CCS research in college 
students, which did not yield significant differences between depressed and anxious 
groups (Bruch et al., 2003; Ingram, 1989b; McKellar et al., 1996), while finding that 
depressed group scored below controls (e.g., Bruch et al., 2003; Ingram, 1989a). Besides 
using a different anxiety type, the disparity in findings regarding depression-anxiety 
distinction may be attributable to several factors, such as differential group selection (in 
McKellar’s study, the comorbid group additionally had negative affect) and smaller 
group size. 
In addition to the relationships above, Subhypothesis 1b) also predicted that the 
comorbid group would have less positive cognitions than the test anxious and control 
groups (i.e., TAD < TA, TAD < C). These predictions were supported. The tendency of 
those with comorbid condition to have lower depressive positive content compared to 
those with anxiety is consistent with several studies in college students (Bruch et al., 
2003; Ingram, 1989b), strengthening evidence for specificity of depression. However, a 
few studies did not yield group differences (e.g., Ingram, 1989a; McKellar et al., 1996). 
Similar ambiguity was seen in empirical literature addressing comorbid and control group 
differences. 
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Exploratory Relationships. Exploratory relationships for Subhypothesis 1b) 
encompassed the same contrasts as for Subhypothesis 1a) (i.e., TAD vs. D, TA vs. C). 
The results, however, were very different from those for negative content in that no 
differences were found between groups. Thus, the presence of test anxiety symptoms 
within the group did not result in this group’s higher likelihood to be differentiated from 
the depression-only or control group. Similar levels of depression in the two groups (see 
section 4.1) might have resulted in a lack of significance, implicating the failure of test 
anxiety to contribute to depressive positive content. Empirical literature is not uniformly 
consistent with the findings for both contrasts, with McKellar et al. (1996) concurring 
with a lack of differences, but Bruch et al. (2003) and Ingram (1989a), (1989b) showing 
the opposite pattern.  
Subhypothesis 1c). 
Primary Relationships. Subhypothesis 1c) proposed significantly higher negative 
test anxious cognitions in “purely” test anxious women compared to depressed women 
and controls. Obtained support for Subhypothesis 1c) reflects test anxiety-specific 
propensity towards negatively-valenced cognition stream, with the focus on the self in 
relation to own performance and fears of being evaluated by others (Ingram et al., 1987; 
Zeidner, 1998). The findings are consistent with several CCS clinical studies (e.g., A.T. 
A.T. Beck et al., 1987; Clark et al., 1989) in that they showed the unique nature of 
anxious negative content, although a few studies (e.g., Woody et al., 1998) contradict the 
CCS predictions. Further, current findings add to the ambiguous evidence of negative 
content specificity of anxiety disorders in college students (Bruch et al., 2003, study 1; 
Sanz & Avia, 1994, studies 1 and 2), which contradicts the obtained differences between 
anxious and depressed groups, while concurring with the present study in that anxiety 
results in higher negative thinking compared to controls.  
Within the additional predictions for Subhypothesis 1c), it was expected that the 
“mixed” group would yield more negative cognitions than the controls and depression-
only group (i.e., TAD > C, TAD > D). These contrasts were supported. Despite being few 
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in number, empirical studies concur with both group distinctions in a clinical study (e.g., 
Woody et al., 1998) and college student samples (e.g., Bruch et al., 2003; Sanz & Avia, 
studies 1 and 2).  
Exploratory Relationships. Exploratory relationships for Subhypothesis 1c) 
involved those between the “mixed” group and test anxious group and between the 
depressed group and control group on test anxiety content (i.e., TAD vs. TA and D vs. 
C). Indeed, the “mixed” group had more negative cognitions than test anxious group, 
while depressed group had more negative test anxious thinking than controls. The 
obtained group differences point to the important role of depressive symptomatology in 
contributing to group differentiation on negative test anxious content. The comorbidity-
versus-anxiety distinction is consistent with a few clinical (e.g., Woody et al., 1998) and 
nonclinical studies (e.g., Bruch et al., 2003; Sanz & Avia, studies 1 and 2). However, 
differences between depressed and control groups garnered less convincing empirical 
validation, with some providing support (e.g., Bruch et al., 2003; Calvete et al., 2005), 
while others finding no significance (e.g., Sanz & Avia, 1994, study 2).  
Subhypothesis 1d). 
Primary Relationships. In contrast to the subhypotheses above, Subhypothesis 
1d) was the only one that did not unequivocally support cognitive specificity contentions 
(i.e., TA < D, TA < C). Specifically, positive anxious cognitions of women with test 
anxiety turned out to be equivalent to those of women with depressive symptoms (i.e., 
TA = D), although both were lower than those of their relatively symptom-free peers. The 
main findings of this subhypothesis are similar to those studies reporting a lack of 
specificity of positive anxious content to anxiety (e.g., Sanz & Avia, study 2) but 
contradict those that discovered that anxiety group was lower than depressed group (e.g., 
Bruch et al.. 2003, study 1). In contrast, the presence of group differences between test 
anxious group and controls on positive anxious content is well established and goes along 
with the non-CCS literature in test anxiety (e.g., Blankstein et al., 1991; Blankstein & 
Flett, 1990; Galassi, 1981a, b) and social phobia (e.g., Beidel et al., 1985). The findings 
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also concur with the limited CCS research in college students by Bruch et al. (2003, study 
1), although they contradict a few studies that found no group differences (e.g., Sanz & 
Avia, 1994, studies 1 and 2).  
In addition to the two above-mentioned contrasts, Subhypothesis 1d) proposed 
that the test anxiety group would also have fewer positive cognitions with evaluative 
content, compared to depression and control groups (i.e., TAD < D, TAD < C). These 
contrasts were supported, providing additional evidence in favor of cognitive specificity 
of test anxiety. The findings add to the limited number of college student studies, which 
did not yield uniform results. Specifically, current study concurs with the research by 
Bruch et al. (2003, study 1) and contradicts the one by Sanz and Avia (1994, studies 1 
and 2).  
Partial support for Subhypothesis 1d) signifies the ability of test anxiety to hold its 
own against controls but challenges the uniqueness of positive anxious cognitions against 
depression. The obtained findings helped amass preliminary evidence on positive anxious 
content comparison of depression and anxiety, which is lacking in nonclinical literature 
on test anxiety and is scanty for social phobia.  
Exploratory Relationships. Exploratory relationships for Subhypothesis 1d) 
incorporated the same contrasts as for Subhypothesis 1c) (i.e., TAD vs. TA, D vs. C). The 
results were also similar to those of Subhypothesis 1c) in that significant differences 
between groups were found, i.e., comorbid group had fewer positive cognitions than test 
anxious group and depressed group had fewer positive cognitions than controls. Thus, the 
presence of depressive symptoms in a group resulted into this group’s higher likelihood 
of being differentiated from test anxious and control groups on positive depressive 
content. The literature on the subject is characterized by ambiguity. Bruch et al.’s (2003) 
study found a difference between comorbid and anxious groups similar to the current 
study, but several other studies failed to provide support the distinction (e.g., Sanz & 
Avia, 1994, studies 1 and 2). Significant differences between the depressed group and 
controls were contradictory to the findings of both Bruch et al. (2003, study 1) and Sanz 
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and Avia (1994, study 2), despite similarities in design. The disparity can be due to group 
selection differences, smaller group size, and a different type of anxiety used.   
5.1.1.2 Cross-Content Summary 
Valence. 
Unequivocal support for Subhypotheses 1a) and 1c) reflects the negative nature of 
depressive and anxious cognitions. Current data also indicate that having depression is 
“not the only key to experiencing negative self-statements” (Sanz & Avia, 1994, p. 121). 
This is in line with most current empirical literature. In contrast to negative content, 
cognitive positivity, i.e., did not receive uniform support because both test anxiety and 
depression were characterized by low positive thoughts, but only depression had 
disorder-specific positive content. The absence of a clear pattern within positive content 
across disorders (Subhypotheses 1b) and 1d)) is consistent with the CCS literature, 
although a dearth of clinical and nonclinical studies investigating positive content 
(particularly, in anxiety) has resulted in a lack of the reliable positive content research 
base. The findings are also consistent with the presence of positive affectivity in both 
depression and social phobia (e.g., Brown et al., 1998; Watson, Clark, & Carey, 1988; 
Watson, Gamez, & Simms, 2005; both cited in Watson, 2005). This study contributes to 
the contradicting literature in the area.  
Disorder Content. 
For the “pure” conditions of depression and anxiety, the results are consistent 
with the literature in that depressed group showed better differentiation on its respective 
content than test anxiety on its content, and these groups were less dysfunctional than the 
comorbid group and more dysfunctional than the controls.  
“Pure” Conditions. Taken together, results from Subhypotheses 1a) and 1b) 
provide solid support for the unique relationship between depressive content and 
depressive symptoms. Those with depressive symptoms manifested more depression-
related negative cognitions and less positive cognitions than those with low levels of 
depression and those with test anxiety. The results also manifest congruence with the 
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CCS research in social anxiety and depression, but there is not enough data from the CCS 
studies of test anxiety and depression, making empirical support preliminary.  
Results from Subhypotheses 1c) and 1d) reflect partial support for the uniqueness 
of anxious content. Specifically, they cast doubt on specificity of positive self-statements 
to test anxiety. Current results show a pattern similar to the CCS studies of social anxiety 
content, which manifest somewhat weak evidence of anxiety specificity. The unique 
cognitive profile of test anxiety has been corroborated by research in anxious cognitive 
processes (e.g., Ingram et al., 1987; Sanz & Avia, 1994). Thus, test anxiety appears to 
have negative content elements that are different from depression, yet demonstrates some 
overlap with depression on positive content.  
Comorbid Condition. In addition to contributing to the specificity of the “pure” 
conditions of depression and anxiety, this study also shed the light on the comorbid 
condition. For both depression and test anxiety, the “mixed” group was predicted to score 
the highest on the measures of negative cognitions and the lowest on the measures of 
positive content. The results reveal that participatns with both depression and test anxiety 
tend to have the highest level of negative thinking and lowest level of positive thinking 
across disorders (with the exception of positive depressive thinking measure). The 
comorbid group showing the highest negative thinking is consistent with several CCS 
studies, including those with test anxiety component (e.g., Ingram et al., 1987; Sanz & 
Avia, 1994, study 1 and 2). However, the findings contradict a few other studies, such as 
Bruch et al. (2003, study 1) and Woody et al. (1998), which found that comorbid group’s 
performance differed depending on the disorder content. Further, lowest positive thinking 
by comorbid group across content has been supported by a few nonclinical studies (e.g., 
Bruch et al., 2003, study 1), but the evidence is not compelling.  
Controls. The current study confirmed that control group tends to be least 
cognitively maladaptive of all groups (with the exception of the positive depressogenic 
cognition shared equally with “purely” test anxious group). This study’s findings are 
similar to those by Bruch et al.’s (2003, study 1) in that control group largely engaged in 
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the least overall negative thinking and highest overall positive thinking. Several other 
nonclinical studies with a similar design are contradictory to this profile in that they 
found the control group to score the same as several other groups on negative measures 
(e.g., Ingram, 1989a, b; Ingram et al., 1987; Sanz & Avia, 1994, study 1 and 2). Overall, 
no CCS studies were identified that found the control group to unequivocally and 
consistently score the lowest on positive measures of both anxiety and depression, 
indicating that high positive thinking is not the prerogative of those without 
psychopathology.  
5.1.2. Hypothesis 2: Integrated CCS/BSOM Model 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the four groups of the depressed, test anxious, 
“mixed”, and low-pathology women would manifest different disorder-related average 
BSOM ratios. Results support Hypothesis 2. Specifically, the test anxious group scored 
differently from other groups on test anxiety-relevant measures, while the depressed 
group scored differently on the depression-relevant measures, providing evidence in 
favor of analyzing disorder-relevant BSOM ratios simultaneously within the context of 
the CCS theory.  The comorbid group also yielded content differences, providing 
additional information in support of cognitive content specificity. Research in specificity 
of anxious and depressive cognitive ratios has not been prolific and is characterized by 
the virtual absence of the clinical adult studies. Current data contribute to the few 
empirical studies addressing group differences in college students (e.g., McKellar et al., 
1996) and children (e.g., Ronan & Kendall, 1997).   
5.1.2.1 Support for Subhypotheses 2a) and 2b) 
Two directional subhypotheses were generated from Hypothesis 2. Within the 
subhypotheses, all primary directional predictions were supported (see Table 9, section 
4.2.2.2 above).  
Subhypothesis 2a). 
Primary Relationships. All four directional contrasts of the Subhypothesis 2a) 
were confirmed in the current study. Specifically, Subhypothesis 2a) produced expected 
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differences for groups of “purely” depressed participants on their disorder-relevant 
BSOM-D ratios, i.e., those with depression-only had lower average BSOM-D ratios 
compared to their peers with test anxiety or controls (i.e., D < TA, D < C). Specificity of 
the SOM-D ratios to depression and not to anxiety has been corroborated by limited 
empirical evidence (e.g., McDermut & Haaga, 1994; Ronan & Kendall, 1997 in 
children). However, the results partially contradict a study by McKellar et al. (1996), 
which did not find group differences. Additionally, the results contribute to the scanty 
non-CCS research in depression (e.g., Garamoni et al., 1991; Schwartz et al., 2002), 
which showed that BSOM-D ratios for depressed participants tend to be lower than those 
of participants with low/remitted depression. Further, as predicted, the “mixed” group’s 
BSOM-D ratios were predicted to be lower than those for test anxiety and controls (i.e., 
TAD < TA, TAD < C).  Several empirical studies were similar to current research in that 
they provided support for the differentiation of the comorbid group from anxious 
individuals and controls (e.g., McKellar et al., 1996; Ronan & Kendall, 1997).   
Secondary Relationships. The BSOM model alone predicted that the “mixed” 
group would yield more dysfunctional ratio compared to “pure” depression (i.e., TAD < 
D). In this study, the groups were equal (i.e., TAD = D), making it the only unsupported 
contrast within Subhypothesis 1a). Such lack of support is similar to the study by Ronan 
and Kendall (1997) with children but is different from the one by McKellar et al. (1996), 
which did find differences. As stated above (see section 5.1.1.1), study’s selection 
procedure for the “purely” depressed group might have impacted the results. Overall, the 
absence of support for this contrast reflects a somewhat weak of role of test anxiety in 
adding to the effects of depression on depressive content differentiation. 
Exploratory Relationships. Neither the CCS nor the BSOM model alone or 
jointly fully explain the relationship between test anxiety and controls on depressive 
content (i.e., TA vs. C). In this study, the test anxious group had more dysfunctional 
BSOM-D ratios than the control group. This can be attributed to shared variance between 
anxiety and depression. The results were different from those yielded by positive content 
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but similar to those generated by the CCS model on negative content, with the 
implication that the negative content element in cognitive ratios plays a more important 
role in accounting for group differentiation. Several studies support this finding in college 
students (e.g., McKellar et al., 1996; Nasby & Russell, 1997) and children (e.g., Ronan & 
Kendall, 1997; Treadwell & Kendall, 1996).  
Subhypothesis 2b). 
Primary Relationships. Subypothesis 2b) mainly predicted that test anxious 
women would have significantly lower average BSOM-TA ratios than those with 
depression-only or controls (TA < D, TA< C). These relationships were supported. CCS 
research, however, does not confirm the anxiety-depression BSOM distinction (e.g., 
Ronan & Kendall, 1997; McDermut & Haaga, 1994), whereas differences between 
anxiety and controls have been documented (e.g., Ronan & Kendall, 1997). The 
divergent profiles of test anxious individuals and controls found in this study were also in 
line with the non-CCS research in anxiety disorders (Arnkoff et al., 1992; Bruch et al., 
1991; Glass & Furlong, 1990; Heimberg et al., 1990; Michelson, Schwartz, & Marchione 
1991; Nasby & Russell, 1997; Schwartz & Michelson, 1987), including test anxiety 
(Topman et al., 1992), although an affective confounding problem limits applicability of 
such research. 
Also, the “mixed” group’s BSOM-TA ratios were predicted to be lower than 
those for “pure” depression condition or controls (TAD < D, TAD < C). These 
relationships were supported unequivocally in the current study. Both results were similar 
to those obtained by Ronan and Kendall (1997) in children.  
Secondary Relationships. The BSOM model also predicted that the comorbid 
group would yield, on average, more dysfunctional cognitive ratios compared to those 
“pure” test anxious group (i.e., TAD < TA), due to comorbidity being associated with 
higher cognitive psychopathology. In this study, this difference was supported. The 
results are consistent with the findings of Ronan and Kendall (1997), corroborating the 
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important role of depressive symptoms in cognitive disturbance and cognitive 
differentiation.   
Exploratory Relationships. In the only exploratory relationship within 
Subhypothesis 2b), the depressed group produced more dysfunctional ratios than control 
group (i.e., D < C), which is indicative of depressive symptoms contributing to test 
anxious content. A study by Ronan and Kendall (1997) supported such distinction. Other 
empirical evidence is missing. 
5.1.2.2 Cross-Content Summary 
“Pure” Conditions. 
Predicted content specificity of the “pure” conditions was supported. On the 
primary relationships, the evidence of differentiating depression from test anxiety on 
anxious content was equally as strong as the evidence on depressive content. Weaker 
support for secondary relationships on depressive content does not minimize the 
content’s connection to depression but, rather, is reflective of test anxiety syndrome’s 
inability to impact the relationship between depression and its relevant content and create 
a categorically new comorbid condition. Literature partially corroborates the findings 
with the “pure” conditions (see section 5.1.2.1 above), but there are so few studies on the 
subject that extreme caution should be used when generalizing results.  
Comorbid and Control Conditions. 
In addition to specificity of “pure” conditions of depression and test anxiety, it 
was expected that across content, women with the comorbid condition would have more 
dysfunctional ratios than those with test anxiety, depression, or without either. This 
prediction was supported in all primary contrasts, consistent with the studies by McKellar 
et al. (1996) and Ronan and Kendall (1997). When examining the results for the control 
group, it must be noted that in both sets of disorder-relevant ratios, control group was 
supported as having the least dysfunctional ratio, a finding corroborated by the same two 
empirical studies above.  
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5.1.3. Hypothesis 3: BSOM Model applied to CCS 
Hypothesis 3 suggested that all four groups of college women would have average 
disorder-relevant cognitive content ratios that fall within the interval parameters outlined 
by the BSOM model (see Table 9, section 4.2.2.2 for results). In this study, the BSOM 
model did not appear to fully translate into the content specificity area, consistent with 
mixed support in several studies with children (e.g., Kendall & Treadwell, 2007; 
Treadwell & Kendall, 1996).  
5.1.3.1 “Pure” Conditions 
Primary Relationships. 
For test anxious and depressive content, expectations were similar, i.e., “pure” 
disorders of test anxiety and depression would produce average respective BSOM-TA 
and BSOM-D ratios that would fall in the Conflicted Dialogue (CD) interval, 
respectively. This prediction of the BSOM model was supported, i.e., both test anxious 
and depressed groups fell within the same interval of CD. This finding has been backed 
by McKellar et al. (1996) for the BSOM-D only. Current results are also consistent with 
the preliminary evidence of the BSOM specificity of anxiety and depression in children 
provided by Ronan and Kendall (1997).  
Exploratory Relationships. 
The predictions for the BSOM-TA ratio of the depressed group and for the 
BSOM-D ratio of the test anxious group were exploratory. In this study, the depressed 
and test anxious groups fell within the different BSOM intervals, i.e., SCD and PD: O, 
respectively. Initial empirical support for the exploratory prediction for depressive 
content was obtained by McKellar et al. (1996) who found that anxiety group fell within 
the SCD interval. The finding that depressed group had a more dysfunctional test anxiety-
relevant BSOM ratio, compared to the depression-relevant ratio of the test anxious group, 
suggests that depressive symptoms contribute more to the anxious content than test 
anxious symptoms to the depressive content. It is contrary to the findings of Ronan and 
Kendall (1997), whose ratios fell within the same range of CD.   
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5.1.3.2 Comorbid Condition 
Regardless of disorder content, the comorbid group was predicted by the BSOM 
model to most likely fall in the interval of Failed Coping Dialogue (FCD), associated 
with the lower mean and more moderate and stable maladjustment than the CD interval 
projected for the “pure” groups. This prediction was only partially supported, as the 
“mixed” group fell into two different intervals, i.e., CD for depressive content and the 
FCD for test anxious content. Literature comparing comorbid group to other groups on 
the BSOM ratios is very scanty, whether for depression or anxiety. The finding for 
depressive content is consistent with McKellar et al.’s study, while Ronan and Kendall’s 
(1997) study in children provided only partial support, as their comorbid group fell within 
the same interval of FCD (.40). The findings yielded evidence for the more negative 
nature of depressive symptoms, compared to test anxious ones, as the test anxiety 
component contributed to a less dysfunctional ratio, compared to the depressive element.  
5.1.3.3 Control Condition 
Irrespective of disorder content, control group was expected to fall within the 
interval typically reported by researchers of sorted and unsorted samples of college 
students and children, i.e., Positive Dialogue (PD) (e.g., Bruch, 1997; Burgess & Haaga, 
1994; McDermutt & Haaga, 1994; Ronan & Kendall, 1997). Unlike children in Ronan 
and Kendall’s (1997) study, however, control participants fell within two different 
intervals. Although both BSOM ratios for controls were within the positive end of the 
BSOM scale, test anxious content yielded an average cognitive ratio that was in the 
optimal range of Positive Dialogue, whereas depressive content resulted in slightly more 
optimistic thinking (i.e., Positive Monologue; PM). The PM category is typical 
characterized by heightened positivity that may be adaptive short-term (Schwartz, 1997). 
It is not entirely unusual for the samples of adults to have higher-than-expected BSOM 
ratios, such as close to the PM interval (e.g., Friedman et al., 2002, affective ratios of 
.90). Further, an elevation might have been a result of group selection (i.e., “low 
scorers”). It is possible that a control group selected for average symptoms could have 
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had ratios that were more dysfunctional and closer to the low end of the PD interval (e.g., 
Ronan & Kendall, 1997, in children) or even within the SCD interval. Finally, neither 
content ratio for the control group was close to the “golden section” of .62 suggested by 
the original SOM model (Schwartz & Garamoni, 1986, 1989). This finding speaks in 
favor of the validity of BSOM model, which allowed for the shift of the optimal ratio 
upward, towards a more optimistic outlook than its predecessor.  
 
5.1.4 Tying It All Together: The CCS and CCS/BSOM Model Comparison 
5.1.4.1 Disorder Specificity 
The main goal of the present study was to compare the two models of cognitive 
content differentiation in order to determine if integrating the BSOM approach with the 
CCS model would produce better disorder specificity results. The summary of contrast 
support for both models can be found in Table 11 below.  
Table 11 
Support for Cognitive Content Specificity of Depression and Test Anxiety by Model 
  
Content 
                  Depressive                                          Test Anxious 
CCS-Negative 
       “Pure” 
       “Mixed” 
 
D > TA         D > C     
TAD > TA    TAD > C 
 
TA > D      TA > C     
TAD > D   TAD > C 
CCS-Positive 
      “Pure” 
      “Mixed” 
 
D < TA          D < C 
TAD < TA     TAD < C 
 
TA = D*      TA < C 
TAD < D     TAD < C 
BSOM 
       “Pure” 
       “Mixed” 
 
D < TA         D < C 
TAD < TA    TAD < C 
 
TA < D       TA < C 
TAD < D    TAD < C 
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Note. Boldface type indicates relationships relevant to test anxiety content; regular type 
font indicates depressive content. An asterisk * denotes a lack of support for the contrast 
at the level of .05.   
 
When evaluating both models, one should consider the support for primary 
relationships on disorder content and effect sizes. It is apparent that the predictions of the 
joint CCS/BSOM model have resulted in better overall differentiation on primary 
contrasts than those of the CCS model. Specifically, the combined model provided 
stronger support for test anxiety and for positive content than the CCS approach alone. 
When the valence components of the CCS model are analyzed separately, both the 
negative content component of the CCS model and the CCS/BSOM model yield equal 
(100%) support for primary contrasts for both anxiety and depression. The effect sizes for 
the two models were large for both disorders. It is noteworthy, however, that the 
CCS/BSOM model yielded a larger effect size for depression than either component of 
the CCS model.  
Additionally, examining directional contrasts can provide a visual of the 
robustness of the BSOM ratios. In Hypothesis 1, the findings for depressive negative 
content were TAD > D > TA > C, while findings for the positive content were TAD = D 
< TA = C. When compared to the BSOM model for depression, i.e., TAD = D < TA < C, 
one can see that the BSOM model was able to partially compensate for the lack of 
differences generated by positive content. Similarly, the results for test anxious negative 
content were: TAD > TA > D > C, while findings for the positive content were: TAD < 
TA = D < C. These are contrasted with the BSOM relationship of TAD < TA < D < C, 
where once again the BSOM ratios were able to mitigate positive content’s weakness in 
group differentiation.  
Present empirical evidence on the differentiating role of cognitive content seems 
to point to two disparate conclusions: (1) either negative thoughts play more significant 
role in psychopathology than the cognitive balance, presumably due to their stability and 
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pervasiveness (e.g., Minor & Gold, 1986), or (2) the balance is equally important as 
negative thoughts (e.g., Calvete & Cardeñoso, 2002; Calvete & Connor-Smith, 2005). 
The current study sides with the second perspective but also provides additional 
information about an advantage of the BSOM ratios over negative content alone. 
Assessing cognitive ratios is beneficial, as they appear to possess differentiating power 
that is similar to if not higher than that of the single-valence content, while encompassing 
more information.  
5.1.4.2 Disorder Effects 
In addition to allowing to establish cognitive content differentiation, the current 
research design lend itself to examination of the effects of one disorder on the cognitive 
content of the other, i.e., the effects of depression on the test anxious content and of test 
anxiety on depressive content. Specific relationships are outlined in Table 12 below. 
Table 12 
Support for Disorder Effects by Model 
  
Content Specificity Model 
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 
 CCS-Neg  CCS-Pos  CCS/BSOM  
Depression 
on TA content 
 
D > C      TAD > TA 
 
D < C      TAD < TA 
 
D < C      TAD < TA 
Test Anxiety 
on D content 
 
TA > C    TAD > D 
 
TA = C*    TAD = D* 
 
TA < C    TAD = D* 
Note. Regular type indicates relationships relevant to negative content of the CCS model; 
Italics type indicates relationships relevant to positive content of the CCS model; Bold 
type indicates relationships relevant to the integrated CCS/BSOM model. An asterisk * 
denotes a lack of support for the contrast at the level of .05.   
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From Table 12, it is apparent that across hypotheses, there is observed primacy of 
depression over test anxiety, as the influence of depression was observed in nine out of 
nine contrasts, whereas the effect of test anxiety was demonstrated in six out of nine 
contrasts. Thus, in this study, the presence of depression in anxiety posed a more serious 
affective confounding problem to depressive content differentiation than the presence of 
specific anxiety disorder comorbid with depression did to test anxious content 
differentiation.  
Overall, although testing predictive powers of either model was outside the scope 
of this study and the relative influence of the cognitive balance and negative thoughts on 
disorder content was not established, this study concurs with the literature above in that 
negative content and the BSOM ratios play a more important role in differentiation of 
psychopathology syndromes than positive content alone.  
5.1.5 Summary 
The current study attempted to replicate some of the methodology and main 
questions of the research by Ingram et al. (1987) and Ronan and Kendall (1997) in order 
to examine content specificity of current cognitive activity in test anxiety and depression. 
The present findings only partially concurred with the two studies above. 
The research confirmed a suggestion that integrating different models within the 
CCS framework can lead to improved content differentiation versus analyzing positive 
content alone but not necessarily over negative content alone. The results yielded 
evidence in favor of content specificity of negative cognitions and BSOM ratios and 
partial evidence in favor of the uniqueness of positive cognitions in test anxiety and 
depression. Further, the data provided convincing support for the integration of the CCS 
hypothesis with the BSOM model, although only partial support for the application of the 
BSOM predictions to disorder-specific content. Additionally, the results point to the 
primacy depressive symptoms over those of test anxiety in terms of contributing to 
cognitive content differentiation. The findings bear similarity to existing CCS clinical and 
nonclinical research in depression and anxiety but also add to their ambiguous nature. 
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Given the inconsistencies and gaps in the literature, as well as its paucity, the results help 
accumulate preliminary evidence for content specificity of cognitive products in test 
anxiety and depression.  
In the following section, theoretical underpinnings of current results for 
conceptualization of test anxiety and depression and relevant theories and models are 
presented.  
 
5.2 Theoretical Implications 
This study contributed to the refinement of conceptual models in the area of test 
anxiety and depression by attempting to attain amalgamation of existing theoretical 
perspectives in the cognitive content areas.  
5.2.1 Disorder Conceptualization 
Conceptually, current findings provide preliminary evidence for the significance 
of positive and negative content in test anxiety and add to the body of evidence on 
content specificity of depression, as well as contribute to the study of inner speech in 
affective disorders. Sanz and Avia (1994) explain the discriminating role of cognitions by 
the fact that they are contained within the syndromes of both disorders. Differentiating 
between the two conditions on cognitive content supports the assumption that test anxiety 
and depression psychopathological states are likely independent of each other and that 
these cognitive symptoms are an integral part of both disorders. A caveat is that since it 
may not be possible to isolate cognitive variables completely whether on the basis of 
theory or empirically, any propositions of specificity should be treated in relative rather 
than absolute terms (Ingram & Malcarne, 1995). 
Cognitive elements of most other anxiety disorders (with the exception of panic 
disorder, which is well researched in cognitive theory) are still to be unraveled (D. A. 
Clark, 2001). Although it is premature to conclude that cognitive content can be used to 
define test anxiety, it is certainly important to continue work on discovering this 
disorder’s cognitive marks, so that they can be incorporated in the future theoretical 
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models. Theorists are also encouraged to identify more creative ways of conceptualizing 
test anxiety, e.g., by integrating current psychoeducational investigations with literature 
on clinical anxiety disorders (particularly social phobia), sport psychology (i.e., 
performance anxiety), and cross-cultural perspective (e.g., Bodas & Ollendick, 2005). In 
regards to depression, although cognitive elements of its clinical expression are well 
grounded in theory and research, its unique cognitive profile in college students 
(especially positive content) does not boast equally solid foundation. This study indicates 
that depressive symptoms in a nonclinical population can demonstrate differentiation 
similar to that of a clinical disorder, provided that the anxiety is specific enough. 
Additionally, stronger depression effects invite a conclusion that depression is capable of 
influencing test anxiety to a higher degree on positive anxious content than test anxiety 
affects depressive positive content.  
5.2.2 Hypothesis 1 
5.2.2.1 Contribution to Theoretical Models 
 Depression versus Anxiety. 
Hypothesis 1 investigated Beck’s cognitive content specificity approach, which 
proposes different cognition themes for depression and anxiety (A.T. Beck, 1976). In the 
current study, the “pure” disorder groups indeed differed in terms of the content of self-
reported cognitive self-statements, except for positive test anxious content. The results 
also concur with the cognitive component model of psychopathology (Ingram & Kendall, 
1987; Kendall & Ingram, 1987), which indicates that among other constructs anxiety and 
depression differ have distinct automatic thought content. Overall, at least on a 
subclinical level, the negative content appears to play a more important role in disorder 
differentiation compared to positive content, which failed to gain unequivocal support as 
a variable that sets one disorder apart from another.  
In addition to partially supporting the CCS hypothesis, the findings concur with 
the other two hypotheses of Beck’s cognitive model, i.e., those of negativity and 
exclusivity. The negativity hypothesis (A.T. Beck, 1967, 1976) reads that too many 
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negative self-referent thoughts are a paramount characteristic of depression, while the 
exclusivity hypothesis additionally places low positive thinking at the core of depression 
(A.T. Beck; D.A. Clark et al., 1999). The evidence for the validity of the exclusivity 
hypotheses has not been strong in the CCS research (see Chapter 2 for view) and its 
appropriateness has been debated (Haaga, Dyck, & Ernst, 1991). Contrary to such 
evidence, the study confirms the uniqueness of the diminished positivity in depressive 
thinking compared to controls.  
The results also partially corroborate cognitive implications of the tripartite model 
(L.A. Clark & Watson, 1991) and its reformulations (e.g., R. Beck, Benedict, & Winkler, 
2003; Cho & Telch, 2005; Mineka et al., 1998; Wilson & Rapee, 2005), which postulate 
the presence of low and unique positive content for depression and high negative general 
psychopathology factor shared by both anxiety and depression. In this study, both test 
anxiety and depression had high negativity with different themes. While the anxiety-
depression group differences on negative content do not contradict the affective 
postulates of the tripartite model in that elevated negativity was found in both disorders, a 
shared negative content component was not identified in this study. The findings are 
more similar to the Mineka et al’s (1998) view in which each disorder has a unique 
component in addition to the common one. In contrast, low positivity of depression 
compared to controls and compared to anxiety was observed, which concurred with the 
model’s predictions. One problem with the tripartite model is that it cannot explain the 
findings regarding low anxious content being similar in both disorders. Commonality in 
low positive affect and possibly content was proposed and tested by several researchers 
as a part of a two-factor structural models (e.g., Jolly & Kramer, 1994) but did not gain 
significant support.  
Lastly, the original CCS theory (A.T. Beck, 1976) does not provide an answer to 
the exploratory questions whether those with test anxiety would differ from controls on 
depression-relevant measures or whether those with depression would differ from 
controls on anxiety-related measures. The presence of such group differences, 
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particularly evident in the negative content of both disorders could be indicative of shared 
variance between the two, presumably due to a common psychopathology element 
proposed by the tripartite model (L.A. Clark & Watson, 1991).  
Comorbid Condition. 
Beck’s cognitive model (1976) indicates that those with co-occurring conditions 
manifest dysfunctional schemas of both disorders, with the implication that the comorbid 
group would have the most dysfunctional profile and, therefore, be different from all 
other groups. Although theoretical predictions associated with this group are typically 
secondary to those for the “pure” groups, they play an important role in establishing a 
niche for comorbidity in research and theory, as they augment disorder specificity and 
help ascertain one disorder’s additive effects on another disorder’s content. In this study, 
the dysfunctional nature of the comorbid group was mostly supported, although its profile 
was thought to depend on the group selection procedure.  
Normality Versus Psychopathology. 
The differences between the control group and all other groups allow one to 
conclude whether it is the “positivity” bias (i.e., high positive content) or low negative 
content rather that reliably sets the low pathology individuals apart from those with 
psychopathology. The support for the low negative content is slightly stronger, favoring 
the proposition of Kendall (1984) that it is likely the “power of nonnegative thinking” 
that is mostly responsible for the differences between control group and “pure” disorder 
groups. 
5.2.2.2 Positive Content’s Discriminating Ability 
Low positive evaluative content did not appear to be specific to test anxiety, as it 
was found to be also present in depression in similar levels, although both depression and 
test anxiety group were lower than controls. This finding goes along with the theoretical 
contentions of Watson (2005) about low positivity being characteristic of both social 
anxiety and depression.  
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There have been several explanations for the failure of the positive content to 
discern between anxiety and depression. For example, some researchers explain the 
differences on the positive thoughts scale as being related to such factors as personality, 
education, parenting, or coping (Calvete & Connor-Smith, 2005), all of which were not 
controlled in this study. They may argue that despite the self-report measures of positive 
cognitions being validated with clinical and nonclinical depression and anxiety, their 
nature is too general and unstable (Calvete & Connor-Smith) to be uniquely linked to any 
disorder, and they are conceptually different from negative thoughts, which are more 
specific, ingrained, and automatic.  
Coping self-instructional cognitions rather than generally positive cognitions have 
been suggested as anxiety markers in children (Kendall & Chansky, 1991; cited in 
Calvete & Cardenoso, 2002). It is possible then that heterogeneity of positive content 
exceeds that of negative content, in a sense that it reflects not just diversity of themes but 
possibly of functions (directing thought, directing affect, directing behavior, completing 
task, etc.). Perhaps, the fact that test anxious cognitions in this study reflected mostly 
positive evaluative thoughts of general nature, which represented only a subset of a 
typical positive thinking stream and did not include a sufficient degree of self-
instructional coping, resulted in a lack of test anxiety uniqueness. Similarly, it is unclear 
the results were due to instability of positive automatic thoughts and whether a multiple-
time sample could have produced different results.  
Some assert that low positive thoughts are indeed capable of differentiation within 
and between pathology but only in clinical populations (D. A. Clark et al., 1999). This 
point of view provides only partial explanation for the current findings since it explains 
the lack of specificity of anxiety but not of depression. Successful differentiation of the 
depressive positive content could have been due to the relatively high average level of 
depression in the depressed group, compared to other student studies. An alternative 
explanation is that positive anxious content and not negative content requires clinical-
level anxiety symptoms to yield distinction. Since test anxiety is by definition a 
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nonclinical condition, this proposition needs to be tested in a performance subtype of 
clinical social phobia with test anxiety symptoms.  
5.2.3 Hypotheses 2 and 3 
5.2.3.1 Contribution to Theoretical Models 
In addition to providing evidence in support of Beck’s CCS hypothesis (A.T. 
Beck, 1976), the results of Hypothesis 2 mostly corroborated the utility of cognitive ratios 
in content separation of the two disorders. While cognitive thought asymmetry is 
postulated to be common to depression and anxiety (Ingram & Kendall, 1987), cognitive 
specificity approach predicted that the content ratios would play an important role in 
differentiating depression from anxiety. This prediction was supported. The only lack of 
contrast support (TAD vs. D on depressive content) was related to the BSOM prediction 
and shows that the BSOM model may not be as applicable to cognitive content specificity 
unless it is integrated with the CCS approach.  
In contrast to depression and clinical anxiety, the SOM/BSOM model (Schwartz 
& Garamoni, 1989; Schwartz, 1997) has not been extensively explored with test anxious 
individuals (for non-CCS research, see work by Topman and his colleagues). The results 
indicated that, similar to depression, test anxiety is characterized by distinct BSOM 
ratios. The current findings are also consistent with the SOM/BSOM model’s (Schwartz 
& Garamoni, 1989; Schwartz, 1997) contention that the more pathological conditions, 
such as comorbidity, tend to produce lower SOM ratios. One exception was the lack of 
differences between the comorbid and depressed groups, likely attributable to the 
peculiarities of group selection.  
While the directional predictions of the joint CCS/BSOM model met with 
success, the results of Hypothesis 3 only partially support the application of the BSOM 
interval parameters to CCS, with similar results for both “pure” conditions on respective 
content (unequivocal support) but different results for comorbid and control groups 
(partial support). The latter two groups had only one out of two content ratios fall within 
the predicted interval. There was an identical pattern of the BSOM-TA ratio being more 
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dysfunctional than that for depressive content. Relatively high BSOM-D ratios for control 
group can be adaptive, as they are associated with “greater dampening of the stress-
dysphoria relationship” (Bruch, 1997, p. 35). If it is true that those with low pathology 
symptoms do not have biases (Beck’s theory), then theoretically, the control ratios should 
fall within the same interval on either content. The obtained content differences point to 
the presence of some sort of bias in those individuals, contradicting Beck’s model. This 
bias could be situation-dependent, as the circumstances surrounding an evaluative 
situation may have created varied response in controls, resulting in a somewhat more 
dysfunctional cognitive profile on the test anxious content. It must also be noted that the 
group fell in the adjacent interval, so the differences may simply reflect the nature of the 
particular sample.  
Beck’s theory emphasizes the congruence of schema-activating event and 
schema-relevant cognitions. While one can attempt to use the situational congruence 
explanation to account for the comorbid group’s considerably more dysfunctional 
BSOM-TA ratio compared to its BSOM-D ratio, no differences observed between “pure” 
test anxiety and depression groups make this hypothesis less plausible unless the schema 
is activated differently for the comorbid condition and “pure” conditions. More likely, 
depression’s common psychopathology factor added to test anxiety’s maladaptive nature, 
resulting in the more maladaptive overall profile of the anxiety-relevant cognitive 
content, contributing evidence to the primacy of depression over anxiety.  
It is more difficult to explain the differences between the disorder-relevant ratios 
for the control group than their magnitude. Perhaps, the fact that the subjects took the 
survey around testing time made a significant impact on the test anxious cognitions of 
controls, indicating that situational variables cannot be discarded when assessing 
cognitions. To test for this, future studies need factor in “induction” of depression along 
with that of anxiety. Further, the contrast between identical interval patterns for the 
“pure” groups and content dissimilarity for the “mixed” group is somewhat puzzling. It 
may reflect that depression component plays a more significant role when it is 
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compounded by anxiety rather than when it is by itself, evidencing the effect of anxiety 
rather than depression observed earlier.  
5.2.3.2 Cognitive Balance 
Anxiety versus Depression. 
When looking at anxiety-depression differentiation, the authors of the original 
SOM model indicate that mild (subclinical) psychopathology, such as anxiety and 
depression, is associated with equal proportion of negative and positive thoughts 
(Schwartz & Garamoni, 1986). Indeed, in this study, both test anxiety and depression 
were found to have unique BSOM ratios that fell within the theory-defined dysfunctional 
range, associated with approximately same total frequency of positive and negative 
cognitions. Comorbid group, however, yielded true asymmetry of negatively-valenced 
test anxious content but not of depressive content (the latter was no more dysfunctional 
than that of the depressed group). Thus, college students even with a moderate degree of 
self-reported affective symptomatology seldom engage in inner speech where negative 
thoughts outweigh positive, with cognitive symmetry varying depending on the disorder 
content and, possibly, appropriateness of situation.  
Normality versus Psychopathology. 
Segal (1988) points out that when looking at psychopathology versus normality, it 
is important to ascertain whether controls would have a bias of positive constructs over 
negative constructs or whether they have a balance of both types of constructs. According 
to the BSOM theory, this question becomes modified, i.e., whether the controls would 
have cognitions in equilibrium (optimal functioning) or whether their ratios would be 
positively or negatively biased in respect to the balance point. This study did not provide 
a clear answer to this question. Overall, the control group demonstrated preponderance of 
positive over negative thoughts (as expected based on the BSOM model). The BSOM 
positive bias, however, was observed only on test anxious content and not depressive 
content, where it approached equilibrium. Such disparity may reflect complexity of 
variable affecting the BSOM ratios.  
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5.2.4 Summary 
Current investigation offers support for theoretical postulates of the CCS and joint 
CCS/BSOM models for cognitive facets of test anxiety, depression, comorbidity, and low 
pathology condition in college women. Successful separation of depressed and test 
anxious groups based on their respective cognitive output variables serves to strengthen 
the claim of the cognitive theorists that depression and anxiety can be cognitively 
differentiated. Further, because depression and test anxiety can be separated 
methodologically, meaningful examination of other cognitive and non-cognitive 
differences between the two becomes possible. Cognitive specificity research is expected 
to lay foundation and provide valuable data for the development of behavioral, emotional, 
and motivational specificity frameworks for anxiety and depression, many of which are 
still in the embryonic state. Given the comorbidity of affective disorders in the real world 
and the complexities of the anxiety-depression relationship, it is evident that valence and 
cognitive content will continue playing an essential role in their future cognitive 
accounts, but the situational factors cannot be discarded.  
Not only does the knowledge of automatic cognition profiles of depressed and test 
anxious college women contribute to the understanding of these two disorders, it also has 
potential treatment implications. Thus, in the following section, the clinical implications 
of the findings will be explored, including conceptualization and identification of both 
test anxiety and depression, as well as significance of the results for the treatment of these 
conditions. 
 
5.3 Clinical Implications 
5.3.1 Disorder Conceptualization and Identification 
Cognitive content specificity contributes to the clinical field by helping elucidate 
whether cognitive content measured by self-report instruments is useful in differentiating 
anxiety and depression. By identifying cognitive products that can be potentially used for 
setting depression apart from test anxiety in clinical settings, this study suggests that a 
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clinician can utilize BSOM ratios with relevant disorder content to capture depression 
and test anxiety. This task is particularly relevant for depression in the light of the 
overlap between clinical mood and anxiety disorders (see Chapter 2) and the DSM-IV 
placing affective and motivational factors at the heart of depressive disorders (in contrast 
to mostly cognitive factors at the core of several anxiety disorders).  
In terms of test anxiety, current study attempted to bridge the gap between clinical 
and psychoeducational fields of study by incorporating a nonclinical disorder within the 
framework of the clinically-based theory and research. This was accomplished by pairing 
test anxiety with a subclinical expression of depression. As a result, the test anxious 
cognitive set mostly succeeded in holding its own against depressogenic thoughts. It may 
be premature, however, to conceive formulation of test anxiety as a distinct clinical entity 
because clinical methods were not used to identify its presence, nor was its most frequent 
clinical correlate (i.e., social phobia) investigated in the study. Given the increasing role 
of tests in our culture, as conceptualization of test anxiety grows more refined and more 
is known about its relationship with social phobia, the circumscribed nature of test 
anxiety is likely to expand to become more comprehensive and applicable to a wider 
variety of settings and population groups.  
Comorbidity findings also hold important clinical promise. Regardless of this 
study’s important theoretical ramifications for those with “pure” depression, in clinical 
practice the performance of the depression-only group has limited generalization, as 
depression has been shown to have very high comorbidity rates with various anxiety 
disorders, including test anxiety disorder (see Chapter 2). Moreover, finding depression 
in isolation may be even a more difficult task than finding anxiety without depressive 
symptoms, as confirmed by this study (see Chapter 3). Although this overlap could have 
resulted from the presence of a test anxiety-activating event in the absence of a 
depression-activation event, a true co-occurrence of symptomatic depression with test 
anxiety in a nonclinical population cannot be excluded.  
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The dysfunctional nature of the comorbid group, which was supported by all three 
hypotheses (i.e., frequent negative cognitions, low positive cognitions, and relatively low 
BSOM ratios falling within the most dysfunctional interval), makes this group 
particularly vulnerable to development and maintenance of clinical-level 
psychopathology. The presence of depressive-test anxious symptomatology should serve 
as a red flag for mental health professionals. Specifically, if comorbid condition yields 
the most cognitive impairment, then it is also likely to be associated with most 
occupational impairment (including lowered academic performance and dropout), a 
finding of utmost importance for any college advisor, counselor, or educational 
psychologist. Psychological and psychoeducational assessments of depression in college 
students may warrant screenings for test anxiety because the latter may add to the already 
negativistic profile of depressive cognitions. Early identification of the individuals at risk 
based on cognitive (as well as emotional and behavioral) symptoms, and the use of 
preventative interventions are likely to be a key to improved functioning.  
5.3.2 Treatment Implications 
Conceptualization of test anxiety and depression is closely related to their 
treatment. Cognitive therapy (CT) has been shown to be efficacious with college students 
when addressing the symptoms of both test anxiety and depression (e.g., A.T. Beck & 
Emery, 1985; A.T. Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1996; A.T. Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 
1979). Cognitive and cognitive-behavioral strategies instruct individuals that they can 
alter their thoughts, feelings, and behaviors through self-control. They are taught skills 
that regulate thoughts and moods, i.e., how to identify and modify dysfunctional thinking, 
including negative patterns of thinking in specific situations related to depressive or 
anxiety actions. Common CT techniques include: recoding dysfunctional thinking, 
examining the validity and basis of each thought, empirically testing beliefs, and 
practicing more functional responses to those (Jacobson et al., 1996). In therapeutic 
interventions, modification of cognitions is vital for the immediate alleviation of distress 
associated with anxiety and depression, as well as long-term preventive goals. Besides 
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traditional modes of CT, highly accessible cognitive products in depression and test 
anxiety yield themselves to a computer-based therapy. Characterized by a high attrition 
rate (Orbach, Lindsay, & Grey, 2007), such type of therapy may be more applicable to 
test anxiety treatment rather than depression, as depressed patients are characterized by 
low motivation and withdrawal from many life events (in contrast with test anxious 
students who tend to withdraw just from evaluation-related situations). Computer-
delivered, evidence-based programs in test anxiety (e.g., Orbach et al.) hold promise.  
5.3.2.1 Role of the CCS Model 
Support for Hypothesis 1 suggests several important points. First, the respective 
content of test anxiety and depression likely plays an important role in those disorders. 
Addressing recurrent themes is a crucial step in cognitive therapy, as those themes lead to 
the underlying beliefs. Second, addressing frequency of cognitions is equally important 
for both depression and test anxiety. In terms of valence, if negative thoughts appear to 
evidence better discrimination power than positive thoughts alone, then the CT 
practitioner would need to focus on teaching clients to identify crucial negative thoughts 
and modify those or replace them with more adaptive ones. Furthermore, if positive 
thinking is as not as specific as negative thinking, then the utility of focusing on positive 
content in treatment of this disorder is placed under question since it is mostly unique 
elements of a disorder that guide intervention (Garber & Hollon, 1991; cited in D. A. 
Clark & Steer, 1996). However, despite its dubious role in disorder differentiation, 
positive talk can still be useful in therapy. The overall level of positive thinking was low 
in both test anxiety and depression and much lower than that of controls, evidencing need 
for intervention. In addition, if positive thoughts fluctuate more and are not part of a rigid 
cognitive set, they may be more susceptible to modifications than more stable negative 
thoughts.  
Overall, the data imply that it is not sheer presence of the content-relevant thought 
but also its valence and frequency that are a part of the maintenance of depression and 
test anxiety. Thus, for a clinician, it is crucial to monitor all these intracognitive 
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components. Moreover, clinical practice can help guide the theory by identifying other 
key elements of cognition in mood and anxiety disorders.  
5.3.2.2 Role of the BSOM Model 
Support for Hypothesis 2 provides important benefits for the utility of the 
cognitive ratios in the treatment of depression and test anxiety. On a general note, a 
concept of balance holds intuitive appeal because there is no assumption about stability 
of cognitive content but rather that predominance of negatively-valenced thoughts is 
associated with significant psychopathology, giving a clinician a broader field of content 
exploration and more content flexibility with the client (Ronan & Kendall, 1997). The 
BSOM ratios serve as an easy-to-implement method for disorder differentiation, allowing 
one to intervene with psychopathology earlier. Understanding the role of negativity 
within the cognitive balance can be useful for some clients who have a difficult time 
letting go of negative cognitive routines and are prone to cognitive distortions, such as 
disqualifying the positive, generalization of the negative, etc. Similarly, excessive 
positivity is not always helpful, as it may be associated with denial and “gloss-over” 
coping styles; therefore, clients who are typically resistant to identifying any negative 
thoughts also would benefit from the optimality approach.  
Cognitive balance can serve to gauge treatment effectiveness, as it successfully 
differentiates pathology from normalcy. The SOM/BSOM model can be utilized to 
visually track the cognitive changes of the intervention either throughout treatment or by 
taking pre- and post- measurements; thus, lending itself to more empirically-based 
interventions (Bruch et al., 1991; Ronan & Kendall, 1997). The visual and concrete 
nature of the model may allow us to reach those with somewhat more limited cognitive 
skills than what is typically required for successful CT.  
5.3.2.3 Cognitive Therapy of Depression 
Beck’s cognitive therapy (A.T. Beck et al., 1979; A.T. Beck & Emery, 1985) 
remains one of first-line empirically-supported psychosocial interventions for depression. 
Within the repertoire of cognitive skills utilized by CT, the primary skill taught is the 
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STOP technique, a thought interruption method developed by Meichenbaum (1977), 
which uses audiotapes and written affirmations to combine visual cues with thought 
alterations in order to interfere with negative thinking. Once the negative flow is 
interrupted, a more positive thought (or affirmation) is inserted. Aaron Beck postulated 
that deeply-rooted cognitive structures are at the heart of cognitive therapy. However, 
some believe that modifying schemas may not be as effective for depression treatment as 
modifying automatic thoughts (e.g., Barber & DeRubeis, 1989; cited in Teasdale et al., 
2002). John Teasdale and his colleagues proposed that it is cognitive products, which are 
less stable than structures and are activated/become accessible even in mild cases of 
depression that are crucial for the depression therapy outcome and relapse prevention 
(Persons & Miranda, 1992; Teasdale, 1983, 1988; all cited in Teasdale et al.). Preliminary 
empirical evidence appears to be supportive of this hypothesis (e.g., Ingram, Miranda, & 
Segal, 1998; cited in Teasdale et al.). Cognitive therapy based on this perspective focuses 
on repeatedly identifying negative thoughts as they arise, and distancing oneself from 
them to evaluate the accuracy of their content (i.e., ‘decentering’) (Teasdale et al.).  
The above-mentioned cognitive techniques are likely to be beneficial when 
dealing with depression in college students. Support for cognitive content specificity in 
the current study indicates that college women with depression would benefit from 
programming that addresses thoughts with both negative and positive content. These 
thoughts are reflective of the increased frequency of typically depressive themes of loss 
and deprivation and low frequency of positive thoughts related to the self, the world, and 
the future.  
5.3.2.4 Cognitive Therapy of Test Anxiety 
Psychosocial treatment of test anxiety has changed with each of its new 
conceptualizations, from relaxation training to systematic desensitization, to attention 
training, to skills training, to cognitive approaches (Orbach et al., 2007). Treatments 
corresponding to all these perspectives have been successful in reducing test anxiety, but 
cognitive therapy alone (particularly, cognitive restructuring) or in combination with 
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skills or emotion-focused training has worked best in terms of produced effect sizes (for 
review, see Ergene, 2003; Vagg & Spielberger, 1995). Beck’s cognitive therapy model 
can be successfully applied to evaluation anxieties, including test anxiety (A.T. Beck, 
1989; A.T. Beck et al., 1996). In addition to altering their cognitions, reducing emotional 
arousal of test anxious students via systematic desensitization may also be effective, as it 
can help lower the frequency of unwanted thoughts and retrieval difficulties that follow 
(Naveh-Benjamin, 1991).  
Similar to depression, cognitive therapy of test anxiety centers on relieving 
individual of burdensome thoughts, which in turn may interfere with one’s ability to 
perform and/or feel comfortable in testing situations, for example, via increasing self-
monitoring and practicing self-control during testing situations. Consistent with the 
current results, literature supports a selective approach when interfering with positive test 
anxious cognitions in that teaching positive self-talk has been found to thwart the 
frequency of negative thoughts only for a select group of highly test anxious college 
students, i.e., whose cognitive style does not include vivid imagery (Kurtz & Wyatt, 
1996). Examination of test anxiety specificity in the current study indicates that the 
automatic thoughts of college women with test anxiety are marked by high unique 
negativity in the evaluative domain (including themes of evaluative threat for self, 
performance, and opinion of others). This could suggest programming that emphasizes 
the development of less negative thought processes with test anxious content as a primary 
focus.  
5.3.2.5 Cognitive Therapy of Comorbid Condition 
Although well researched, comorbidity of depression and anxiety is often 
neglected in devising treatment plans. Most intervention programs for anxiety and 
depression target those conditions separately (van Lang et al., 2006). A practice of 
singling out one disorder to treat also holds true in a larger scheme of psychopathology, 
despite a widespread preponderance of comorbid conditions and the fact that treating 
anxiety and mood disorders in sequence is not always efficient in terms of cost and time 
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(Craske, Anthony, & Barlow, 1997; Foa & Rotnbaum, 1998; Steketee, 1993; all cited in 
Persons et al., 2006). The issue whether treating clients with a technique for a single 
disorder is beneficial to them is still being debated. Although comorbid depression may 
not have a damaging effect on the course of the anxiety treatment, targeting anxiety alone 
is not likely to result in post-treatment improvement in depression scores (Joormann, 
Kosfelder, & Schulte, 2005; McLean, Woody, Taylor, & Koch, 1998). Popular cognitive 
approaches based on Beck’s theory, such as Mind over Mood (Greenberger & Padesky, 
1995) are suitable for both anxiety and depression. However, the empirical evidence on 
validating these approaches with college students is yet to be amassed.  
The present study did not answer the question as to whether the disorder 
components need to be treated in sequence or simultaneously, but the performance of the 
comorbid group across hypotheses suggests that despite the likely primacy of depression 
in comorbid condition, it is likely that the uniqueness of test anxiety would make it 
necessary to target its specific content separately in addition to that of depression. These 
predictions, however, remain but a speculation until further research is done.   
5.3.3 Summary 
The differentiating role of negative and positive automatic cognitions and their 
BSOM ratios in the profiles of depression and test anxiety places them at the core of 
disorder maintenance and alleviation. Cognitive therapy, which involves modifying 
automatic thoughts, has been successful in treatment of depression and test anxiety 
separately and can be applied to their comorbid condition. Compared to a traditional 
focus of treatment on either negative or positive content, cognitive ratios can provide 
additional benefits in assessment and intervention. The findings highlight the need to 
improve test anxiety clinical conceptualization and instrumentation, expand cognitive 
interventions to incorporate BSOM ratios into depression and test anxiety treatment 
protocols, and continue investigating methods of successful identification and treatment 
for comorbid condition.  
 
 146 
Next, the strengths and shortcoming of the current study are discussed.  
5.4 Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
The study’s limitations have to do with its design, scope, instruments and 
measurement, procedure, and sample.  
5.4.1 Design 
In terms of design, not addressing causality has been a criticism of most CCS 
research to date, as support for the CCS hypothesis “neither rules in nor rules out the 
causality” of the variables under study (Garber & Hollon, 1991, p. 131). Similar to most 
specificity studies, this study did not examine causality directly and only looked at the 
differences between groups. It must be noted that although specificity designs are an 
important initial step towards the identification of potential causality (Garber & Hollon, 
1991), a relationship between the affective state and cognitions is a part of a complex 
multivariate process, and cognitive variables alone are unlikely to be a sufficient cause of 
the disorder (Garber & Hollon, 1991; Ingram & Malcarne, 1995). Moreover, since it is 
well established that psychopathological conditions and cognitive factors are a part of the 
circular loop, it may be impossible to exactly pinpoint the causal chain. Despite this 
dilemma, prospective designs should strive to extend current descriptive models to 
determine if cognition is a part of depression and test anxiety etiology. In the absence of 
such designs in the area, specificity models do help confirm that cognitive phenomena are 
involved in the onset and/or maintenance of the psychopathology (Garber and Hollon, 
1991). Another design shortcoming was not addressing the temporal component of the 
anxiety-depression relationship, which has been the focus of recent theoretical work (see 
Chapter 2). Longitudinal studies may serve to resolve the issue.  
5.4.2 Scope 
5.4.2.1 Models and Model Elements 
Given the success of the present integrative attempt, future research should strive 
to continue expanding the scope of models examined to explore the commonalities and 
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differences between depression and anxiety in more depth. For example, specificity 
models could be augmented by including the measures of general distress and positive 
and negative affectivity, which would allow one to test for affective and cognitive 
predictions of the tripartite, CCS, and BSOM models simultaneously. A study by 
McKellar et al. (1996) suggested that the influence of negative affect may explain the 
most dysfunctional cognitive thought patterns of the comorbid group. R. Beck et al. 
(2003) note that most integrative efforts until recently have failed to assess the tripartite 
model completely in one sample. Moreover, there are several models that yield 
themselves to CCS and BSOM but have not been investigated extensively (e.g, Lightsey, 
1994 a, b). Researchers have suggested that structural equation modeling is better suited 
for identifying the unique and common cognitive elements that contribute to symptoms 
and evaluating their magnitudes simultaneously than a methodological strategy of 
comparing group differences in cognitive content used in this study (Cho & Telch, 2005). 
Additionally, such approach allows to incorporate continuous assessment of depression 
and anxiety.  
5.4.2.2 Affective Variables 
Comprehensive CCS efforts should also consider expanding the scope of 
independent variables in order to address additional affective confounding issues. For 
example, the results of the current study were likely to be clouded by comorbidity of 
anxiety and depression with such conditions as social anxiety and generalized anxiety. 
For example, it has been shown that social anxiety frequently co-occurs with test anxiety 
or could be encompassing it (see Chapter 2). Anger is another important variable for 
cognitive-affective exploration simultaneously with depression and anxiety. In addition to 
worry and other signs of generalized anxiety, depression is often associated with feelings 
of hostility (A. Brown & Zeichner, 1989; Fava, Anderson, & Rosenbaum, 1990; Fava, 
Rosenbaum, Pava, & McCarthy, 1993). Preliminary research on content differentiation of 
anger, depression, and anxiety with children and adults (Calvete et al., 2005a, 2005b; 
Schniering & Rapee, 2004) yields optimistic results in that anger can hold its own against 
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depression and anxiety, despite sharing the overall high negative and low positive 
cognition profile with it.  
5.4.2.3 Cognitive Variables 
The present study is further limited by the scope of its cognitive dependent 
variables. First, only automatic thoughts were explored and no connection was tested to 
the underlying cognitive structures or processes, which are vital for the CCS models 
(A.T. Beck, 1976; Ingram & Kendall, 1987; Kendall & Ingram, 1987). A narrow range of 
cognitive measures is partly explained by shortage of the CCS-relevant test anxiety 
cognitive instruments that are directly comparable to depression in valence. Schema 
specificity studies in test anxiety are missing. Due to test anxiety having a strong 
achievement component, it is of interest to identify what role an achievement schema (an 
“autonomy” concept in Beck’s theory; A.T. Beck et al., 1983, 1987) may play in test 
anxiety. In addition to schematic differences, the content of cognitive interference in test 
anxiety and depression is of importance to the CCS hypothesis and needs to be studied 
(see Klinger, 1996). Overall, future research should strive to establish a link between 
cognitions and cognitive structures and processes. Researchers are encouraged to expand 
the range of cognitive variables implicated in the differentiation of test anxiety and 
depression (see D.A. Clark, 1988) and to devise new test anxiety-relevant cognitive 
instruments that would tap into its schematic content and allow for the cross-content 
comparison with depression.  
5.4.2.4 Intracognitive Elements  
In addition to a limited number of cognitive variables addressed, the present 
research did not investigate many intracognitive elements besides valence, content, and 
frequency (with the latter not examined separately from the other two components). 
Although in the current study automatic thought content was established as a basis for 
differentiation of anxiety and depression, specific aspects instrumental to the distinction 
were not identified and may lie outside the sheer content or valence of the automatic 
thoughts. Such important elements relating to cognitions include: form, intrusiveness, 
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controllability, intensity, and salience (D.A Clark, 1986; DiNardo & Barlow, 1990; Glass 
& Arnkoff, 1997). Moreover, recent research appears to be shifting towards the 
exploration of metacognition rather than surface cognitions. It has been proposed that it is 
not the content of thoughts per se but the level of endorsement of negative metacognitive 
beliefs that is more important for differentiation of various anxiety disorders (Wells & 
Carter, 2000; cited in D.A. Clark, 2001) and pathology from normality (Ingram & 
Kendall, 1987). Thus, what one thinks may be less important than how one interprets and 
responds to thinking (D.A. Clark), including such facets of cognitions as unacceptability, 
believability, and importance.  
Secondly, despite promising preliminary results, there potential problem with the 
BSOM model applied to the CCS of test anxiety, which lies within the concept of 
cognitive interference. This process is essential to test anxiety and encompasses a lot of 
neutrally-valenced cognitions, e.g., thinking about members of one’s family, about what 
happened earlier, etc. (see Sarason et al., 1986; I.G. Sarason & Sarason, 1987). It is likely 
then that neutral cognition could play a role in the cognitive balance of test anxiety or any 
anxiety disorder that incorporates neutral thinking in its cognitive system. The idea of 
including neutral thoughts in the cognitive ratios is not new (see Heimberg et al., 1990; 
Kendall, Howard, & Hays, 1989), but precise ratio structure and parameters unique to 
this disorder await exploration.  
5.4.3 Methodology 
Besides the criticisms related to the design and scope, this study has several 
significant methodological limitations, mostly related to instruments and assessment, 
group selection, procedure, and sample. Prior to addressing those limitations, the study’s 
contributions must be discussed. 
5.4.3.1 Assessment Contributions 
In terms of affective assessment, current findings lay groundwork for the utility of 
the TAI in CCS research and add to the body of nonclinical specificity literature with the 
BDI-II. In the realm of cognitive measures, the results concur with the position of some 
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researchers (e.g., Sanz & Avia, 1994) that by using instruments with disorder-specific 
content one can obtain evidence in favor of cognitive content specificity. Establishing 
that cognitions play an important role in differentiation of test anxiety from depression 
should, in turn, have an impact on the measurement of the two disorders, as discriminant 
validity of instruments of the two disorders can be enhanced by including more 
cognitively loaded items (D. A. Clark & Steer, 1996).  
Moreover, present results add to the existing body of evidence for the use of the 
ATQ-N and ATQ-P in CCS studies with nonclinical populations (e.g., Bruch et al., 2003; 
Ingram, 1989a, 1989b; McDermut & Haaga, 1994; Sanz & Avia, 1994). Specificity of the 
ATQ-N to depressive symptomatology has been challenged by some, as it has been often 
shown to correlate strongly with a measure of trait anxiety (Hollon & Kendall, 1980) and 
has not always shown adequate depression-anxiety group differentiation in CCS studies 
of social phobia (Sanz & Avia, 1994, study 2). However, in this study, it has reliably set 
apart depressed participants from the non-depressed and test anxious ones and yielded a 
low correlation with the measure of test anxiety, pointing to its adequate differentiating 
ability. When measuring positive content, researchers have long expressed doubts about 
the ATQ-P’s specificity to any particular psychopathological state and the CCS research 
mostly did not find support for the depressive content differentiation (e.g., Bruch et al., 
2003; Ingram, 1989a). Contrary to this conclusion, current findings support the measure’s 
adequate ability to discriminate between depressive symptoms and a specific type of 
anxiety.  
In the realm of test anxious thinking, this study provides initial evidence for the 
validity and differentiating ability of the frequency-version of the CPNT. However, a lack 
of previous psychometric research for the frequency version of the CPNT results in its 
limited generalizability. Further studies are required to validate this instrument.  
5.4.3.2 Use of Self-Statements 
A more general criticism involves the use of self-statement instruments. Exclusive 
reliance on such questionnaire measures may not be an optimal way to thoroughly test the 
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underlying cognitive mechanisms (Yee & Vaughan, 1996). A shortcoming of survey 
instruments is a selective memory bias, i.e., potential inconsistencies due to memory 
failure (Galassi et al., 1981a; Calvete et al., 2005a). Since the measures were 
administered retrospectively, it is unclear to what extent the recall of negative or positive 
content could have been biased by the current emotional state (Galassi et al., 1981a), as a 
questionnaire approach includes more reactivity potential than other assessment measures 
(Prins & Hanewald, 1997). Another important point is that restrospective recall is often 
contaminated by the appraisal of situation and attributions of success/failure, and 
endorsement is made based on implicit theories of the individual’s thoughts and feelings 
rather than actual cognitions (Prins & Hanewald, 1997; Ronan et al., 1994). Although 
most of the current data were obtained prior to actual grades announcement and, 
therefore, might have not been largely contaminated by the students’ appraisal of that 
event, the possibility of biased recall should not be excluded.  
Subjects tend to under- and overreport their symptoms and cognitions because 
individuals often attach a different meaning to the same item. Social desirability of 
questionnaire measures is often cited as another limitation and may have been at work in 
this study. Personal meaning of intrusive thoughts is related to how distressing the 
thought is (Purdon, 2000; cited in D.A. Clark, 2001); thus, retrospective self-report 
instruments are biased in that respondents tend to suppress the thoughts that are not 
socially desirable or cause distress. Although the anonymous and computer-based 
administration (which eliminates viewing the examiner and, therefore, excludes a 
potential “judging” factor) makes social desirability less likely to be of significance, 
future use of prospective methods and inclusion of a measure of social desirability would 
allow to mitigate this problem. 
Current categorical nature of cognitive questionnaire measures (i.e., negative or 
positive valence) has also been criticized by some researchers (e.g., Conroy & Metzler, 
2004), who note that applying a dimensional approach (e.g., identifying to what degree 
the statement is positive or negative) may prove more useful because not all statements 
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within one category are equivalent. Conroy and Metzler suggest that one potential 
direction for reconceptualization of self-talk and giving it more personal meaning is the 
well-researched in psychotherapy and psychopathology circumplex model named the 
Structural Analysis of Social Behavior (SASB; Benjamin, 1996; cited in Conroy & 
Metzler). To address the complexity of cognition, rating criteria of self-report measures 
warrant expansion. 
Finally, one should be cautioned that although the presence of differences 
between depression and anxiety in self-statement cognitions is reassuring, it does not 
mean that the differences would be found using other types of assessment (Laurent & 
Stark, 1993). 
5.4.3.3 Calculation of the BSOM Ratios 
Another assessment issue that deserves attention is the calculation of the BSOM 
ratios. The ratio calculation method used in this study (see section 3.6.2.2) is only one of 
several found in the literature. A variety of the BSOM ratio calculation methods makes a 
task of cross-study interval comparison and generalization rather difficult, especially in 
the light of the ratio sensitivity to the assessment method. To address unequal numbers of 
positive and negative statements, this study has utilized multiplication by a constant (e.g., 
McDermut & Haaga, 1994). Other methods have included selecting an equal number of 
items from those that best differentiate pathology from the lack of thereof. In a procedure 
termed “criterion keying”, the items with the highest discrimination ability are chosen 
based on a statistical test (e.g., t-tests or discriminant function analysis with self-talk as a 
predictor variable; Calvete & Cardeñoso, 2002; Ronan & Kendall, 1997). Yet another 
method has to do with “rational” choice (e.g., Calvete & Cardeñoso; Ronan & Kendall), 
whereby an equal number of items is selected to ensure content variety, based on highest 
loading on the corresponding factor selected if the items are similar. In Calvete and 
Cardeñoso’s study, rationally-derived BSOM ratios produced the results different from 
the criterion-keyed ratios, with the latter having more positive average group ratios. It is 
important to give consideration to the method of the BSOM ratio calculation because it 
 153 
can impact the parameters of the BSOM interval, as well as the number of participants 
falling within the specific intervals. More research identifying preferable calculation 
methods is needed.  
The results also highlight that while the BSOM intervals appear to be more 
accurate in differentiating pathology from normality and capturing “normality” and 
“pure” conditions, they may be too precise for the higher levels of psychopathology 
(comorbid condition). One solution could be to address the exact conditions of their 
original derivation (Schwartz, 1997), including stress level and mood. Theoretical 
explorations incorporating those confounding factors await development. 
5.4.3.4 Intracontent Elements 
Whereas many limitations above were related to the breadth of variables involved, 
current criticism has to do with the depth of assessment and analyses and can be also tied 
to design (see section 5.4.1 above). There is preliminary evidence that specific content 
areas within depressive cognitions may be the key to improving the discriminating ability 
of positive and negative self-statements (e.g., Calvete & Connor-Smith, 2005), as well as 
the BSOM ratios (e.g., Fichten et al., 1991; Calvete & Cardeñoso, 2002). Both depression 
and test anxiety yield several intracontent elements but, unlike depression, the elements 
in test anxious content have not been explored.  
Unfortunately, current cognitive scales do not allow for discrimination between 
various intracontent characteristics of the automatic thoughts, which in turn limits 
researchers in performing direct group comparisons on those characteristics. Thus, factor 
analysis followed by content analysis of cognitive measures is often desirable when 
addressing content specificity. Content exploration studies offer directions for 
differentiation of anxious and depressive cognitions and their respective BSOM ratios, 
which may prove useful in devising new theoretical models. In addition to intracontent 
analysis, individual item analysis may be beneficial, as total scores may obscure 
individual’s endorsement of a particular symptom. Furthermore, multidimensional 
cognitive assessment tools need to be developed and validated for anxiety (for an attempt, 
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see R. Beck et al., 2003) and possibly for depression. As content heterogeneity is not 
limited to cognitive measures, isolating subsets of symptoms to examine specificity 
within those, as opposed to the entire cluster of symptoms can offer yet another strategy 
for the refinement of cognitive specificity (R. Beck & Perkins, 2001). 
5.4.3.5 Group Selection 
As it has largely succeeded in setting apart the depressed and comorbid groups, 
this study adds to the validity evidence in support of empirical cutoffs for depression 
(A.T. Beck et al., 1996; Dozois et al., 1998). There are several concerns regarding group 
sorting, however, that are worth noting. Some researchers challenge the accuracy of the 
cutoff scores, calling for consistent parameters to form groups with depression. For 
example, a group of researchers suggested that comorbid group is typically 
heterogeneous; thus, a depression cutoff for the comorbid group should be different from 
that for a “purely” depressed group, at least in clinical populations (Sloan, Marx, & 
Bradley, 2002). Further, others challenge the appropriateness of the cutoff scores 
altogether. For example, Ruscio and Ruscio (2002) conducted an analysis of the latent 
structure of the BDI-measured depression in a large college student sample, which 
provided evidence of the dimensionality of depression and against the use of the BDI to 
classify participants into groups. Further, on a more general note, it can be argued that 
using cutoffs to put participants in groups with either presence or absence of a certain 
disorder is a categorical approach and is inconsistent with the literature advocating the 
use of continuous assessment in disorder identification.  
Another issue has to do with control group selection. Individuals with low self-
reported levels of depression and anxiety do not necessarily represent a psychologically 
healthy and/or typical “control” population. In other words, reporting fewer symptoms of 
depression and anxiety does not guarantee that the group is pathology free, as it may be 
indicative of a response bias and/or maladaptive coping (e.g., denial), sometimes 
associated with confounding psychopathologies. Therefore, it may be more prudent to 
select control group with average levels of internalizing disorders rather than with low 
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levels. Moreover, although it was feasible in the current study, using a 
psychopathological control group in addition to nonclinical controls may prove useful. 
5.4.3.6 Procedure 
In regards to the procedure, a significant limitation of this study was its one-time, 
single-method, single-measure, single-informant assessment. The present results cannot 
be generalized easily to the individuals with true psychopathology even on a subdromal 
level, as symptoms (especially, depressive ones) tend to fluctuate widely, and one-time 
presence of such symptoms is not necessarily indicative of a disorder. A similar argument 
can be applied to the cognitive measures. Different findings are sometimes obtained on 
both cognitive and affective measures depending on the data-recording method (Arnkoff 
& Smith, 1988; Glass & Arnkoff, 1997). Although pervasiveness of a negative depressive 
bias has been demonstrated by research (e.g., Persons & Miranda, 1988; Teasdale & 
Dent, 1987; both cited in Teasdale et al., 2002), given the fluctuation of depression over 
time and proposed instability of the positive cognitions, multiple-point/multistage, 
multimeasure, and multimethod approach is advocated in order to improve validity of 
assessment and its generalization (e.g., Ingram et al., 1987; Laurent & Stark, 1993; 
Ronan & Kendall, 1997). For example, students can be screened for depression and 
anxiety first (e.g., for trait symptoms or diagnosis) and then administered the affective 
and cognitive measures of various types (e.g., self-report and interview); thus, ensuring 
that depression and anxiety are still present.  
In the realm of the BSOM ratios, future studies should explore convergence of 
different types of cognitive ratios, such as affective and cognitive one or use different 
BSOM assessment methods, such as Semantic Function Assessment Measure (SFAM, 
Ingram, 1990; cited in Nasby & Russell, 1997). Given the complexity of the affect-
cognition relationship, it is possible that averaging across various BSOM ratios may yield 
a better overall estimate of the individual’s functioning than when relying exclusively on 
a single type of the ratio.  
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Next, the specific classes, in which participants were enrolled while completing 
the measures, were not identified. Certain subject areas, such as statistics, typically 
engender more test anxiety than others. Statistics test anxiety is prevalent in college 
students (Onwuegbuzie, 1995) and yields preponderance of women over men (Benson, 
1989; Demaria-Mitton, 1987; both cited in Onwuegbuzie, 1995). Thus, the number of 
students enrolled in statistics courses might have varied across groups and, therefore, led 
to confounded findings.  
Yet another procedural limitation is that the ‘before’, ‘after’, and ‘before-after’ 
categories of participants were grouped together in order to maximize the number of 
subjects with test anxiety. Although there were no differences in test anxiety between the 
participants in terms of the time of test taking, the item content, particularly for the test 
anxious group, might have meant different things to those subsets of participants because 
in the ‘before’ case they were asked about their most recent test, while in the ‘after’ case 
they were asked about a specific test they had just taken.  
5.4.4 Sample 
Caution should be exercised when generalizing from the current sample. First, the 
data were collected from nonclinical participants, mostly showing subclinical levels of 
depression. It remains unclear whether the relationship between mild, moderate, and 
severe expression of depression is linear and whether a disorder expression studied in 
college students is a part of the same continuum as its clinical expression or is 
conceptually different, despite recent evidence pointing to the continuity model (e.g., 
Flett et al., 1997). Thus, generalization of the results to populations other than college 
students may be limited. What is more, in light of a relatively high number of participants 
with the scores above “severe” depression cutoff in the current study (which are not 
typically present in college student studies), one should use caution when generalizing 
the present results to other college populations. Further studies are needed with test 
anxiety and depression that would not only tap into cognitive content specificity in 
clinical versus nonclinical populations and subclinical versus clinical disorder 
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manifestations, but would also elucidate clinical appearance and levels of evaluation 
anxiety, which are not currently established.  
Next, a narrow age range of the sample, although typical of the studies with 
students from large urban universities, limits generalizability to other student samples 
from smaller universities and/or community colleges, where age ranges tend to be 
broader. The present sample was also restricted to women. A recent review of literature 
by Simonds and Whiffen (2003) showed that preponderance of women to men in 
experiencing anxiety alone and comorbid anxiety-depression is more pronounced than for 
depression alone. Further, women have been found to endorse more anxious and 
depressed negative cognitions, less positive cognitions, and lower BSOM ratios than men 
(Armstrong & Khawaja, 2002; Calvete, 2005; Roothman, Kirsten, & Wissing, 2003). 
Their negative depressive cognitions have been shown to have a different, more complex 
relationship structure than those of men (Bryant & Baxter, 1997). It has been noted that 
men may attach more importance to achievement situations that women (Dozois, 2007) 
despite generally lower levels of test anxiety (see Chapter 2 for discussion). Overall, it is 
conceivable that men’s cognitive patterns may be different from those of women in both 
“pure” disorder conditions and comorbid conditions. The study awaits replication in the 
male and mixed-sex samples.  
5.4.5 Summary 
Despite its contribution to theory, assessment, and treatment of test anxiety and 
depression, the current research suffers from many limitations typical of the other CCS 
studies of anxiety and depression. This study and other similar studies would benefit from 
expansion of their scope, including the use of more comprehensive and integrative 
approaches while simultaneously assessing unique and common disorder elements, as 
well as generating complex designs with more affective and cognitive variables. More 
research depth, including causal and temporal connections, linking cognitive output with 
structures and processes, and analyzing intracontent differences is also needed. Further, 
improvements in measurement procedures and innovative approaches towards automatic 
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thought assessment and conceptualization should be strongly considered. Until this 
research is augmented and replicated in other samples, caution should be used when 
generalizing the current results.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
The current investigation is one of very few that address cognitive content 
specificity of test anxiety, as it compares to another disorder, i.e., depression. In contrast 
to many CCS studies, which typically focus exclusively on negative thought content, 
current research zeroes in on both positive and negative content of the two 
psychopathology conditions. The present study also adds to the limited literature on 
comorbidity research by including a “mixed” test anxiety-depression group. Its 
limitations notwithstanding, the study contributes to the refinement of conceptual models 
in the area of test anxiety by attempting to attain amalgamation of existing theoretical 
perspectives in the cognitive areas of depression and anxiety. It also aims at engendering 
interest in the area of test anxiety from a clinical as well as research perspective. This 
research adds to the body of literature in content specificity of automatic cognition, as it 
strives to fill the gap in positive anxious content differentiation. Furthermore, it provides 
information that is of potential benefit to the practice of psychotherapy and counseling, 
therefore contributing to the improved understanding of test anxiety, depression, and their 
comorbid condition in the academic environment.  
The results suggest that researchers examining cognitive content specificity of 
specific types of anxiety and depression may want to take into account the Balanced 
States of Mind model that meaningfully combines positive and negative cognitions. The 
research also highlights that using specific types of anxiety disorders is beneficial for 
depression-anxiety differentiation, but the positive anxiety content by itself may not be 
unique to test anxiety syndrome, as corroborated by many anxiety specificity studies.  
The data offer support for the utility of applying self-statements to achieve cognitive 
differentiation of test anxiety and depression. Present findings invite a conclusion that 
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automatic cognitions relevant to either disorder can be reliably differentiated in a 
nonclinical population. Cognitive specificity research offers multiple and exciting 
avenues for future exploration. It is this author’s hope that investigators take these 
opportunities to the next level and build all-inclusive, integrative models of depression 

























Test Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger et al., 1978) 
 
Instructions: Listed below are a variety of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that happen 
during and before examinations. Please read each item carefully and select only one 
answer choice for each statement out of the following: 1 = “almost never”, 2 = 
“sometimes”, 3 = “moderately often”, 4 = “often”, and 5 = “almost always”. 
 
1. I feel confident and relaxed during tests 
2. I get uneasy or upset feeling during finals 
3. I think too much about grade and it interferes with my work 
4. I freeze up on finals 
5. I think about whether I’ll get through school 
6. I get confused when working on tests 
7. I think that I am doing poorly and that interferes with my concentration 
8. I feel jittery during tests 
9. I am anxious during tests, even when I am well prepared 
10. I get uneasy feeling before getting test paper back 
11. I feel tense during tests 
12. I wish exams did not bother me so much 
13. I am so tense that my stomach gets upset during tests 
14. I defeat myself on tests 
15. I feel panicky during tests 
16. During tests, I think of failing 
17. I worry a lot before important tests 
18. My heart is beating fast during tests 
19. I worry after exam is over 




Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ-N; Hollon & Kendall, 1980) 
 
Instructions: Listed below are a variety of thoughts that pop into people’s heads. Please 
indicate how frequently, if at all, the thought occurred to you over the last week. Please 
read each item carefully and select only one answer choice for each statement out of the 
following: 1 = “not at all”, 2 = “sometimes”, 3 = “moderately often”, 4 = “often”, and 5 = 
“all the time”. 
1. I feel like I’m up against the world. 
2. I’m no good. 
3. Why can’t I ever succeed? 
4. No one understands me. 
5. I’ve let people down. 
6. I don’t think I can go on. 
7. I wish I were a better person. 
8. I’m so weak. 
9. My life’s not going the way I want it to. 
10. I’m so disappointed in myself. 
11. Nothing feels good anymore. 
12. I can’t stand this anymore. 
13. I can’t get started. 
14. What’s wrong with me? 
15. I wish I were somewhere else. 
16. I can’t get things together. 
17. I hate myself. 
18. I’m worthless. 
19. Wish I could just disappear. 
20. What’s the matter with me? 
21. I’m a loser. 
22. My life is a mess. 
23. I’m a failure. 
24. I’ll never make it. 
25. I feel so hopeless. 
26. Something has to change. 
27. There must be something wrong with me. 
28. My future is bleak. 
29. It’s just not worth it. 




Positive Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ-P; Ingram & Wisnicki, 1988) 
Instructions: Listed below are a variety of thoughts that pop into people’s heads. Please 
indicate how frequently, if at all, the thought occurred to you over the last week. Please 
read each item carefully and select only one answer choice for each statement out of the 
following: 1 = “not at all”, 2 = “sometimes”, 3 = “moderately often”, 4 = “often”, and 5 = 
“all the time”. 
1. I am respected by my peers. 
2. I have a good sense of humor. 
3. My future looks bright. 
4. I will be successful. 
5. I’m fun to be with. 
6. I am in a great mood. 
7. There are many people who care about me. 
8. I’m proud of my accomplishments. 
9. I will finish what I start. 
10. I have many good qualities. 
11. I am comfortable with life. 
12. I have a good way with others. 
13. I am a lucky person. 
14. I have friends who support me. 
15. Life is exciting. 
16. I enjoy a challenge. 
17. My social life is terrific. 
18. There’s nothing to worry about. 
19. I’m so relaxed. 
20. My life is running smoothly. 
21. I’m happy with the way I look. 
22. I take good care of myself. 
23. I deserve the best in life. 
24. Bad days are rare. 
25. I have many useful qualities. 
26. There is no problem that is hopeless. 
27. I won’t give up. 
28. I state my opinions with confidence. 
29. My life keeps getting better. 
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